

PROPERTY OF
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

OCT 1949

V. A. C.

PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES
OF
The American Philosophical
Association
1948-1949

VOLUME XXII

OF THE COMBINED PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVERAL DIVISIONS

Reprinted from THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. LVIII, No. 5,

September, 1949

METAPHYSICAL VISION¹

WE ALL KNOW that the mind does not have an eye, and yet we find it difficult to avoid the language of vision in speaking of mental processes. So deeply embedded in philosophical tradition are the idioms of "speculation," of "points of view," of "seeing" truth, of "introspection," "circumspection," and "inspection" that we are in danger of forgetting from time to time that this language is metaphorical. Though we readily agree with Aristotle that this habit of speaking is a tribute to the value of our bodily eyes, we nevertheless imagine ourselves even more readily with Plato living in dimly lighted caves or apartments, surrounded by unsubstantial phenomena and moving pictures, or we imagine that perchance we have escaped from the shadows and are being enlightened by the sun of reason itself. It would take more schoolwork than we could endure this evening to explain why, in spite of its dangers, this language of the mind's eye continues to be employed in both technical and common discourse. I shall, therefore, ask your indulgence while I fall into the ancient habit and exploit the metaphors of vision, in order to describe as simply as possible the enterprise of metaphysics.

You may recall that in metaphysical iconography the divine wisdom is represented by a single celestial eye inscribed in a luminous triangle. Have you not been struck by the uncanny effect which the picture of this solitary eye has on you? How it stares! It does not look *through* you, as it should; it merely gazes *at* you. No question lies in its look, no judgment, no idea, no wink, no sleep — that blank, all-seeing, omniscient stare; it is hardly terrifying, but it is horrible. One-eyed beings are notoriously monsters; their fishy stare is worse than the stare of fish, for we know, when we face a fish, that there is another eye on the other side of the head fixed on something else. But this so-called divine eye has a solitary as well as a vacuous look. Nothing lies behind it. Like the sense datum, as G. E. Moore describes it, this eye

¹ Presidential address delivered before the forty-fifth annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., December 27, 28, 29, 1948.

is extremely one-sided! Can this repulsive being represent divine wisdom? Or should the image of a wise being have at least two eyes and a more substantial head than is suggested by a plane triangle, however luminous? This is the question before us tonight: If Divine Wisdom had another eye, would it be useful? I find that Professor Hartshorne, our expert in these matters, has neither raised nor answered this very serious question concerning the perfection of God.

In a way, Spinoza gave God two eyes when he conceived the two infinite attributes of substance. But each attribute, precisely because it was self-limited, infinite, or perfect, had no need for the other; the two did not function together. Having a double aspect is quite different from having a pair of eyes. Let us therefore consider this evening whether a perfect mind would not be equipped better, if in place of having two faces or even two eyes each complete in its own perspective, it had, like men, a pair of eyes, both together focused on a common object.

The suggestion I wish to make to you is that though the traditional monocular mental vision has its uses, a binocular vision gives to the mind a depth effect analogous to the bodily perception of distance. When the mind's two eyes focus on a common object, they cease their vacant, omniscient staring, and their vision becomes penetrating; they look into things. Their adspecing becomes inspecting; they achieve insights. I know that a cautious philosopher avoids the term "insight" even more than "intuition." It has bad traditional connotations, especially in the plural, for persons who have insights are usually disagreeable bores. In spite of these well-founded objections to the use of "insights" on the part of philosophers, I found as I reflected on the subject that "insights" in the plural are probably more defensible than is "insight" in the singular. And it is a defense of insights as a genuine form of knowledge that I propose to make this evening. I shall not appeal, at least not intentionally, to any theory of intuition. On the contrary, it is because I wish to disregard for the present all the technical discussion of intuition that I have pitched on the non-technical and vague word "insight." My argument will be based not on a psychological analysis of knowledge, nor on epistemology of any sort. In fact, I should not call it an argument at all, for I intend to keep within the analogy suggested by the terms "vision," "sight," and "perspective."

What are these two eyes of the metaphysical mind and why are they better than one? I intend to make a distinction between scientific and philosophical knowledge. To make this distinction may seem to be in bad form, coming from an editor of a journal which has long been dedicated to the promotion of scientific philosophy, and it may seem to many of you to be a pitiful blindness that I should elaborate and belabor a distinction which really makes no difference, since these supposed "insights" do not exist in fact however much they may be appealed to in rhetoric. But it is precisely to you skeptics that I address this essay, for I hope to show that no damage is done to either science or philosophy in distinguishing them, and I hope to explain why you and I and many other would-be scientific philosophers fail, despite the best of intentions and methods, in achieving scientific results. I intend neither to praise nor to condemn this failure, but merely to throw a little metaphorical light on the metaphorical nature of metaphysical vision as distinguished from scientific.

Any science is single-eyed or single-minded. With complete devotion it fixes its scrutiny on its chosen objects, pausing neither to explain to the curious why it chose those objects nor to remind itself of the long history of its errors and discoveries. Though scientists are human and have other interests besides their science, and though they would no doubt be the first to admit that science is a human achievement, they do not permit such considerations to become distracting. Their vision is entirely fixed on a particular field. Contemporary physicists, for example, pursue relentlessly their analysis of the field of energy, though they serve to burst the human world into pieces with their centrifuges and explosions. They must explore the sources and forms of energy energetically. Whatever happens as a social consequence, be it a major or a minor earthquake, is from their perspective not applied physics but exploited physics. Physicists are not apt to take the social sciences as in any sense continuous with physics. And even social physics, so called, they regard with extreme skepticism. In short, as physicists their responsibility stops with physical discovery; let other sciences or arts claim responsibility for the use to which their discoveries are put. If they used metaphysical language they would say that their concern is entirely with the structure of physical existence and not with the implications of their discoveries for human existence. Similarly logic and semantics, to pass at once

from the most powerful to the most verbal of sciences, are true to themselves when they refuse to be diverted from analysis by either metaphysical dialectic or questions of utility. So, too, sociology, epistemology, phenomenology, value theory, psychosomatics, and whatever other brave new sciences may be born can thrive each by examining its chosen objects of study, without pausing for self-examination.

So metaphysics, too, could be a science — the science of ontology. It could ask with more precision and persistence than is ordinarily profitable, what the world is. Where must one go to get a world view? Can the world be identified when viewed, or is it merely a name for a number of things? Does it exist as things exist in it? Does it contain kinds of things in the sense that they exist in different ways? If so, what are these ways of being? Does anything exist *per se*, or do all things exist *inter se*? Such questions could be developed systematically and answered co-operatively. It should be possible to show how any existential assertion of the form xRy fits into an ontological system of such assertions. For example, the true propositions — x is father of a , child of b , loved by c , hated by d , white to e , black to f , citizen of g , alien of h , subject of i , predicate of j , present for k , absent for l , object of animal faith for s , power for u , eternal object for w , and experience for Alpha and Omega — all these propositions, if they state facts, can be construed as exhibiting types of relationships which in turn exhibit types of being. True propositions could thus be systematized not merely as logical statements, but as descriptive of states-of-affairs. These states-of-affairs would be the data for an analytic ontology, without benefit of any postulates or presuppositions other than the general rules of scientific method. No cosmology, theology, value theory, or transcendental deductions need complicate its wholehearted devotion to types of being. No claims to primacy or to ultimacy need embarrass its modest place among other sciences. There is no reason, therefore, why ontology could not be scientific enough to satisfy the fussiest logician. On such austere and possibly barren ground metaphysics could, if it chose, eke out its little life among the sciences. But it doesn't! And why should it? Is it any temptation to a metaphysician to live peacefully on such terms among scientists, when he might do battle gloriously among philosophers?

For philosophers, unlike scientists, live contentiously, and what

they euphemistically call "dialectic" is usually disputation. Their inquiries are not peaceful and co-operative, but rather the occasions where opposites meet, and their "associations" are meetings for exhibiting such oppositions. It is in this environment that at least *modern* metaphysics has chosen to live. It never has both eyes on its own field of inquiry, but always one eye on the other philosopher. It is habitually critical and not merely analytical. It lives by self-criticism, hesitation, evaluation, and complication. To its own particular concern with being it brings the added load of its own history and of human experience in general. Its ambition is not merely to be true but to be empirical as well; not merely to understand how things exist but to report man's experience with existence. Thus it struggles with a double interest in man and in nature. It tries to be scientifically philosophical. Whereas any ordinary philosopher is systematically contentious, the metaphysical philosopher is contentiously systematic, for he insists on putting the whole of human experience into scientific form and at the same time putting the whole of science into the form of human experience.

Now let me explore this predicament of modern metaphysics in terms of the metaphor of binocular vision. With one eye the metaphysician sees the field of ontology: What does it mean to be? With the other eye he sees the field of human experience: What does being mean to man? He then tries to see how these two fields can be one. He says: "Things are what they are experienced as!" To be is what it means to me to be what it means! The difficult art of focusing his two eyes makes the metaphysical beginner play the fool. He sees nothing clearly, for he always sees everything in anything. The meanings that exist in things obstruct his view of the things themselves and make them appear as mere bundles of meanings. Or the things that exist are so confused that he imagines his eyes to be clouded and tries to clear his lenses. The general effect of such failures to focus both eyes on an object is, as Emerson said of the idealist, "to see the miraculous in the common." Emerson continues with his exposition of insights: "What is a day?...What is woman?...What is sleep?... We make fables to hide the baldness of the fact and conform it, as we say, to the higher law of the mind. But when the fact is seen under the light of an idea, the gaudy fable fades and shrivels. We behold the real higher law." Now on the contrary, according to my theory of

binocular metaphysical vision, it is precisely this effort to "see the fact under the light of an idea" that is the source of metaphysical perplexity and leads the man of double vision to attempt to unite two objects into one without proper focusing. But this double seeing of existence and of experience may, when it leads to the art of focusing on a common object, produce a peculiar kind of vision, a "depth" effect, which may appropriately be named insight. Let us call it inspection, to distinguish it from both introspection and observation or "adspection." The metaphysician looks into things by correlating perspectives. Thus, for example, he asks (like Emerson), What is a penny? How does a penny exist? Will the economist answer? No, for he will tell us merely the use of a penny. But the *being* of a penny includes its appearance. So let us view a penny before using it. The real penny must be constructed out of what it appears to be. Has the economist ever stopped to examine the appearance of a penny? Somehow we must identify the penny seen and the penny used, for pennies lead this double life, and we cannot tell what a penny is without explaining how the same penny can be a sense datum and a price. This calls for multidimensional analysis, and hence there must be a metaphysics of how pennies are experienced as being.

As there is a metaphysics of pennies so there is a metaphysics of events. What is the discovery of America? Shall we ask the historian? Nowadays, indeed, we might, for the old-fashioned chronicler who would tell us *when* America was discovered has disappeared; the contemporary historian is metaphysically oriented! *When* the discovery of America *was*, who cares? What it really *is* lies in its consequences and its significance. The real being of the discovery of America who can yet tell? Before our very eyes the nature of this event is being transformed. What more may it mean in the future? The discovery of America continues to become. Such is the metaphysics of history.

Similarly there is a metaphysics of space. What is distance? Shall we ask the astronomer? What would distance be without light? And what would light be without eyes and light-years? It takes vision and time to make distance. At this point the astronomer calculates how much time it takes a given ray of light to make how much distance. But the metaphysical relativist has seen a "new light." It takes time to give space meaning. Distance is multidimensional.

So we might continue to enumerate the commonplaces of contemporary metaphysics. But add together the metaphysics of pennies, of times, and spaces, and other things, and we get the familiar metaphysics of nature. Emerson's version of this metaphysics, though not contemporary, will serve as well as any to illustrate what I have termed the binocular way of viewing the world. I select a few well-known passages from his *Nature*.

Man is an analogist and studies relations in all objects. He is placed in the center of beings, and a ray of relation passes from every other being to him. And neither can man be understood without these objects, nor these objects without man. All the facts in natural history taken by themselves have no value, but are barren, like a single sex. But marry it to human history, and it is full of life. . . . Nature is thoroughly mediate. It is made to serve. . . . All things are moral, and in their boundless changes have an unceasing reference to spiritual nature. . . . To this one end of discipline all parts of nature conspire. . . . It is a sufficient account of that appearance we call the world that God will teach a human mind. . . . Therefore is space, and therefore time, that man may know that things are not huddled and lumped, but sundered and individual. . . . How calmly and genially the mind apprehends one after another the laws of physics. What noble emotions dilate the mortal as he enters into the councils of the creation and feels by knowledge the privilege to *Be!* His insight refines him. The beauty of nature shines in his own breast. Man is greater that he can see this, and the universe less, because time and space relations vanish as laws are known. . . . The ruin, or the blank, that we see when we look at nature is in our own eye. The axis of vision is not coincident with the axis of things, and so they appear not transparent but opaque. The reason why the world lacks unity and lies broken and in heaps is because man is disunited with himself. He cannot be a naturalist until he satisfies all the demands of the spirit. . . . Nature is so pervaded with human life that there is something of humanity in all and in every particular. . . . There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet.

Here the perspective of meaning and the perspective of existence can readily be distinguished by an attentive reader who is not blinded by the rhetoric of Emerson's disjointed "insights." For things are obviously not merely what they mean to man; space and time are there and not merely "therefore." To identify the "theory of nature" with the use of nature is nonsense except in the context of poetry. And so the metaphysician must turn poet in order to make his two perspectives seem to converge.

Poetry is one device, and a good one (as the Yankee Emerson perceived), by which the modern metaphysician tries to hide his confusion. For in poetry the use of metaphor is understood. Poetic language is meaningful and therefore vague. It means so much to so

many that it constantly acquires richer expressiveness. Poetry cultivates the imaginatively ideal language of *meaningfulness*. Science on the other hand cultivates the mathematically ideal language of precision. Metaphysics and philosophy exploit both languages. Philosophical language is apt to be more or less poetic because it, too, attempts to describe the being of a thing in terms of varied human experiences. An ordinary philosopher usually fails to conceal when he is being a poet and when he expects to be taken literally. But the metaphysical philosopher abuses the poetic license. He affects scientific precision and systematic accuracy for his poetic, meaningful terms, and asks the reader to believe that he is getting at once both natural science and human experience together in this super-poetry. Thus metaphysics is both elusive and attractive, for this metaphysical game of metaphors may prove to be, in skillful hands, a highly illuminating and constructive art. It clearly is more than science, but it need not be less. If the scientist and poet truly unite to create a single art of reporting the facts in all their wealth of implication and significance, we have philosophy at its best. Like Pláto and Aristotle our contemporary metaphysicians seem to be aware of the poetic element in their art, but they use it too often as a distracting and confusing ornamentation for what they conceive to be the philosophy of science. Were they more versed in the art of metaphysics, were they more scientific with one eye and more frankly poetic with the other, their metaphors would become more expressive of genuine insights.

Another device by which metaphysics attempts to give the effect of genuine binocular vision without achieving it is the use of the category of "reality." "Reality" is not only a weasel word, but a foxy concept. It has all the smart appearance of ideality but the beastly habit of devouring actuality. I need not expound to this company how tricky the use of the idea of reality has become. "To be real" is a combination of "to be" and "to be significant." No philosophical concept more clearly illustrates the ambivalent character of the metaphysical enterprise. There can be no "science of reality," because the idea of reality serves not to denote a subject matter, but to make a systematic construction out of a confusion. Last summer as I happened to be looking at the shop window display of a Swiss hardware store, I was struck by a German advertisement, which read as follows: "Buy products marked *Piccoli*! Why? Because the name *Piccoli* is a concept!" My

objection to the name "reality" is that unlike "Piccoli" it is too much of a concept to be a good name. It embodies a whole metaphysical theory and can never recover enough cognitive innocence to denote the special subject matter of a would-be science. Certainly the science of ontology would be capitulating to scholasticism at the outset, if it began with an *ens realissimum*, and to begin with "reality" is worse, because the modern concept contains the ghost of the *ens realissimum* in addition to the confusions of modern epistemology on which it flourishes. As either a clear name or a scientific concept "reality" is useless. But as a symbol for binocular vision it may have its utility for philosophical metaphysics. It now serves chiefly as a horrible example of poor focusing. However, I would not deny that it may be used critically, and that because of its double meaning it may serve the more constructive purpose of providing a category for insight.

A third indication of the ambivalence of metaphysics is the vague use of the term "experience." It does too much double duty. According to Samuel Alexander and many others who use his language, the empirical world is "experience minus the experiencing." If realism wishes, as Alexander declared, to be "democracy in metaphysics," it is not sufficient to pay ontological lip service to equality by dethroning "mind" technically, only to reinstate mind in a position of "empirical eminence" as "chief of the world mind knows." There are no privileged positions in an ontological democracy, and empiricism smuggles humanistic prejudices into metaphysics, when it assigns either to experience or to mind a central or eminent place in nature, which it actually enjoys only in art. Thus realistic empiricism seems to me to continue the tricky art of Emerson. What intellectual purpose is served in calling the natural order of events by these anthropocentric names? When Columbus announced his arrival on American shores the natives are reported to have exclaimed, "Thank God, we are discovered at last!" Similarly I can imagine nature exclaiming, "Thank God, I am at last experienced!" From the viewpoint of the one metaphysical eye, the humanist eye, the fact of experience is of primary concern; from the other, the naturalist or scientific point of view, it is trivial. Scientists occasionally still speak of events as "phenomena," but they no longer take this term so seriously and systematically as they did during the nineteenth century and as phenomenologists still wish them to do. To speak of the world as appearance, phenomenon,

or experience is ontologically no better than to call it "natural revelation," and to transport these terms from empiricist epistemology, where they serve a purpose, into ontology, where they suggest that experience is the primary form of existence, is to be metaphysically cross-eyed.

An even worse use of binocular mental vision is to speak carelessly of immediate experience. Strictly speaking, psychologically speaking, no experience can be immediate; a thing taken out of its context of significance ceases to be an experience and becomes a mere being or an abstract essence for dialectic. It is, strictly speaking, not even a sense datum until it makes some sense. But these abstractions from experience have their uses both for the science of logic and for the theory of categories. What are often called "immediate experiences" should be called either "logical simples" or "categorical firsts." They are not, in either of these contexts, examined as they enter into experience immediately, but as they function systematically. Scientifically it is possible to deal intelligibly with either pure particulars or pure universals, but empirically neither come pure, and metaphysics exploits this fact for its own cross-eyed purposes. Neither do those naturalists who explain that all natural events are potentially experienceable clarify either their science or their empiricism. What is it that is gained for the theory of existence by explaining, for example, that the process of the formation of coal beds is an *empirical* process, because if men had been able to live when coal beds were being formed they could have observed the process? Such pretended empiricism is clearly irrelevant for the existence of coal. We know, if we know anything, that we have evidence of many things of which we have no experience. Why all these methodological pretenses and complications? Experience and existence each has its own categories and type of order, but since we live in both perspectives, we can learn to translate and correlate in metaphysical uncommon sight, much as we learn to translate and correlate our two eyes in common vision.

These three illustrations of ambivalence in contemporary metaphysics may serve to make more concrete my thesis that metaphysics as it actually exists is engaged in a curious enterprise, either consciously or unconsciously, of correlating two types of knowledge—knowledge of existence and knowledge of experience. The one is essentially naturalistic and scientific; the other is essentially humanistic

and poetic. Usually one of these is regarded as primary. My thesis is that each is an independent perspective but that both may have a common object. The two views cannot be identified, but they serve to interpret each other. The peculiar virtue and task of philosophical metaphysics is to get a binocular view of whatever subject matter happens to be central to the field of vision. It is intelligible to describe the existence of all things, including the existence of meaning; and it is intelligible to analyze the meaning of anything, including the meaning of existence. But it is not intelligible to reduce existence to a kind of meaning or meaning to a kind of existence.

Hence there is a plurality of insights, but not a plurality of metaphysics. In place of the traditional metaphysics of experience, metaphysics of morals, metaphysics of value, metaphysics of events, of space, of time, and of pennies, each conceived as supplying a logical grounding for a particular science, I would conceive philosophical metaphysics as a peculiar method of binocular vision which can be applied to any subject matter, not for the sake of integrating knowledge systematically, but for the sake of illuminating by its plurality of perspective those aspects of a particular being which no one science or any other art can reveal. Though the method may be conceived systematically, there is no systematic application of it, no universal insight, no insight into reality as such, no wisdom-in-general. For the correlation of perspectives is achieved not in a third type of system which synthesizes science and experience, but in practice and imagination. Philosophic insight, like intelligence, is not expounded in treatises, for it cannot be formulated systematically; it exists piecemeal in practical judgment, critical ability, and poetic imagination.

It is ironical that philosophers from Plato to Jean-Paul Sartre have given so niggardly an account of the imagination, though they have used it effectively. To conceive philosophy essentially as an imaginative art is but to take account of what philosophers have always exhibited. But it is difficult to find a philosopher who admits being what he clearly is. For in philosophical treatises the imagination is usually divorced from insight and allied with sensation; it is divorced from inspection and allied either with "adspection" or with the "transcendental condition of consciousness." It is conceived not as a penetrating vision but as the awareness of aesthetic surface or even of nothingness. On the analogy of binocular vision it is no mystery that

metaphysics should give us a peculiar depth effect. It is also no mystery that the life of the critical imagination should be full of cross-eyed, nearsighted, farsighted, and astigmatic effects. In any case, I hope this analogy will at least suggest the need for a more adequate analysis of the relation between insight and imagination.

At this point, having discussed chiefly the contemporary situation in metaphysics, I should, according to well-established tradition, survey the history of philosophy, pointing out how in the course of its history metaphysics lost one or the other of its eyes, or how, having both, it failed to correlate their reciprocal perspectives, and I should point out especially how the Enlightenment repudiated ontology because of its corruptions and substituted for it two critical philosophies, British empiricism and German transcendentalism, the one essentially naturalistic, the other essentially humanistic, but so antithetical to each other that they offered no basis either singly or together for a binocular metaphysics as I have sketched it. But I spare you this familiar story, which would constitute the solid body of my essay, and jump at once to the conclusion, which is that today more than in previous generations there seems to be a favorable environment for the development of this binocular vision. I refer especially to the fact that the naturalistic and humanistic strains in contemporary philosophy are co-operative. They are so co-operative, in fact, that the first obstacle to a clarification of our metaphysics is the difficulty of persuading the naturalists and the humanists that they are not one. The issues which divide these two types of philosophy must be more clearly formulated before either can define its own perspective. Neither now sees any particular need for metaphysics, but if they should become conscious of the way in which they actually supplement each other, they would almost unconsciously learn the mediatorial and metaphorical art of metaphysics.

Before I close I feel that I ought to address myself more especially to two members of this Association. I can imagine Mr. Lovejoy chuckling "Another little revolt against dualism has ended?" There is obviously some justice in such a remark, for I mean to emphasize a duality in metaphysical thought, which neither the natural nor the moral sciences exhibit. But this duality, it seems to me, bears little relation to traditional forms of dualism, either ontological or epistemological. And what is more to the point, it is a dualism which does not

appear in thought generally, but only in the philosophical enterprise. In no other context does the peculiar predicament of interpreting existence and meaning in terms of each other arise. In emphasizing the irreducibility of existential and empirical analysis, I am not committing myself to a dualistic ontology. What little ontology I have been able to work out for myself is pluralistic, not dualistic: I believe in four or five distinct types of being. The dualism which I would confess giving up the revolt against is the dualism between science and art as forms of knowledge, between knowledge of fact and awareness of significance for human experience.

The other member to whom I owe a few words is Mr. Sheldon, who will certainly contend that this is all a clear case of polarity. Now I have no objection, if he hasn't, to adding one more to his list of "productive dualities." I think metaphysics exhibits precisely the kind of structure which he enjoys expounding. But I would not wish this polarity of perspectives to be generalized into an ontology. On the contrary, my aim has been to show how much simpler and more scientific a straightforward ontology can be than this peculiar kind of tortuous and elusive thinking which goes by the unfortunate name of metaphysical insight, but which under any other name would reveal the presence of a philosopher.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

Columbia University

PHILOSOPHY, PRAGMATISM, AND HUMAN BONDAGE¹

AS BEFITS the honor which you have conferred upon me on this occasion, I propose to speak to you in behalf of philosophy against some of the forces which I think are today traducing it. Philosophy being so much bigger than any philosopher or any of the many and diverse attempts that have been made to define it, I shall not presume to speak for all of it. The point of view which you are asked to assume is that of our present human situation. How does philosophy appear from that standpoint?

It was uncommon wisdom that inspired George Herbert Mead,² in his functional analysis of the self, to recognize the conflict that is never completely resolved between the "I" and the "me," between what are relatively the dictates of the heart and the dictates of the head. The "I" can never be fully incorporated in or embraced by the "me," and vice versa, because the "me" or generalized other, as the introjected or internalized mind of the community, is always more or less the alien other to what is felt to be uniquely and most significantly one's self. There is much more to the self than there is to the mind, as we recognize in saying that we have minds but are selves. I cherish the memory of Mead as a true philosopher and great teacher because he tellingly exemplified, and succeeded in communicating to his students, this endless struggle between the "I" and the "me." Mead did not honor articulate speech and the clear and distinct ideas of reason the less, he honored life, impulse, feeling, desire, sensitivity, and imagination or vision the more, by his unflagging effort to transmute the elusive but life-affirming, and ever freshly emerging "I" into the intelligible and objective terms of the "me."

¹ Presidential address delivered before the twenty-second annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association at Stanford University, California, December 27, 28, 29, 1948.

² *Mind, Self and Society* (1934), pp. 196-213, *passim*.

Now the bearing of this distinction on the theme I wish to treat is this. A man who aspires to be a philosopher has to be true to himself, and this requires uncommon candor. He must say not only what is *on* his mind but also what is *in* his heart, as far as this is possible. He must try and try again to close the awful gap between the "in" and the "on," between the "I" and the "me," between creative, liberating intelligence and conventional, imprisoning thought. In proposing to close this gap, I am proposing to elicit clear and distinct ideas about this aspect of human, including the philosopher's, experience. I am seeking to be empirical.

The justification for focusing our attention upon the human situation in terms of the "I" and the "me" is that philosophers have pretty much ignored it to the detriment of philosophy and of human life, and at a time when the fragmentation of human life has become a conscious indictment of philosophy and of education in general. It is pertinent to add that the scientists have not ignored the problem. In fact, we are witnessing a curious exchange of roles on the part of scientists and philosophers, such that scientists are tending increasingly to see things in their togetherness while philosophers are tending to see things apart. It is interesting too that in this tendency toward a reversal of roles, the scientist shows little if any regard — in fact, to a large extent complete disregard — for the philosopher, while the philosopher tends increasingly to pride himself on becoming a scientist.

I. THE HUMAN SITUATION TODAY

With this general statement of aims, let us begin with a report of the human situation in its own terms, leaning toward the lower limit of the fact-conjecture continuum, of course commenting where this seems necessary, but putting our philosophical theories as far as possible in abeyance, and putting ourselves in readiness to find what is strange in what has been familiar.

Almost wherever I turn today, whether to novelists, poets, and dramatists, whose authority rests on knowledge by intimacy of acquaintance; whether to political and social news or broadcasts; whether to social scientists, psychologists, and the more specialized students of psychodynamics; whether to the now socially and morally conscious physicists, chemists, and biologists who talk of atom bombs,

germ warfare, and the threat of the dehumanization of science; whether to students and laymen who have come to me distraught; whether to old or new acquaintances at cocktail parties where people are seeking diversion and enjoyment—almost wherever I turn I either come flush upon human distress or an ill-concealed effort to hide or dispel it. In lesser or greater degree, the “I” is being drowned in the “me.” Psychoanalysts, delving into the “unconscious,” are spotlighting the deep-seated and widespread nature of the inner conflicts of our time and are showing how thin is the line that separates many of these conflicts from neurotic behavior. Sociologists are helping psychoanalysts to receive a serious hearing by augmenting the evidence for the general thesis that our capitalistic society is shot through and through with frustration and aggression. The evidence that is piling up for the increase in sadistic and masochistic aggression is evidence of human bondage. The welter of conflicting theories of the causes of aggression indicates, by the complexity of the problem, how far the human situation has gotten out of hand.

The philosopher's complaint of the revolt against reason, with which I sympathize, has to reckon with the religionist's complaint of the revolt against God. The revival of religion, of religious superstitions, even on the part of many educated people who we may think should know better, is not as strange as the tough-minded among us take it to be. When people describe their condition by saying that they feel as though they are falling into a bottomless pit, that there is nothing to hold on to, that there is no use to turn to other people and no use to turn to themselves, that science and reason have failed them, that their political leaders are as daffy as they are, and are leading them into yet another war too dreadful to think about, what refuge is there for the inarticulate “I” against the social pressure of the “me”—save blind faith? Perhaps the blindness is ours in calling all kinds of faith equally blind. Perhaps in the spirit of William James we should delve deeper into the psychology of the religious experience and see that ideals must perish if there is no way of keeping them alive, no way of avoiding the pathetic fallacy, no way of rationalizing our deepest hopes against our greatest fears. Man's faith that the world can be made to realize his dreams will be altogether blind only when that faith is dead. What makes human bondage critical today is the impoverishment of reason or of the “me” which is due to the

divorce of reason from a sustaining faith. The greatest disservice to man's reason is the sterile supposition, so characteristic of our culture and so blatant in our philosophy, that man can live or should live by reason alone. Reason and faith go down together when reason is permitted to become man's master rather than his servant.

Now it is a familiar fact of human psychology that deeply painful experiences due to frustrated desires become, as far as possible, repressed. Repression and resistance are basic terms in theories of motivation and psychodynamics. The conscious "me" resists, represses, and seeks to cover up, as though in this way it could obliterate, the deepest feelings of the "I." There is a limit to what people can endure, a considerably lower limit to what they can endure on the conscious level of experience. People don't like to hear of our troubles any more than we like to attend to them ourselves. Hence out of politeness to others as well as out of self-protection, the "me" comes to serve as a protective barrier against the hostile forces, or what appear as such, both within and without what is most truly ourselves.

The psychological mechanism underlying this attitude may be called *the principle of selection*; and I submit that it is necessary to lift this principle from the level of unconscious operation to the level of explicit awareness because this attitude is as pervasive in human experience today as it is unnecessary. And I suggest that philosophers reflect human experience in general, and the present crisis of that experience in particular, in their detachment from matters emotional, sensational, or alarming, and in their preference for matters that can without too much difficulty be thought about in terms of habitual categories. Like other human beings, the philosopher represses the "I" and subordinates it to the "me" without awareness of his principle of preference or selection, and what is worse, without critical inquiry as to the causes in his culture and in himself for the preference. This principle of selection is an idol of the tribe that can be exposed for what it is only through penetrating understanding of self and other people.

Closely related to the principle of selection is what I propose to call *the principle of indifference*. Much of the surface calm that people are showing today is a calm that borders on contemptuous indifference, based on repressed fear and on loss of faith and hope. People are losing the sense of personal responsibility for what is going to happen

to them; their future, they feel, is beyond their control. Not being able, or rather not feeling able, to make a difference in the course of events, they assume a protective attitude of indifference. The principle of indifference expresses itself in all sorts of ways. When I become impatient with a discussion, as I fear I too frequently do, and say: "You are just talking to hear yourself talk; why not be yourself?" the answer frequently is the candid confession that the talk is compensatory, a device for hiding from or escaping the self, the "I," which is too inarticulate, bewildered, and beaten down to be able to think and speak for itself.

What is here called the principle of indifference is not introduced as an original idea. It reflects the tendency in modern life to reduce the individual to a thing (the "I" to the "me"), which has been noted, under various names, by almost all students concerned with the sciences of man. A world that treats us as things invites from us a reciprocal attitude. And in having access to ourselves only from the outside, in terms of the "me," we are quite consistent in regarding others from the outside; the loss of self-respect goes hand in hand with the loss of respect for others. Man's indifference to himself and indifference to other selves are the twin faces of man as creature; they represent man's profound sense of failure as creator. Thus power over others becomes the principal *modus vivendi*, the cheap substitute for the sense of intrinsic power that we have lost. Rationalizing this inner motivation, people tell me that it is a case of exploiting others lest they themselves be exploited; and business enterprise gives point enough to this logic. However, we have only to gain people's confidence in our own sincerity, in our respect for their submerged ego-ideal, to unmask this logic as a piece of rationalization which, while ingenious, doesn't ultimately satisfy the very individuals who most strongly defend it. It only extends and makes more insidious the process of self-estrangement and estrangement from others.

This impressionistic account of what we have called the human situation is reinforced by the data which have been brought to light by the various social and psychological sciences. From the mass of the available evidence, let us briefly consider a few facts pertinent to our theme and revealing most strikingly this trend of our age, whether we prefer to characterize it as "The Tidal Wave of Modern Unhappi-

ness," or "The Age of Anxiety," or "The Neurotic Personality of Our Time."

Take the social problem of divorce. More than 20 per cent of marriages now end in divorce, and the rate of increase of divorce to married population has been 30 per cent a decade, a rate, if continued, which would show, in the year 1965, about 51 per cent of American marriages ending in divorce. More significant for our purpose is the abundant evidence, not yet in statistical form, that in the majority of divorcees the ability to give and receive love is lost long before the divorce. The number of unhappy marriages that are simply endured has been conservatively estimated as at least equal to the number of divorces. If Erich Fromm is right, as I think he is, in signalizing love and potency along with knowledge as the defining marks of the productive and moral character pattern, are not impotence, sterility, hate, and indifference problems that should challenge philosophic inquiry? What can a theory of value amount to without them?

Consider next the falling birth rate. Aside from the temporary wartime rise, the rate has fallen steadily since 1810, when there were more than 950 children under 5 years of age for every 1,000 women 15 to 44 years of age. By 1850 the total had dropped to fewer than 700; by 1900 it was approximately 500; in 1930 it sank below 400, and it continued to sink up until the last war. Significant too is the positive correlation between fewer children and increasing divorce, five out of every six cases of divorce stemming from childless marriages. Moreover, women are failing to give birth, in most cases, not because of disease or structural defect, but because of more or less severe emotional disorder. It may be putting it on a bit thick to refer to modern woman as the lost sex,³ but my inquiries have disclosed very few women who are basically happy.

To dismiss these and other facts that could be adduced as merely psychological and sociological is to overlook the fact that philosophers are human beings whose quality as humane or inhumane or indifferent will necessarily be reflected in their philosophy. Whether Lundberg and Farnham are right in calling modern woman the lost sex, I do not know; but I believe that the problem is of far-reaching significance, obviously reflecting upon men as much as upon women.

³ Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia F. Farnham, M.D., *Modern Woman: The Lost Sex* (1947). My statistical data are taken from Appendix III, pp. 387 ff.

In addition to divorce and falling birth rate, we might mention the rising homicide rate and the increase in the number of suicides; we might observe the increase in hostility and destructiveness in general; we might note the evidence which Fromm and other students of psychology have subsumed under the general heading of the "unlived life." We might even reconsider the traditional view according to which crime is due to heredity, poverty, slums, or other obviously unfavorable environmental conditions. Lundberg and Farnham report that crime "is present in every modern social layer, and is most manifest at the top of the social pyramid, decreasing in strength and harmfulness as one moves downward."⁴

With regard to upper-layer or "white-collar" crime, in particular, these authors quote a long and telling passage from an article by Edwin H. Sutherland, who declares that the most general, although not universal, characteristic of this top-layer type of crime is *violation of trust*. By violation of trust is meant "the obtaining of money under false pretenses" through misrepresentations "in the financial statements of corporations, in the advertising and other sales methods, in manipulations on the stock exchange, in short weights and measures and in the misgrading of commodities, in embezzlement and misapplication of funds, in commercial bribery, in the bribery of public officials, in tax frauds, and in the misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies."⁵ But more significant for our purpose is the fact that Sutherland, a sociologist, is compelled to explain violation of trust in moral terms consequential for philosophy. The "fifty-million dollar losses" that are not uncommon in "the large-scale crimes committed by corporations, investment trusts, and public utility holding companies" he states as the least important of the consequences for society. Much more important is the fact that white-collar crimes destroy morale and promote social disorganization for want of effective moral leadership. The leaders of society themselves belong to the upper socioeconomic class which is infected by the "psychic disorganization which is at the root of so much other aberrant human behavior today." White-collar crimes thus raise a question for the philosopher as to his class status and its effect on his sense of personal responsibility and on his theories. Perhaps the sociology of knowledge

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

is a question inseparable from the nature and ethical import of knowledge.

This catalogue of human failures is aptly "night"-capped by the evidence drawn from alcoholism and problem drinking, which is distinctly peculiar to our age and to just about all ages within our age. We needn't waste time on moral platitudes; what is significant in our context is the light thrown by problem drinking on the attempts of the individual self to regain its bearings in a world riddled with contradictions. Anything that can, if only temporarily, buck a man up when he is down, relax his nerves from killing tension induced by the mad pace of our living, bring dreamless sleep in protection against thinking that only further complicates an already too-complicated pattern of living; anything that can bring a person to believe that everybody is somebody and a friend, including himself, and that the world, stripped from its conventional veneer, is a wonderful and soul-satisfying place to live in; anything that can bring relief from unrequited love, transmute moaning into laughter, nonsense into sense, liabilities into assets that won't freeze till tomorrow; anything that can make an ambitious capitalist confess confidentially the emptiness of his gains and make him throw his money around on less fortunate but, as he thinks, worthier people; anything that makes philosophers and academicians in general more human, more communicable and intelligible, more modest and humble, more sensitive to the things that humanly matter, more aware of the connection between matter and what matters—well, such an all-purpose potion is not to be thrown down the drain even if an overdose can be deadly. Uninhabited people are going to fill up one way or another.

II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SITUATION

So much for the melancholy prelude. Let us turn now from the human to the philosophical situation, viewing it broadly and at first with nonprofessional eyes so as to gain whatever benefit we can from seeing ourselves as others see us. The philosopher's "I" and "me" may come into sharper focus in this inspection.

What then, when candidly expressed, is the judgment of philosophy by an outside observer? It is that the philosopher knows much too little of what he is talking about in case he presumes to be talking

about a world that includes human beings, and that he is talking at best very strangely if he presumes to be concerned with anything else. Macneile Dixon in his Gifford Lectures on "The Human Situation"⁶ puts the nonprofessional's case against philosophy pithily: "When philosophers begin to substitute words for things one tires of their company."⁷ What he means, of course, is that good words take hold of things, show wide and deep experience with things, enhance our appreciation of things, and aid us in controlling things. But Dixon speaks so well for himself that I quote him at some length.

Foreigners express astonishment at the insularity of English thought... Yet I find in myself a greater astonishment at the remoteness of philosophers from the world in which they live. One wishes they would thumb the leaves of the historical record before they constructed their admirable theories. They should, after the manner of the artists, have made some preliminary studies. They should have cultivated the acquaintance of plotters and revolutionaries, of angry souls in underground dwellings. They would write more convincingly if they consoorted, even in imagination, with cave-dwellers, talked with buffoons, and mountebanks, and charlatans, with sadists and pimps and procurers, as well as with priests, prophets and professors. They might have learned something from the cynics and courtesans as well as from philanthropists, from beserker fighters, stark men, quicker with a blow than a word, whose joy was more in the argument of steel with steel than of sentence with sentence, "with heroes who thought death in battle, hot corpses high heaped for a pillow," the only form of death worthy of a man... What have Hegel or Kant to say of such people, or the structure of their minds?⁸

This analysis squarely attributes to the philosopher the chronic disease of academicians in general which one would think the true philosopher would resist at all costs. The price of nonconforming to academic canons of respectability, scholarship, or research is negligible as compared with the price of isolation from the human scene, euphemistically masked as scientific detachment. People instinctively turn away from philosophers because philosophic detachment only writes large and, what is worse, seems to adopt as a principle the irrelevancy and hostility of thought to what is basic in human feeling. Philosophers have become habituated, one suspects, to judge themselves as "philosophers" rather than as men.

Now if philosophers could be psychoanalyzed, they would probably come to appreciate the following remark quoted by Dixon: "A man

⁶ In 1937.

⁷ "The Human Situation," Gifford Lectures (1937), p. 100.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

may dwell so long upon a thought that it may take him prisoner."⁹ Thinking that has lost its perspective can become a disease. Rationality apart from the sentiment of rationality may be taken as synonymous with reason, but it can never rightly be taken as synonymous with reasonableness, any more than thought can be taken as equivalent to thoughtfulness, or than signification can be taken as one with significance. Intelligence is much more than a running to and fro through neatly swept corridors of thought; it has to rest on a firm moral base; it has to have windows and skylights so that there will be room for communion to enliven communication. While loath to succumb to superstition, it should not be afraid of being dubbed religious. The anomaly of the scientific trend in current philosophy is its assumption that there will be faith in reason after reason has openly declared its complete divorce from faith. What people in bondage are looking to philosophers for is a rational faith for living. They find philosophy to be the cult of unintelligibility, as Cornelius Benjamin aptly describes it in the title of his presidential address to the Western Division of this Association last year. According to Benjamin's version, the philosopher's dilemma is that of either being simple-minded and communicating the obvious or of trying to communicate what is important and being muddledheaded. This statement of the philosopher's dilemma is indeed an inescapable conclusion if we implicitly accept what constitutes traditionally the notion of empirical analysis.

No philosopher today is so divorced from the human scene that he wishes to be regarded as unempirical. In fact, empiricisms are a dime a dozen; but what a weasel word "experience" has turned out to be. Though, in the name of empiricism, philosophers have almost invariably proceeded from the materials of perceptual experience, they have seldom done this after the manner of what ordinary people would call men of perception. The ordinary man prefers his perceptions unsliced, and if they must be sliced, he prefers them sliced thick, with a notation that the slicing has occurred, and for what purpose. The pernicious anemia of philosophers he attributes to their liking their perceptions sliced thin, the thinner the better, with the result that the typical object of their perceptions is the so-called "physical object," if perchance there is any actual object at all. The result of this "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" has been that what functions in

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

perception as desire or purpose or feeling is trimmed away and tossed into a subjective garbage pail, with the lid shoved down tight, lest the objective world, the world tagged real, become contaminated. And we should not be fooled by the term "real," a value term signifying the philosopher's peculiar preference.

"The kernel of the scientific outlook," wrote Lord Russell, "is the refusal to regard our desires and interests as affording a key to the understanding of the world." And Dixon makes the only proper comment: "This is the superb gesture with which we are familiar. Mention your feelings to these men of iron, our scientific friends, and you will be met with a cold stare and the acid enquiry, 'My dear sir, what have your feelings to do with the matter?'"¹⁰ Obviously nothing, we should have to reply, if the world that is the object of our understanding is Russell's world, or rather the world that he claims as the object. Obviously everything, we should have to add, if the world that we are trying to understand is big enough to include Russell and possibly even lesser lights.

Russell's statement brings to a focus what I have been trying to describe as the root of human bondage today. The superb gesture with which we are all too familiar is the *reductio ad absurdum* of philosophy and of human intelligence. It is salutary counsel to be told that our wishes and desires can lead to wishful and deceptive thinking, but what makes this salutary and worth saying is that we do not *wish* to be deceived. That some wishes and feelings lead to phantasy, faulty observation, muddled thinking is no reason for putting the lid on all wishes and feelings. When philosophers tell us that we see what we are looking for, rather than what is objectively there, they invite the rejoinder that they likewise see what they are looking for, and that no perceptions are utterly aimless or devoid of feeling. What matters is the quality of the feeling, whether it is sensitive and discriminating and appreciative, or whether it is callous and indifferent and reaching only the hard surface of things. And what matters is that things perceived are things had, are things enjoyed or suffered, felt as favorable or unfavorable, consequential or inconsequential, are things of use and abuse, and are things or objects at all only owing to their qualitative immediacy and uniqueness as felt. Thus, any genuinely empirical knowledge presupposes the objectivity of feeling.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

Now the "scientific" philosopher's assertion of the privacy of feeling is speciously plausible today because, as our account makes only too clear, our deepest feelings are in fact subjective, feelings of privation, loneliness, frustration. The creative "I" is repressed, driven to cover inwardly, and rendered impotent by the alien and unfeeling "me." Sentiment is repressed out of fear of sentimentality. Love shrivels in shame. Since there is a market value on selling and buying, but not on giving, since there is a premium on acquisition, what passes for love is itself possessiveness and exploitation.

What gives the philosopher's assertion of the privacy of feeling *sinister* plausibility is the fact that, by putting his weight behind the demand for "objectivity" (things "designated" as over against feelings "expressed"), he only drives deeper the wedge by which our culture has separated the "I" from the "me." The philosophical realist may think he is miles apart from the man in the market place who prides himself on being unsentimentally realistic, practical, or intelligent; but he is closer than he thinks. By treating experience essentially as experiencing rather than as nature experienced, he encapsules the self. By conjuring up a preposterous bifurcation of nature, he robs nature of aesthetic, moral, and spiritual qualities that once made us feel at home there; and he evacuates our feelings and desires of all hope of their natural productive function in outward consummation. Man wants no part of a world that has become mostly empty space, and if the philosopher can provide him with no other world, he will withdraw into himself where the philosopher has put him. The scientific philosopher can scoff at the present reactionary trend toward supernaturalism, in and out of philosophy, but what alternative does he as a scientific empiricist provide? And little wonder that philosophy as a significant intellectual enterprise is lost if the lay observer must choose between supernaturalist obscurantism and an empiricism which is almost exclusively concerned with the development of linguistic analysis and other purely technological skills. Let us by all means have a scientific philosophy, but let us not lose the substance of the noun philosophy in the form of the adjective scientific.

It has been my thought that by coming at the philosophical situation from the vantage ground of the human situation we might agree that there is the same bifurcation in both, each reinforcing the other, and that the basic trouble with philosophy today is the spurious notion of

what constitutes empiricism. By examining now, even briefly, what brought about an enfeebled empiricism, how it was that the principle of selection and the principle of indifference came to rob experience of its human significance, turning the "I" against the "me," and cutting the mind off from nature, we can then venture some constructive proposals for the recovery of philosophy. Indeed a good diagnosis of a disease will itself suggest the remedy.

It is well known how modern empiricism, ambivalent in Locke's treatment, and initially naïve, came to grief in the skepticism of Hume. It is to the credit of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume that they at least tried to analyze firsthand experience with something like full awareness of the direct connection between philosophy and the problems of men in their day. The upshot of empirical analysis was, however, as Hume had the candor to say, the absurd notion of experience as a bundle of perceptions, minus either a subject or an object to tie it together, and Hume's skepticism, the *reductio ad absurdum* of philosophy and of human life, has stalked the premises of both to this day. Locke, the apostle of human freedom, spokesman for the Revolution of 1688, tried to state experience in terms that would do justice to the "I" as a creative agent and as at home with the "me" and with the world. In doing this, he by-passes the psychophysical dualism of Descartes, only to have it catch up with him later. In the end he could not avoid the trap of psychophysical dualism, and perception became a subjective state of mind as over against a world of ghostly substantiality. The die was cast, and empiricism took flight through one blind alley after another.

The trouble with British empiricism and most of the empiricist tradition is not that it was initially naïve; it was not naïve enough, not true enough to what men were doing and feeling as a result and expression of their hard-won freedom in science, government, and social life. Science was demonstrating the power of creative human intelligence, the power of knowledge as human agency for transforming precarious and accidental natural events into dependable mechanisms for consummating human purposes. What the scientist did was to analyze not the object of perception but the causal structure in which objects in their qualitative immediacy are embedded. Thus the scientist did not pass judgment on the ontological status of the perceptual world; he merely exhibited the causal conditions for rendering more

secure the aesthetic, moral, and practical objects of our experience. In this he behaved very much as the artist does, since both of them convert material into objects as ends, though concerned with different aspects of experience. By ruling out final causes, the scientist was not at all ruling out the notion of a purposive universe; quite to the contrary, he was only transferring the locus and agency of purpose from the dead past or a utopian future to the living human present. In short, science was empiricism actively at work, demonstrating the potency and dignity of man, showing that possible worlds are not just conceivable worlds but worlds that man, if wise in his choice, can bring to pass.

How far philosophical empiricism strayed from this description of scientific empiricism is clearly recorded in history, in contemporary philosophy, and in the present pattern of our culture. It is the reason for this that we are concerned about. Being occupationally and culturally conditioned to view ideas — those especially qualified ideas that pass for our most important knowledge — as a revelation of ultimate Reality, philosophical empiricists were unable to take science operationally and contextually; they had to erect a metaphysics out of it. So instead of regarding science as an instrument to be put to work in the interest of man, they regarded it as man's master, as God incarnate, as a final revelation of Reality, little realizing that this was the surest way of making science subservient to the forces of reaction and of defeating the purpose of science. The philosophical empiricist committed what has been called the intellectualist fallacy that has been haunting philosophy ever since, by mistaking the scientific end product of inquiry for the original objects experienced, i.e., the presupposed context of the analysis. Thus the mechanical nature of the world as outcome of analysis came to be interpreted as a denial of any purposiveness in the world at all, even a denial of what one would think is the obvious purposiveness of the human activity of the scientist in making the analysis. Likewise, the mechanical and determinate nature of the world, as outcome of analysis, ruled out the factual or objective character of the problematic situation which alone gave point to the analysis. The indeterminate situation — which is precisely what we previously called the human situation — was taken to be purely subjective, a state of mind, no part of the real world. Man's sense of creative intelligence and of personal responsibility was virtually destroyed.

There was a place in the world for the mechanical and routine "me"; but the "I" was left dangling outside the world in a position from which, at best, it could only observe the passing parade of the wooden soldiers.

This being the way that empiricism went wrong, we have now to note the theoretical consequences for the theory of value corresponding to the practical consequences which I have labeled human bondage. Both in theory and in practice we have set science over against religion, morality, and art. And we have done this despite the fact that science, operationally considered, is an art through and through and could not be conducted without an implicit recognition of moral virtues and values associated with our religious heritage. We have set fact over against value, that which can be designated and objectively verified as against that which can be subjectively expressed and emoted. Our feelings, as Russell has told us, can have nothing to do with the world.

This fallacy is directly relevant to the interminable discussions about the subjective or objective status of values. Most interest theories of value, like the emotive theories, treat value as subjective. The logic seems to be this: values must be either subjective or objective; since they are not objective they must be subjective. The way was prepared for this logic by traditional epistemology, physics being taken pre-emptively as science and as final authority as to what is to be regarded as objective fact. Tertiary, secondary, and finally even the traditional holdouts, the primary qualities of objects, were dumped into the mind. Why this had to be done, being so completely at odds with human experience before it had grown pathological, and being so far removed from physical science itself, operationally considered, has never been explained. To say that values must be objective or subjective is not logical but pathological; it is a case of the either-or fallacy, for values are experienced as qualities of objects within the activity of individuals which gives the objects their meaning and function. A truly empirical or scientific theory of value is looking to the field theory of a behavioristic psychology and of the social sciences, not to theoretical physics, for its basic frame of reference. It finds this frame of reference in the indissoluble organism-environment transaction, not in the subject-object or mind-world distinction.

It is not proposed here to offer an empirical or scientific theory of

value, but our theme of human bondage indicates the direction which it should take. Human bondage gives point and poignancy to the thesis that the main concern of philosophy should be the nature of the world with man in it as its central fact. This is simply because man is man, man is the central fact, and there is no getting away from him. To take man as central is to take his problems seriously, and this requires recognition that the problem of knowledge and the problem of valuation are not at bottom two problems but are one and the same problem. The main point of the thesis that knowing is active on-going inquiry which transforms an unsettled problematic situation (organism-environment transaction) into a settled and satisfactory situation, and is not an apprehension, in the mind of a subject, of what is independently real, is this: a problematic situation is a situation of need-demand, and a need-demand situation is a human situation. Moreover, it is what everybody recognizes as an unsatisfactory situation. This fact alone should be sufficient to scotch all subjective theories of value. Need-demand is something quite different from arbitrary volitional decisions or subjective tastes; it sits in judgment, so to speak, on those decisions and tastes. Theories of value will begin to be empirical and scientific therefore when they dare formulate propositions which not only describe people's tastes, preferences, and desires but genuinely resolve the ever-increasing complexity of the need-demand relations in the contemporary human and social situation.

With the imperative character of these need-demand relations, we bring our present inquiry to a close, though this ending is more properly a beginning if the main conclusions of the inquiry are sound. It has been submitted that only by overcoming its sterile bifurcation of theory and practice, knowledge and value, object and subject, will philosophy overcome its present estrangement from the kind of problems which the human situation, as outlined above, would consider as most significant and urgent. When the "I" is experiencing a crisis, understanding the "I" is that kind of resolute thinking-desire that stands under the "I" and the objective conditions of need-demand. So philosophy is assigned a kind of revolutionary role, and this all the more so when, as at present, the threats against the freedom of the self to be itself are serious and insistent. It goes without saying that the philosophical enterprise, as envisaged here, is doomed from the start

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

unless it can protect the freedom and integrity of the academic profession as a whole. By turning its attention away from things as they are to the way in which things are connected in passage, and by giving man an appreciable control over things in passage, science has imposed a heavy responsibility upon philosophy, the responsibility for becoming scientific about the ends of life as well as about the means for achieving these ends. The objective need-demand situation makes the philosophical enterprise perform a genuine service, mediating between the rich complexity of human life as immediately experienced and suffered and the objective causal structure exhibited by the sciences. So it is that a kind of pragmatism has emerged in our inquiry as a hopeful *tertium quid* between philosophy and human bondage, pragmatism signalizing the militant faith of the "I" in creative human intelligence.

DONALD AYRES PIATT

University of California, Los Angeles

CHANCE, LOVE, AND INCOMPATIBILITY¹

CHANCE, love, and incompatibility are ultimate principles, applicable to all reality. In defending this thesis, I wish also to discuss some of the interrelations of these three concepts themselves. That they are interconnected is evident on a common-sense level. By chance-proximity people come to love each other, and there is often, if not always, some element of incompatibility between them. But of course, if the three ideas named are to be philosophical categories, applicable to all things, their meanings must be refined and extended beyond the ordinary ones. Philosophy (or at any rate, metaphysics) consists in such refinement of meanings to the end of removing their limitations. To object that in this process all identity of meaning must disappear is to declare philosophy an impossible enterprise. The philosopher should then cease to encumber the academic scene. Assuming, however, that continuity of meaning is possible between the special cases drawn from common speech and the universal conceptions arrived at by philosophical refinement, the question is: Are chance, love, and incompatibility favorable starting points for such refinement?

Philosophic attempts to depreciate these ideas are not lacking. Chance has been said to be a word for our ignorance of causes; love, to be but a form assumed by self-interest; and incompatibility has been held to arise solely through arbitrary negation — so that only if we declare that a possible state of affairs excludes another is it impossible, and then but verbally, that both be actualized.² Are these contentions justified?

Two of our ideas, chance and incompatibility, seem to be required by logic. Logic rests on the notion of mutually exclusive alternatives,

¹ Presidential address read (with a few omissions and differences) before the meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at Columbus, Ohio, April 29, 1949.

² See W. H. Sheldon, *America's Progressive Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), ch. iv.

P and not-P. This is a form of incompatibility. But it is also a manifestation of chance. For chance is the alternative to necessity, and if proposition P is true by necessity, then not-P is absurd and hence not a genuine proposition. This may indeed be the case with respect to some P's and not-P's, those affirming or denying necessary truths; but logical conceptions cannot be elucidated except on the assumption that not all truths belong to this class. Again, the logical notion of entailment, of "If...then," implies chance; for an "if" is correlative to an "if not," and (once more, apart from certain special cases) both must be meaningful, and thus, whichever is true, it is true by chance, not by necessity. The very notion of necessity presupposes that of chance. For the necessary is merely that which is common to a set of chances; or that of whose absence there is no chance! It is the common factor of the chances. Such a common factor is of course abstract. Assume that there are chances, and it is easy to see wherein necessity consists; assume that there is no such thing as chance, and it will, I think, prove impossible (that is, there will be no chance) to give an intelligible account of necessity. This is an example of Morris Cohen's Law of Polarity, the law that categories run in contraries so related that neither of the contrary poles has meaning or application by itself. In every set of chances, there must be abstract common factors, that is, necessities; and there seems no intelligible meaning for necessity except as common factor of a set of chances. Unconditional necessity is, of course, the highly abstract common factor of the universal set of chances, all chances whatsoever; conditional necessity is the more concrete common factor of a limited set of chances. The factor limiting the set is that *by* which, as we say, the necessary thing is necessitated. The notion that the necessary must in all cases be necessitated by something is, however, a confusion between the restricted and the general case. The unconditionally necessary is not necessitated *by* anything, for it is merely what all possibilities or chances have in common. (Is there here a problem of logical types?) There is simply no chance of its being absent; not because anything prevents this, but because such "absence" is nonentity, denoting not even a bare possibility. (The sense in which this agrees, and the sense in which it disagrees, with the traditional notion of "necessary being" cannot here be set forth.)

Chance is nonnecessity. This negative characterization, however,

does not suffice. For, as just pointed out, necessity is merely an abstract aspect of a set of chances; and the concrete is more inclusive and positive than the abstract. Hence chance must have a positive character. Peirce was one of the first to do justice to this concrete and positive character of chance.

Chance is the particularity of the particular, its Peircian firstness, freshness, spontaneity, originality — or, in Whiteheadian language, its self-creativity. Stated negatively, this is the particular's undeducibility from general concepts, which is all that distinguishes it from the general, and its undeducibility from antecedent particulars (the impossibility of deriving the total truth about it from the truth about them), which is all that distinguishes one particular state of the universe from another. If a particular were necessitated, or if all that is true of it were logically entailed, by the general, the general would be particular. For the general is the partially indefinite. Humanity in general is not the humanity of Lincoln or of Washington, but neutral to the distinction. Now to imply something definite is to be definite; for a meaning includes its implications. Hence the general cannot imply any determinate particular coming under it. If, again, a particular must occur because another particular, called its cause, occurs, then the two are logically inseparable, and indeed the later particular can only be a constituent of the earlier, and so not really later.

However, you may say, cannot a particular be implied by its cause or antecedent particular, plus a causal law? But the complex entity, cause and law, can only be either a particular or a general, and we have already seen that neither can imply the subsequent particular.

If nondeducibility is thus the very particularity of the particular, it follows that all particulars occur by chance, in our sense of the term. Are they then uncaused? Only if caused means deducible from antecedent conditions and laws. But there is another definition of cause that enables us to say that all events are caused, and that all occur by chance. Causality, on any useful definition, is whatever distinguishes from the logically possible, or the thinkable as such, that which is *really* possible in a given actual situation. Many things are thinkable that cannot here and now occur. But whatever here and now can occur is thinkable. The actually possible is thus narrower than the logically possible. There are, however, two ways of conceiving this narrowness. According to the first way, the actually possible is as nar-

lowly limited as the actual itself. Future events that *can* occur are then just as determinate as past events that have occurred. This view is an extreme. It is also a paradox. For if real possibility is as determinate as actuality, what is the difference? Why is not the future actual already? As Whitehead says, "Definiteness is the soul of actuality." The actual particular is the fully unambiguous, that which conforms to the law of excluded middle as applied to predicates. Indeed, this law in this application is best taken as a definition of actuality. But if the future is wholly definite and thus actual, is it not present rather than future? Should we not try a less extreme and less paradoxical assumption? Why not suppose that only *past* actuality down to and including the present is fully definite (that this does not annul the difference between past and present has been shown elsewhere), and that the restricted or real possibilities which are the future so long as it is not yet present are somewhere between this fullness of definiteness and the opposite pole of unrestricted or merely logical possibility? (The more immediate future is, of course, more narrowly restricted than the more remote future, and it is but one step removed from definite actuality.) We can then say: every event is caused, that is to say, it issues out of a restricted or real potentiality; but also, every event occurs by chance, that is to say, it is more determinate than its proximate real potentiality, and just to that extent is unpredictable, undeducible from its causes and causal laws. By its proximate potentiality, an event is put into a class of then and there possible effects. Membership in the class is compulsory for the next event, not open for its decision. But within the class, or insofar as the proximate potentiality is less sharply definite than actuality, there are limits within which the event decides for itself. Insofar it determines or creates itself; or, as Whitehead says, it is *causa sui*. This is really less a paradox than the notion that all determination is by antecedent causes, since the latter notion merely puts the effective determination or decision, by which possibility is restricted, back to some unimaginable beginning of time or act outside of time. Somewhere, *somewhen*, somehow, the restriction of the logically possible to the determinateness of the actual must be effected. Where better than here and now, in each and every event? If, however, all events thus do the restricting, any one event can do but a certain portion of it. The rest has already been done by antecedent events. This antecedent, not quite complete,

restriction of the logically possible is real possibility or causality.

The classic objection to any such doctrine appeals to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which runs: for everything, there must be a reason why it is as it is, and not otherwise. This means, if anything, a denial of chance as defined above. The Principle has an air of attractiveness. An event for whose exact nature no antecedent reason can be given is insofar, it seems, inexplicable, irrational; to accept it amounts to a defeatist renunciation of the hope of explanation. However, is explanation really thus to be equated with the possibility of deducibility from causes or reasons? One may use the word "explanation" as synonym for such deducibility; but then we shall need another word for a broader conception of which this is only a special case. To explain, or deal with rationally, in this broader sense—for which a good word is "understand"—is to spell out the relations of a thing, its wider context beyond that apparent to our sense perceptions. This context includes not only relations of similarity, repetitiveness, and causal deducibility, but also relations of novelty, nonrepetitive change, and nondeducibility. Relations of nondeducibility are just as legitimate objects of rational grasp as those of deducibility. Indeed, as Bradley, Bosanquet, and his followers have been making clear for us, somewhat unwittingly, the very idea of deducibility loses its rational intelligibility the moment we suppose that everything implies everything else. Reason is not the mere tracing of necessary relations. It is the correct classification of relations, with respect to necessity and nonnecessity. A mathematician who could not see that being square does *not* follow from being rectangular would be just as odd as one who could not see that being rectangular *does* follow from being square. A very famous mathematical discovery consisted in the proof that the parallel axiom of Euclid is independent of his other axioms, does not follow from them.

If, then, to explain or understand is to classify correctly a thing's relations, or lack of them, the statement that an event is not wholly deducible from its antecedent causes may be as much an explanation, as contributory to understanding, as the statement that in part or in some features the event is deducible. We must go further. Events would become ununderstandable, just as geometry would become so, were we to adopt the assumption that all relations are relations of derivability. Temporal derivability is predictability. We say that

knowledge is for the sake of prediction and control. But prediction and control, if taken without qualification, exclude one another. One predicts an eclipse, but does not control it. One controls — from moment to moment — one's conversational utterances, but just to this extent one does not predict them. To predict is to renounce further control; to hold open for control is to renounce prediction. If I predict what I shall say tomorrow, I imply that I shall tomorrow make no decisions concerning my speech; for the decisions must already have been made. If Beethoven had predicted one of his symphonies, he would have created it already; and if a psychologist had predicted it, he would have been just such a composer as Beethoven and assuredly no psychologist. The predictor of Newton must be at least a Newton. Such absurdities may help to teach us that — as Dewey has been contending for nearly half a century — the basic function of knowledge is not to focus a mental camera on the future but to discover what *present* limited potentialities, that is to say, partial indeterminacies, are given for resolution in the future. The resolution itself will be the coming of the future, and to talk of predicting its form is to suppose that something can be settled while it is still unsettled. The object of knowledge is not the future as determinate, but present realities as materials from which alone the future can be made.

The ideal of absolute predictability makes sense indeed only if contemplation is in no way relative to action. The defender of chance need not go to the opposite extreme and say that contemplation is merely an adjunct to action. It suffices to say that knowing and doing have mutual relations to each other, so that neither can be solely and absolutely an end in itself. The conception of a knower who sees past, present, and future — or all time from eternity — sees them but reserves no right to make further choices with respect to them, is, I submit, a mythical one which fails to describe even what we wish knowledge to be. The myth once had a theological garb; now one finds it among logicians who have no desire to be theological. The verbal argument for the determinateness of the future, "What will be will be," is a part of this inheritance from medieval theology. It involves, as has been explained elsewhere, a doubtful conception of the relation of truth to time. The future consists of what will be only insofar as its proximate potentiality is determinate; for the rest, it consists of what may-or-may-not-be. To say, "The future when it is present will have

determinate character," is not by any valid logical principle equivalent to saying, "There is a determinate character which the future will have."

But can our view do justice to the role of verified predictions in testing scientific theories? Insofar as science looks for causal laws, successful prediction is of course a valid criterion. To the extent that such laws obtain, and events are *not* matters of chance but determined by their antecedents in some repetitive way, prediction must be possible. A single success would not, it is true, completely establish the law, for such isolated agreement with prediction might occur by chance. But repeated success without failures renders this unlikely. And in regions of nature where there is good reason to think the element of chance is small, we may proceed for practical purposes as though it were not there at all.

Of course, in addition to the aspects of absolute prediction of the future, there are the conditional predictions. If we were to set off a bomb, such-and-such would be the consequences. This is a statement about the interrelations of certain potentialities in the future, or in some unspecified time. Each potentiality has an infinite comet tail of possible or probable consequences, and whatever properties are spread throughout the tail are necessary consequences. Science enables us, then, first to set aside what definitely will happen, such as eclipses, as not suitable material for preference or decision, and second and above all, it enables us to comprehend as many as possible of the real potentialities (including those of our own character) among which we are to decide, so that we will not overlook possibilities we might wish to favor or oppose and will not imagine that such a potentiality as setting off an explosion is self-enclosed and without ramifications, other than the most obvious ones.

The hold of the Principle of Sufficient Reason upon some philosophers seems to have been due to their not distinguishing with sufficient reasonableness between various meanings of the word reason.

For what do we ask reasons? First of all, for beliefs, for theoretical decisions. The ideal of belief is that it should be determined by evidence. From this relation of belief to evidence, chance is to be excluded. The content of the belief is to represent and be necessitated by the facts. This, however, is for us only an ideal. Human beliefs are not determined solely by evidences, but in part by other factors, such as

desires and wishes, whose action, so far as the ideal is concerned, involves an element of chance. In the second place, we ask reasons for practical decisions, for deliberate modes of behavior. What is their ideal? I suggest that, whereas belief has the aim of duplicating facts already in being, practical decisions have the aim of creating new facts. Science is an echo of nature, but technology is not. It is the business of an echo to be faithful. Caprice is to be excluded. But a suspension bridge is no echo, still less is a symphony or a poem. It is not even the ideal of these creations to be determined by the world in which they arise. They are to be something new, not wholly modeled on anything antecedent, including antecedent laws or ideals.

Is such creation, underivable from its antecedents, irrational? Not if words are reasonably employed. The function of reason is not, in spite of Leibniz, to dictate to the will the one best action. Reason operates with universals, and these cannot point unambiguously to a particular, hence not to a particular action. The function of reason is to point not to an action better than any other, but to a class of actions better than any other class. Ideally every member of the class is, at least for our knowledge, superior to every possibility outside the class, and equal to any within it. The enactment of any member of such a class is entirely rational, if that means immune to criticism. Suppose I say to a man, "My dear sir, you have acted unwisely; for there is another action you could have performed whose results would probably have been just as good as the one you did perform." Would he not reply, "What of it? Is there unwisdom in an action so well chosen that there is scant probability that it could have been improved upon?" Unwisdom consists in accepting a lesser value where a greater is within reach. If a man were to act like Buridan's ass and refuse, petulantly, to nourish himself because no food was best, would not all recognize what an ass that man was! As though a man should refuse to use a nail until he could be assured that one nail in the box was supreme! Any nail of the right size is better than none, any bundle of hay better than none, and one does not starve because no food is known to be the best available. Sufficient reason in conduct is not that a particular act has a ground of preference, but that the class of acts from which a particular act is arbitrarily determined has such a ground. The ass eats hay because he is hungry, and hay is the available food; but he eats just *this* bit of hay, perhaps, only because it is *as good as any* he could now have.

This reason suffices for the wisest beast or man, or even, I dare affirm, the wisest superhuman being.

To the old, old query, how an act can fail to be determined by its motive, we may reply thus: An element in all motives is the desire that something new, not previously defined, should achieve definition; further, if the motive is antecedent to the act, then it cannot entirely define its subsequent fulfilment for, since definiteness is actuality, a fully defining motive would have actually all that the fulfilment could have; while, if the motive is not antecedent, then its influence upon the act belongs to the latter's self-causation and lends no support to the theory of complete determination by antecedent causes.

In the third place, one may ask for reasons for concrete events. This is the question of causality once more. The causal ideal is that events should be interesting and valuable novelties, connected with antecedent real potentiality but possessing additional determinations. One does not evaluate transactions with a friend in terms of their predictability, but in part in quite contrary terms. Only with low forms of existence, valued chiefly as means, do we tend to distinguish predictable and unpredictable as good and bad. Yet in no case is absolute predictability a valid ideal, and even if it were, events might fall short of it, as of other ideals.

An ideal still to be considered is that of freedom in the ethical sense. Most of us have read dozens of essays striving to show that ethical freedom and responsibility are compatible with causal determinism, or even that they require it. Yet I still think, with William James, that ethical freedom and metaphysical freedom are connected. All kinds of freedom have this in common, that something which, in abstraction from the entity said to be free, is undecided, by virtue of the entity acquires decision. A slave is unfree, because little is decided by him that is left undecided by others. His environment narrows down what he can do to a meager range of alternatives, out of proportion to his human capacities. Unfreedom is, then, an unduly narrow range of alternatives for decision as left open by others. Now some conclude from this that there is no unfreedom in being determined by one's antecedent character or experience, since it is still the self, though the antecedent self, which thus determines. One is not enslaved to another person. For legal purposes, perhaps this suffices. But it involves two oversights.

First, if the argument of this essay, and of many other defenses of indeterminism, is sound, to say that men are free provided they can deliberate (and act) unhampered, even though this deliberating is perhaps fully determined by antecedent factors, amounts to saying, "Men are free if they can deliberate, even though perhaps they cannot deliberate." For no real occurrence, least of all one involving the consciousness of wide alternatives and of universals, could be fully determined by its antecedents, or by any law or order which excludes chance and uncertainty. So the famous compatibility of determinism with freedom only means that the fact of ethical deliberation and its unimpeded consequences establishes freedom, regardless of what else be true or false. This is acceptable; but the question, Could ethical deliberation occur deterministically? is the question of compatibility over again. And the affirmative answer is assumed, not proved. Admitting that determinism cannot contradict or nullify the *fact* of freedom (nothing can nullify a fact), it remains to ascertain whether or not this fact nullifies the thesis of determinism.

Second, there is a sense, and we shall see that it is an ethically significant one, in which a human being has a different self every moment. From this point of view, to be limited by one's past self is to be limited by another, in extreme cases a very alien other at that. We return to this topic later, since the same question is involved in the attempted reduction of love to self-interest. Here I will only point out that if today's action is determined by, inferable from, yesterday's self and its environment, then by the same logic it is determined, even though in a sense mediately rather than immediately, still *completely*, by the self and world state of fifty years ago. The self of a squalling infant and its world become the repositories of the freedom that was supposedly mine. And that infant and its world were determined by the natures of the parents and their environments. (According to some forms of scientific determinism one can as well say that we determine our past as that it determines us; but this makes it but the clearer that from no point of view is there anything *otherwise unsettled* for the present self to settle, since neither past nor future leaves us any possibility of action but one.) So, as with excess of determination by neighbors in the case of the slave, so with excess of determination by antecedent character, freedom and responsibility shrink by retreating, in the one case into the environment, in the other into the past. As

James said, the question of ethical meaning is not essentially one of the utility of rewards and punishments, or of praise and blame. It is a question of the locus of decision, as a real settling of the objectively unsettled. This locus cannot be in the self-identical person from birth to the present but must be in the act of the given moment. The value of human beings, from which derive, for example, our rights over the lower animals, is that in us the particularization of real potentiality which is the generic nature of process occurs on a higher and more conscious level. We are important, as birds and tigers are not, because we, radically more than they, settle now what was yesterday in no sense entirely settled, and because we know that we are doing this, that we are — as Bergson says — artists of actuality, really creating new definiteness.

Quantum physics, by its category of statistical law and its principle of indeterminacy, seems to open a door to such creation. But then it appears to close it again, for practical purposes (though some authorities deny this), by implying the virtually absolute determinacy of organic action, due to the high numbers of particles involved. However, in philosophy it is categories and principles, not quantitative matters, that are at issue. If individuals on the lowest level are unpredictable, perhaps this is because they are individuals, not because they are on a low level. Now we too are individuals, units of reality, indeed we are radically more individual, and our unity is more certain, because more immediately given, than that of electrons. But we are individuals on a high level. Hence a human being need not be so predictable as the consideration of its particles alone would imply. A particle in one's brain is in the neighborhood of human thoughts and feelings, not just of other subhuman particles. Moreover, since absolute order is for all we know inapplicable to units, the theory of real potentiality is at least not excluded. Assuming the theory, must there not be levels of such potentiality, as there are of units, rather than merely more or less complex cases of lowest-level potentialities? How my potentiality, or even that of an amoeba, is related to electronic potentiality may not be a matter for simple extrapolation from low-level physics, but for reasoning by analogy, tested if possible empirically. Thus ethical freedom can, though less simply or conclusively than some perhaps have supposed, derive support from the new physics. For that physics has given up the dream, the pseudo category,

of a causality which in principle excludes chance. Of course, one may prefer to dream on.

To say that the passion for a tidy world has been a source of chaos in philosophy is scarcely a paradox. Absolute tidiness is a contradiction in terms — logical chaos. The attempt to convert men to it produces disagreement — psychological chaos. Absolute order is logical chaos, for order is a channeling of vitalities, of chance-spontaneities; and if the channeling were absolute, exact, complete — there would be no vitality, no channeling, and no order. The closer together the banks of a river, the more precisely the path of individual particles of water can be deduced from the location of the banks. But if, in the effort to restrict the particles to a precise line of flow, one were to bring the banks infinitely close together, there would be no water, no river, and no banks. This is what determinism does. In a deterministic world everything is completely determined — but this everything is precisely nothing. Whatever happens — but hold! Is not, it happens, a synonym for, it chances? The element of chance is not unrestricted. There is real, not merely logical, possibility. But it is still possibility, not inevitability; it involves maybe's, not mere will-be's. Events come with a freshness, firstness, spontaneity, which is their very particularity. So much for chance.

Incompatibility, like chance, is inherent in particularity. To be actual, concrete, particular, is to be definite, that is de-finite, limited, this but not that, or that but not this. Only pure potentiality can be unlimited, indefinite, and void of incompatibility. Real potentiality is always limited, exclusive; and actuality is the final portion of limitation or exclusiveness. A poet sitting down with an idea for a poem is in a state of mind in which many decisions as to the detail of the poem are not yet made. As they are made, more and more possibilities are excluded. Only as possibilities are thus shut out, condemned to non-actualization, can anything be actualized. The condemned possibilities are not necessarily inferior or evil. The basic incompatibility is not of good with evil, but of good with good. (Bigots, of course, fail to see this.) Moreover, there may be those who are strongly attached to some of the excluded possibilities. Every legislative act excludes things which for some are genuine values. Always someone loses or suffers. This is an element of tragedy inherent in process itself.

Ah, say some, there must be a supramundane, supratemporal, im-

material realm in which the excluded possibilities may be, or are, fulfilled. This implies, in the first place, that our choices have no significance; that they settle nothing as to what is actual and what is not. If the possibilities we reject are not left unactualized, any more than those we accept, then our choices are cosmically null. In the second place, is there any meaning to the notion of an actuality which excludes no possibility? The total realm of possibility itself excludes nothing, *qua* possibility. But it excludes everything, *qua* actuality. (To explicate this fully, we should have to discuss the concept of vagueness.) An actuality which excluded nothing would be coextensive with possibility. But then what would make it actuality rather than possibility? What would be the distinction? The mere word, actuality? Is not the more intelligible assumption that the possibilities each of us rejects are cosmically rejected, really excluded from actualization? True, someone else can ride in the plane in my place if I give up my seat. But the more particular possibility I give up is *my* riding in the plane on that trip, and *this* possibility can never more be actualized. Every choice involves just such final and irrevocable exclusions, valid, I suggest, for the most superior being one can conceive. Two men who each wish to share the central thoughts and experiences of the same woman throughout her life are striving to realize values which are incompatible even from the most ultimate perspective. No being whatever will enjoy both the qualities of shared experiences which can ensue if A achieves such a place in the lady's life, and those which can ensue if B achieves it. (To make marriage so loose and flexible that both men can have what they want will mean that neither can have it. Not that all reform is futile in such matters, but that it cannot eliminate incompatibility.)

As the foregoing example suggests, logical incompatibility, P and not-P, is merely the translation into linguistic form of aesthetic incompatibility. For, as Peirce, Bradley, and Whitehead have noted, the unity of actuality is given as a felt unity, and its laws are laws of feeling. That one cannot feel blue and red as characterizing the same aspect of experience is because the aesthetic values of these qualities are mutually destructive, unless separated and made possibly complementary by some difference of locus. The definiteness of actuality is its value, for in the indefiniteness of mere possibility contrasts are lacking; and value is unity in contrast, beauty in the broadest sense. The

supreme example of such unity is the social harmony which is called love. Love, in the form I have chiefly in mind, is the sense of valuable contrast and unity with another. It is distinguished from hate or indifference as positive evaluation from negative or neutral, and from other forms of positive evaluation or liking in that its object is concrete and singular, not abstract, general, or collective, as in love for mathematics or for mankind. It may seem that there is a further ground of distinction, in that the concrete object of love may be itself a subject with its own feelings and intrinsic values, or not such a subject. If panpsychism is correct, this distinction is verbal only. With Leibniz and many others, I hold that mere matter as such is abstract or collective, and that only panpsychism can give content to it as concrete and singular. When we love a house, we really love an abstraction, a shape, a Gestalt, or else we love a vaguely apprehended collection of singulars (molecules, say) whose characters as singulars are for us indeterminate.

However, the classic failure to see the supremacy of love is found perhaps less in the neglect or denial of panpsychism than in the age-old theory of self-interest as the root motivation. This theory has often been criticized; but few are the philosophies in which the criticism goes far enough. It is often said that if the self which is affirmed in self-interest or self-realization is the highest self, all is well. But it is not merely the kind of self which requires examination, but its numerical identity. Am I simply one self throughout my life? And is my body merely this self in its physical or spatial aspect? Then all relations of my present to my past or future are relations of identity, and likewise all relations to my body. From this standpoint, either love of others or self-love is a metaphysical monstrosity, since in the one the object loved simply transcends our identity, whereas in the other it simply remains within it. Thus the striking empirical parallels between self-love — or self-hatred — and love or hate toward others are explained away. Metaphysically there could be nothing in common, since between sheer identity and sheer nonidentity there is no possibility of mediation. Either self-love must not be called love, but just identity, or love of others cannot be love, but only a ruse of self-interest, serving the identical self, and using the other as means to this end. Again, is it much of an account of the remarkable fact that injury to certain bodily cells is felt as injury to me simply to say that I have or am those cells,

or that they are my physical or material aspect? Is not the notion of absolute, substantial self-identity, as still often accepted in ethics, a logical and scientific anachronism? Since Bolzano, certainly since Whitehead and Russell, logic has known better. Psychology and physiology also know better. But the situation is confused and requires bold clarification. The first step toward a more intelligible view is to recognize with Scholz and a number of other logicians that absolute identity of the concrete or particular is given in an event or occasion, not in a thing enduring through time, like a person or a body. The merely relative identity of the latter may be called, with Levin and Scholz, genetic identity, *Genidentität*. It is logically much weaker than the absolute identity of an event. This logical weakness is, so to speak, the ethical strength of the situation. My life consists of hundreds of thousands of selves, if by self is meant subjects with strict identity. When I love myself, this is no mere relation of identity, but an interest of a present actuality in other and past actualities, as well as in potentialities for future actualization. And these objects of my love are really loved, in that there is sympathy for them, a delight in the contrast and unity between "my" feelings, those of the present strictly identical experience, and the feelings of past or future experiences in the same sequence. It is not because there is an enduring self that there is self-love; rather, it is the relations of sympathetic memory and anticipation between successive experiences that constitute the enduring genidentical self. Memory is a form of sympathy, feeling by one experience of the feelings of other experiences. Anticipation is a more imaginative and reversed form of the same relation. It is bonds of sympathy, not between an entity and itself, but between an experience with its subject pole or focus or ego, and other experiences with their foci, that *make* self-identity.

But, am I not forgetting the body as the bearer of selfhood? In the first place, the body is many things, not just one. It is, for example, many cells, each of these many molecules. And a cell or molecule is a sequence of states or events. Each of these sequences presents the problem of genetic identity over again. Furthermore, what makes a body one's own? What binds an experience or self to a body? According to Ducasse, one's body is that with which one directly and constantly interacts. This is the minimal explication of the relation. But what is interaction? Ducasse agrees with Hume that we have no

a priori insight into causal dependence, whether between physical events or between a physical and a psychical one. True, but we have such insight as between psychical events. Accordingly, but one explanation of the mind-body relation is fully intelligible. It says that every human experience immediately sympathizes with certain other experiences of a drastically subhuman type. The spatial spread of these subhuman experiences is the human body, or at least, the most intimate part of it. When I feel toothache, I suffer; am I alone with this suffering, or is it shared with others? The known fact is that I am not the only living thing involved; for nerve cells are living things. We also know that my pain occurs under conditions injurious to some of my cells. All this is as it would be if the sufferings were not mine alone, but shared with the cells.

That the entire field of aesthetic experience is illuminated by the foregoing theory is manifest. The emotional expressiveness of visual and auditory data is only to be expected if these sensations are sympathetic echoes of the sufferings and enjoyments of cells. The joyous sunshine is joyous, not because visible light is any happier than invisible ultraviolet rays, but because cells stimulated by light are raised to a higher level of self-enjoyed activity. That sense of a world of emotions which constitutes the hearing of music is exactly what is implied if auditory experience is a synthesis of what in actuality is indeed a world of feelings, the miniature, but in its way complex and vast, world of sentient cells. The emergent over-all qualities of the synthesis lift this emotional world up to the human level, and the subhuman contributed feelings serve as iconic signs of contrasting emotional qualities which, in generic aspect, are remotely similar as between us and such things as cells.

If the concrete sensory aspects of experience are forms of love, what about thought, or the abstract aspects? Has not logic been called the social discipline of thinking? He who will not say what he means and stand by its implications is he who will deceive his neighbors, and very likely himself, that is, he is deficient in sympathy with other experiences. Or again, take the predictive aspect of knowledge. Why predict? There is only one reason, because we sympathize with future experience. Even to know what one means by other experiences is already a social and sympathetic state.

The connection of knowledge with sympathy sets limits to the possi-

ble divorce of intelligence and goodness. Did Hitler know his social environment? He saw of it largely what he wanted to see. He saw the weakness of Chamberlain, because that fitted his desires. Did he see the strength concealed in that absurd man, the ultimate love of country and decency? Nothing of the kind. He thought Chamberlain would just go on playing the same game, and the British people with him. One whose mind is filled with the social realities, that is, the joys and sorrows and ideals of those around him, cannot maintain as an island untouched by all this his own egocentric ideal and purposes. The egoist, or if you prefer the fanatic, must manipulate or ration his sympathies (that is, his social relations). Hitler could be kind to a visiting British pacifist. Why not, since the pacifist was his unwitting ally, as well as a cripple? But Hitler could not enter too freely into certain British attitudes because there was that in them which not only was incompatible with the success of his plans but which, worse still, could only be grasped by one whose heart was not quite as Hitler's, a scene of passions that did not dare to own their own names or to see themselves from the standpoint of men of good will.

Some ethical theories seek to furnish sanction for obligation by arguing that since sympathetic emotions are largely pleasant, it is to one's interest to cultivate them. This implies that a man asking for a motive for doing good has for the time being ceased to love his fellows. But if the man has really and utterly put aside all concern for others, then almost all that is human must have left him. And insofar as he does still care about other persons, he *has* a motive for doing good to them—simply that he wants to do so. Must one have a motive for doing what one wants to do? This is to ask a motive for the motive one already has. Yet I am perpetually bedeviled with the suggestion that I must instantly cease to do good if I become convinced that my future welfare will fail to register an increment because I now act on the good will I feel. But what I need in order to act now is not a future motive, but a present one. If I presently feel concern for another and act on this concern, I do now what I now want to do, and it is absurd to ask a reward for doing what one wants to do. That I, the present self, am privileged to act out my wishes is reward enough. The account is closed. Only if I am asked to do good where I do not love or take any interest in the good of others, is it in order to raise the question of reward. For here a motive *is* needed. I may not want to do

good to one I do not cherish, unless some other motive can be furnished — for instance, the hope of reward—as lure to my sympathetic interest in future experiences belonging to my sequence. Given this hope, then perhaps I can do what is asked. Frustrate the hope, and I can complain that I have been misled into a bad bargain, but only on the assumption that I did not love. Hope of reward is a substitute for the intrinsic motive of love.

Is there need for this substitute? I answer, there is political, but not ethical or religious, need. The state and society must hold out rewards, including negative ones or punishments, just to the extent that the minimal requirements of social behavior outrun the amount of love that can be presupposed in men generally. But just to the same extent, men will be legally rather than ethically correct in their conduct. They, or we — for to some extent this applies to all of us — are not really good men if, caring little for the good of others, we yet, because of rewards, promote or at least refrain from injuring that good. Bishop Paley actually presented Christian charity as simply self-regard which takes Heaven and Hell into account.³ Berdyaev well calls such transcendentalized self-interest, “the most disgusting morality ever conceived.” For it carries the denial of the primacy of love farther than an irreligious theory could plausibly carry it, since it is plain enough that in this life concern for others must often be its own reward. If, then, religion claims as its merit that it assists love by furnishing an extrinsic motive, we must reply that this is a merit only on the non-ethical, political level, the level of police action. It is, I hold, the business of the state and other social forms to provide whatever rewards or punishments the deficiencies of love make necessary and to do it so thoroughly that nothing of that sort would be left for any cosmic magistrate.

The function of religion is not to enable us to act as the needs of others require without love for these others, but to enable us to love them as we otherwise could not. How can religion do this? There is only one way. We can only love or cherish people if we become aware of the beauty, actual or potential, that is in them. The religious idea in its best ethical form is that of a cosmic setting of men, and of all things, the consciousness of which exhibits them as more beautiful, more lovable than they appear when we ignore this setting. (Even the

³ *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, Bk. II, chs. ii, iii.

Kantian ethics, in some of its aspects, can be interpreted in this fashion.) How religion effects this enhancement of the sense for the beauty of things is a topic for another occasion. But I may perhaps mention my conviction that it can be done not by transcendentalizing self-interest, nor yet by depreciating, even from the most ultimate perspective, the concepts of chance and incompatibility, but rather by making us aware of a love which takes upon itself the totality of actualized chances, even the most painful.

Let us summarize our results and consider one or two practical applications. We have held that all happenings are to some extent by chance, and that this violates no legitimate ideal of intelligibility or reasonableness. By means of love or sympathy, what happens here and now is made relevant to what happens there and then. Human self-identity is merely a particularly important strand of this relevance. Knowledge and all interest in the past or future are forms of sympathy. Because of chance and incompatibility between possibilities, the world is partly wild and ever somewhat dangerous — as William James delighted to note. His passion here was no more than was needed to correct the bias of the great tradition in favor of some cosmic, all-detailed, infallibly executed design, some chain of syllogisms or dialectical progressions from some blessed first premise out of which, as a necessary conclusion, my hat and your toothache would eventually emerge. A chance world, that is, any world, has a tinge of tragedy in its constitution. A multiplicity of decisions irreducible to any single decision means a multiplicity of relationships that literally no one has decided, if that means chosen. Now in some of these relationships there is social harmony, in some social discord. Just which occur when is a matter of mere chance, not of choice or necessity. It follows that we must break once for all with the confused dream of an existence simply beyond the reach of chance and tragedy. Absolute protection against conflict or suffering is a mirage.

This does not exclude every conception of providential guidance of events. Rather it means that providence can reasonably be conceived, not as a simple alternative to chance, its mere negation or prevention, but only as a channeling of chances between banks less than infinitely close together. The function of providence is not to enforce a maximal ratio of good to evil, but a maximal ratio of chances of good to chances of evil. That chances of evil remain is not because evil is good or useful

after all, but because chances of evil overlap with chances of good. A dead man has no chance of suffering, also none of enjoyment. The principle is universal and *a priori*. Tone down sensitiveness and spontaneity, and one reduces the risk of suffering but also the opportunities for depth of enjoyment. All the utopias are tame, just because vitality has been sacrificed to reduce risk. Opportunity, willy-nilly, drops too. Tragedy is thus inherent in value.

For thousands of years men have sought some way to avoid recognizing this. Buddhism, Stoicism, the Christian and Mohammedan theory of Providence and of heaven as commonly interpreted, the Marxian dream of a practically conflict-free society, all are tinged with this escapism. And the result is not that tragedy is genuinely averted; just the contrary, the effect of these evasions is itself tragic in high degree. We shall be able better to minimize tragedy when we face it resolutely as in principle inevitable, though in detail always open to amelioration. The Christian idea of the redeemed as wholly happy in the knowledge that others are damned is a tragic renunciation of sympathy which Berdyaev has gone so far as to term sadistic. The notion of an all-arranging, chance-excluding providence is doubly tragic; it is cruel, for it compels us to try to imagine that our worst tortures are deliberately contrived for our own or someone's good by an allegedly all-loving being, and it is dangerous, for it suggests that we need not use our own resources to avert evil where possible and to help others in danger and privation.

Over and over we find practical programs vitiated by their failure to reckon sufficiently with the principles we have been discussing. Classical economics, although not so worthless or irrelevant as Marxists allege, is nevertheless weakened by two almost metaphysical deficiencies. On the one hand, it toys with the idea of an invisible hand which always and infallibly brings beneficent results out of individual motivations; and on the other, it toys with the idea that human beings should resign themselves to being, outside of family relations, simply selfish and calculating, rather than beings whose very core is love or social solidarity. Thus it is uncomfortably close to the metaphysical blunders of trying to separate chance from tragedy and of denying the primacy of love. The market may be, and I take it it is, a marvellous mechanism for usefully co-ordinating actions in ways not intended by the actors; but it is not an absolute or all-sufficient mechanism. Its

more or less inevitable tragedies must be carefully compared with those of available alternatives for this and that portion of our economic life. On the other hand, Marxian planning and dictatorship seem excessive limitations upon the chance-spontaneity of the many, and Marxian solidarity seems to ask both too much and too little of human love. Blanket socialistic or antisocialistic dogmas are pseudo absolutes, not justified by the genuine absolutes, which are the ultimate factors of chance and love in correct mutual adjustment. This adjustment requires that destructive conflict arising from incompatibility of values should be mitigated without paying too high a price in loss of individuality, from which spontaneity, chance, and danger cannot be eliminated. It is through love that tragedy is, not indeed wholly prevented, but made bearable and given whatever beauty it is capable of. The love that can do this is that which expects to share with others the sufferings from which no actuality, human or superhuman — subject as all must be to chance and incompatibility — can entirely escape. Such love is not, as Plato thought, the search for the supreme beauty. In its highest human and superhuman forms it simply is that beauty.

The branch of secular science that is bringing us back to this principle, long ago, though seldom consistently, professed by religious teachers, is psychiatry. Some look to this science to finish the job of discrediting religious ideas. But, as Karl Menninger has pointed out, the basic religious idea (at least in our Judeo-Christian tradition) is identical with that of psychiatry — the idea that love is the key to life's riddles. If it be objected that religious love is *agape*, and that the love with which psychiatrists are chiefly or wholly concerned is *eros*, I reply that in this famous distinction Nygren (with whom I have discussed this matter) none too well expresses his own meaning and has often been misunderstood — as no doubt have the psychiatrists. Theologians and philosophers might well join with Menninger in longing for the day when, as he says, "We shall have accorded to love that preeminence which it deserves in our scale of values; we shall seek it and proclaim it as the highest virtue and the greatest boon. . . . Love is the medicine for the sickness of the world, a prescription often given, too rarely taken."⁴ Menninger also quotes from Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* some words which suggest a reason why men have so

⁴ Karl Menninger, *Love against Hate* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1942), pp. 293-94.

often turned to lesser ideas than that of love, the reason that otherwise the greatness of their theme might have made only too plain the littleness of all that they could say about it. Burton's words are these: "To enlarge [upon] or illustrate the power and effect of love is to set a candle in the sun."⁵ Behold then my candle; or rather, behold the sun!

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

The University of Chicago

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

1948-1949

TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES (1948)

During the summer of 1948 Cornelius Krusé tendered his resignation as Executive Director of the Council in order to resume the teaching of philosophy at Wesleyan University. This resignation was accepted with deep regret. During his year in office Mr. Krusé had guided the Council skillfully through the difficult transition to the new constitution; he had strengthened the basis of its financial support; he had shown new possibilities of service by the Council to the humanities; and he had done much (particularly through an extended trip to the West in the spring of this year) to make the purposes and activities of the Council better known to workers in the humanities. In accepting his resignation, the Board of Directors elected him a member of the Board to fill the unexpired term of Marjorie Nicolson.

Mr. Krusé was succeeded as Executive Director by Charles E. Odegaard, formerly Professor of Medieval History and Assistant to the Dean of the Graduate School at the University of Illinois. Mr. Odegaard, a graduate of Dartmouth College, received his Ph.D. in History from Harvard in 1937. During the war he was on active duty for four years with the Navy, rising to the rank of Lieutenant Commander, and was cited for outstanding performance during the operations against the Japanese forces in the Gilbert, Marshall, and Palau Islands. Mr. Odegaard began his duties as Executive Director of the Council on September 1, 1948.

The range and variety of the Council's activities during the past year can best be exhibited through a list of its committees, most of which have been very active either in exploring new problems or in the execution of established projects: Committee on Far Eastern Studies, Committee on the History of Religions, Committee on Indic and Iranian Studies, Committee on the Language Program, Committee on Negro Studies, Committee on Renaissance Studies, Committee on the Russian Translation Project, Committee on the Recovery of Archaeological Remains, Committee on American Speech, Committee on American Civilization, Committee on Near Eastern Studies, Committee on Musicology, Pacific Coast Committee for the Humanities. The Council also participates with

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

the other councils (the National Research Council, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council on Education) in certain joint committees dealing with areas or problems of mutual concern, viz., the Committee for the International Exchange of Persons, the Committee on American Native Languages, the Committee on the History of Science in the United States, and the Committee on Slavic Studies.

Besides the activities represented by these committees, the Council has been particularly concerned during the past year with two problems of a more general character: the international exchange of scholarly personnel and the recruitment, in this country, of scholarly personnel for the humanities. The administration of the Fulbright Act requires careful work in the screening of applicants and in the setting of criteria and standards for the award of grants-in-aid. The Department of State, through its Board of Foreign Scholarships, has enlisted the aid of the Conference Board of the Associated Research Councils, which represents the four councils above mentioned, and which has been meeting with increasing frequency. The operation of the Displaced Persons Bill will also result, in all probability, in bringing to this country a number of foreign scholars who are potential assets to our intellectual life. One of the purposes of the Committee on the International Exchange of Persons is to study means whereby these displaced scholars may be rehabilitated and reinstated as intellectual workers in their new environment. The A.C.L.S. is also participating with the other councils in an important study of Human Resources and the Higher Learning, a study inspired by the fear that competition for the limited supply of the most talented youth is affecting adversely the recruitment of scientific and scholarly talent for the areas represented by the various councils. The A.C.L.S. is working effectively, on its own account, to encourage young scholars in the humanities through its award of fellowships, both predoctoral and postdoctoral. The total of these awards has been around \$50,000 a year for the past few years, and the continuance of the program is assured by a new three-year grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

The Council is a member of the U.S. Commission for UNESCO, and was represented by two delegates at the meeting of UNESCO in Brussels last August. The Council was also represented at the meeting last summer of the International Union of Academies, also held in Brussels.

The annual meeting of the Council (the thirty-first in its history) was held at the Westchester Country Club at Rye, New York, January 29 and 30, 1948. The Board of Directors met four times during the year: in January at Rye, New York, and in March, June, and October at the headquarters of the Council in Washington.

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES (1949 Meeting)

The annual meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies was held at the Claridge Hotel in Atlantic City, January 27-28, 1949. The American Philosophical Association was represented by its delegate, Glenn R. Morrow, and by Cornelius Krusé, as a member of the Board of Directors. Another member of the association, Frank H. Knight, was present as delegate of the American Economic Association. The annual meeting was preceded by the annual

PROCEEDINGS

Conference of Secretaries of Constituent Societies, at which George R. Geiger was present as Secretary of the American Philosophical Association.

The Executive Director presented a statement on the operation of the Fulbright Program. He explained the complexity of the negotiations with foreign countries that have to be successfully concluded before grants-in-aid can become available and cautioned patience with respect to particular fields or projects. The program as it is being worked out is a very ambitious one, and it will probably be in operation for many years. Apart from the delicacy of the negotiations involved, the sound establishment of such a program requires time.

Another matter of great interest to the Council was the Director's report on problems of manpower in the humanities. He reminded the Council of the forces at work to discourage the perpetuation of social and humanistic studies, through the diversion of talented youth into other programs of national service supported by large appropriations. Since the supply of the kind of talent that can carry on such activities as are represented in the Council is limited, we must endeavor to find ways of assuring that the claims of our fields are not neglected. The Conference Board of the Associated Research Councils has a special committee at work on this problem, and the Director also informed the Council that various agencies of the Government, such as the Manpower Division of the National Security Resources Board and the Personnel Policy Board of the Department of Defense, are giving consideration to it.

With respect to Selective Service, the Director reported that General Hershey has expressed his desire to find a policy governing deferments that would recognize the national interest in the preservation of all activities of our Western culture. To this end he has appointed five advisory committees representing the whole range of higher learning, from the engineering sciences to the humanities. Our Director has sat with these committees and reported his satisfaction with the proposals that are being submitted to General Hershey and with General Hershey's sympathetic attitude toward them.

The problem of publication, which has resulted from the sharply increased costs of recent years, has become a serious one for most of the constituent societies. The Director announced that Mr. Henry M. Silver had been appointed to the staff of the Executive Offices to render advisory services to the constituent societies on their particular problems of publication.

The officers elected for the ensuing year were the following: Cornelius Krusé, Chairman; John A. Wilson, Vice-Chairman; Lewis Hanke, Secretary; S. Whittemore Boggs, Treasurer.

GLENN R. MORROW

COMMITTEES

Permanent Committee on Bibliography

The past year has been notable in the field of philosophical bibliography chiefly for the reappearance of the *Bibliography of Philosophy* (now published in both French and English), edited by the *Institut International de Philosophie* of Paris, which is now an official organ of the newly formed *International Federation of Philosophical Societies* and is a publication sponsored and supported by UNESCO. The central task of compilation is carried on by Professor Raymond

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

Bayer of the Sorbonne, Professor Ake Petzäll of Lund, and by Mlle Suzanne Delorme of the *Institut*. They are assisted by compilers in many countries; in the United States this work has been done chiefly by Professor Helmut Kuhn and by Mr. Emerson Buchanan, Secretary of this Committee. In spite of the great obstacles produced by the war, these persons have managed to gather a bibliography for the war years, during which regular publication was impossible. They are now offering the bibliography as before, semiannually, and have enlarged it by adding translations of titles into English, as well as other useful features. It is important that subscriptions to this bibliography be renewed now, since practically all of them lapsed during the war; the publication cannot receive the continued support of UNESCO unless it is vigorously supported by the members of the International Federation and by libraries.

The subscription price to nonmembers is \$3.00, to members \$2.00, plus postage of 75¢. Subscription blanks and information can be obtained from Professor Raymond Bayer, 51 Avenue Georges-Mandel, Paris, 16e. He requests that checks be made to the account of the *Union des Banques Suisses*, 1 Place St. Francois, Lausanne, Switzerland. However, for the convenience of American members the Secretary of this Committee will serve as a clearinghouse for American subscriptions. Send checks for \$2.75 to Emerson Buchanan, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.

It may be appropriate to mention in this report that through the initiative and generosity of Dr. Simon Millner, President of the Spinoza Foundation, with the co-operation of Mr. Buchanan, our Secretary, and of American authors and publishers, an impressive exhibit of American philosophical publications was arranged at the Xth International Congress in Amsterdam last August. These publications become the property of Dutch university libraries.

Requests for exchange of books have come to this Committee from philosophers in various countries of Europe, particularly Germany, who because of the difficulties of currency regulations find it impossible to buy American books, but who are in a position to carry on a considerable exchange by barter. The Committee has hopes of arranging some more or less systematic scheme for conducting exchanges among authors and owners of books. Members of the Association who may be particularly interested in such an exchange are requested to inform some member of this Committee.

For the Committee,
HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER, *Chairman*

Publication Committee

Professor Gregory D. Walcott, General Editor of Source Books in the History of the Sciences, has submitted the following report:

The long-awaited *Source Book in Greek Science* by the late Morris R. Cohen and Dr. I. E. Drabkin has just come from the press. This is very gratifying. Professor Thomas S. Hall of Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., has indicated that the manuscript for a *Source Book in Zoology* will be turned over to the publishers by January 1, 1949. Dr. Henry M. Leicester of the College of Physicians and Surgeons, San Francisco, Calif., has taken over the task of completing the manuscript for a *Source Book in Chemistry*. He is being assisted by Mr. Herbert S. Klickstein, who has access to the Edgar F. Smith Collection at the University of Pennsylvania. These two men have taken hold of this project very vigorously. Professor Richard McKeon of the University of Chi-

PROCEEDINGS

cago has written that he is making some progress in preparing a manuscript for a *Source Book in Mediaeval Science*. No one has yet been secured to finish the manuscript for a *Source Book in Botany*, but search for the right man is continuing. These points picture the present status of this undertaking.

In connection with the publication of the *Source Book in Greek Science* mentioned by Professor Walcott, it was found that sharply rising costs made necessary a revision of the terms of the original Memorandum of Agreement between the Association and McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., the publishers (so far without subsidy) of the series. During the summer the terms were renegotiated by Professor Walcott with the approval of the Advisory Board of the series, and of this Committee, to provide that the list price of *Source Book of Greek Science* might be \$9.00 (the former limit was 1¼ cents per page), and for a reduction in the scale of royalties, rather than a subvention from the revolving fund.

No recommendations of manuscripts for grants-in-aid of publication from the A.C.L.S. have been made during the year. One manuscript is still before the Committee for consideration.

For the Committee,
HAROLD A. LARRABEE, *Chairman*

Committee on International Cultural Cooperation

In accordance with a recent vote of the National Board of Officers, a National Committee on International Cultural Cooperation was created with the following membership: Cornelius Krusé, chairman; Edgar S. Brightman, Richard McKeon, F. S. C. Northrop, W. R. Dennes, Charles W. Morris, Arthur E. Murphy, George Boas, Susanne K. Langer, W. E. Hocking. The period of appointment initially is for four, three, and two years, respectively. All appointments hereafter will be for four years.

In the past year the Rockefeller grant for visiting professors from Latin America has been amended to include the possibility of awarding grants-in-aid to Latin American professors or philosophers for specific studies which give promise of proving helpful to North American philosophers in their efforts to obtain a better understanding of philosophy in Latin America. At the same time the period for which the Fund is available was extended to December 31, 1951.

Clarence Finlayson, originally from Chile, but with many years of teaching experience in Medellín, Colombia, was visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina for the first quarter of the scholarship year, 1948-1949. Risieri Frondizi, formerly Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tucumán and more recently Professor at the University of Venezuela, was visiting Professor at the University of Pennsylvania for the first semester and is currently teaching in the same capacity at Swarthmore College. Leopoldo Zea is under appointment in Mexico as research fellow in the history of Latin-American philosophy, in accordance with the amended provisions of the Rockefeller grant.

The *Proceedings* of the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy held at Columbia, December 28-31, 1947, have appeared as the March issue of the *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. Generous grants for publishing the *Proceedings* were received from the Bollingen Foundation and the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation.

The Third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy will be held in Mexico early in 1950.

Members of the Association are no doubt aware that at the Tenth Inter-

national Congress of Philosophy at Amsterdam the International Federation of Philosophical Societies was created. A full account of its formation, its officers, and a complete statement of its statutes in the official French version was given in the *Journal of Philosophy* for November 4, 1948, by Herbert W. Schneider, who was elected one of the three vice-presidents of the Federation and member of its Executive Committee. Marten ten Hoor and Richard P. McKeon are also members of this committee.

On September 8-11, 1948, there was held in Paris an organizational meeting of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies under the auspices of UNESCO. Professor H. J. Pos, president of the Congress at Amsterdam, was the chief representative of the Federation of Philosophical Societies at this meeting, with Professor Raymond Bayer, general secretary of the Federation, as alternate.

For the Committee,

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ, *Chairman*

Report of the Delegate to the American Documentation Institute

During the emergency, ADI assisted the war effort, chiefly by helping the Alien Property Custodian to list, sift, and translate books on scientific and technological subjects with copyrights in enemy countries. Recently ADI has been endeavoring to adjust itself to the postwar scene by constructing a program which involves activities on the international level as well as new operations at home.

At the 17th International Conference of FID (Berne, 1947), ADI was officially recognized as the U.S. representative of FID, whose program envisages a variety of projects in classification, standardization, co-ordination and promotion. Examples are: (1) a compilation of directories (or guides) to documentation, information and reproduction services; (2) a compilation of small, specialized subject lists of periodicals; (3) a new edition of the *Index Bibliographicus*; (4) an attempt at standardization of nomenclature and the publication of a multilingual vocabulary of librarianship; (5) a study and co-ordination of abstracting services (in collaboration with UNESCO); (6) a study and standardization of filing and classification systems, of bibliographical methods, and of methods of document reproduction; and (7) the publication of an international quarterly, the *Review of Documentation*.

This year, at its Annual Meeting and subsequent Board meetings, ADI voted to: (1) co-operate with FID; (2) create its own committees on classification, bibliography, and abstracting; (3) take steps toward the establishing of a journal of its own; (4) continue its usual activities, such as the microfilming of books and journals, "auxiliary publication," and "getting literature out of libraries and onto the desks of research workers"; and (5) ask each nominating agency to make an "annual contribution of \$25.00-\$100.00" toward financing ADI's program.

In my judgment these projects contemplated by ADI (and FID) are valuable undertakings and any sum which the American Philosophical Association sees fit to send to ADI will be well spent. Therefore I hope that our Association will be willing to share in the expense of this work.

RAYMOND P. HAWES

PROCEEDINGS

Report of the Delegate to the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy

The Tenth International Congress of Philosophy was held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, on August 11 to 18, 1948. The meetings were held in the main university building of the University of Amsterdam. Professor H. J. Pos, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam, had been elected President of the Congress by the Organizing Committee. In his opening address he made reference to the fact that it had been understood from the time that the Congress was assigned to the Netherlands that Professor Leo Polak was to be Chairman of the Organizing Committee and President. Professor Polak was betrayed by one of his colleagues and executed by the Germans during the war. In addition to a commemorative biographical sketch by Professor Pos, a small orchestra from the famous Amsterdam Orchestra played a number on the program as a memorial to Professor Polak.

The Organizing Committee of the Congress was constituted of professors of philosophy from the principal Dutch universities. His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands was the patron of the Congress. An imposing honorary committee had been selected. (It was reported that someone, in typical professorial fashion, had unfortunately forgotten to send invitations to the honorary committee so that they were not present to add luster to the meetings.)

I think it might be interesting to give some statistics about the Congress. There were two business sessions for official delegates, five plenary sessions devoted to papers, and seventy different meetings of twenty different sections. There were 297 papers listed, not all of which were read. The size of the Congress in terms of space-time concepts was impressive. The abstracts added up to 943 printed pages. The estimated length of all papers is 4,455 double-spaced pages, which would make about seven volumes of philosophy.

Twenty-nine countries were represented at the Congress. The official languages were French and English. There were 186 papers in French and 99 papers in English. In addition, there were eleven papers in German and one in Italian. The growth of English as an international language was indicated by the large number of papers in English. It is particularly interesting to note that seven Polish delegates, two Czechoslovakian delegates, and three Hungarian delegates, delegates thus from the satellite countries, submitted papers in English. It should be pointed out that the volume of abstracts is not to be accepted as a report of the papers presented, for several papers were read by title. In connection with the number of countries represented, it should also be noted that Russia refused an invitation to the Congress, indicating that it looked upon it as an agency of the capitalistic countries, and that Poland at the last minute refused visas to its professors.

It is rather interesting to know that the papers were distributed by countries as follows: France, 65; United States, 33; Netherlands, 26; Belgium, 24; England, 21; Poland, 18; Switzerland, 15; Italy, 14; Czechoslovakia, 12; Germany, 9; Hungary, 5; Denmark, Spain, and Turkey, 4 each; Argentina, Austria, and Sweden, 3 each. The other countries were represented by less than three papers each.

In raising the question of philosophical trends in the Congress I must confess that I have only my own impression and impressions and reports of colleagues to go by. If impressions and reports were correct, there were no official existen-

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

tialists present at the Congress, though there were many references to existentialism. There was strong interest in philosophy of language, signification, various types of symbolic logic, and logical analysis. It seemed to me that the Congress was noticeably characterized by an apparent lack of interest in vitalism, neovitalism, and theories of that type. Papers in these fields and trends of thought used to appear in substantial numbers on programs of international congresses.

There was considerable interest in the philosophy of civilization, culture, and history, which was to be expected in view of the condition of the world and recent history. It was clear that Toynbee and other philosophers of history had interested many people. There were many papers which were definitely oriented to Catholic theology. It was remarked that an unusually large number of clerics were in attendance at the Congress. I was struck by the noticeable absence of papers in the orthodox, objective, idealist tradition. Part of this was, no doubt, due to the absence of German philosophers, who have always played the heavy roles in international philosophical congresses. I think it can with justice be said that the Congress was greatly occupied with ethics and with general philosophical theories and their relation to the international situation.

There seemed to be a noticeable lack of humor and of the lighter tone in philosophical papers. Several colleagues from other countries remarked to me on what they described as the calm and urbane tone of papers read by Americans. One of them added the observation that this was to be expected in view of the fact that we were living so far from the center of world strife and conflict.

I think I should say a word about the business meetings. At the first business meeting there was a long wrangle about the seating of delegates, which was settled finally by the decision to seat delegates by nations and not by philosophical societies. The confusion was due to some lack of system in the accreditation of delegates. The second important issue brought up was the discussion of the constitution of a proposed permanent international philosophical organization. There seemed at first to be a rather strong minority opposition to the organization of an international confederation, but this later seemed to disappear. Some of the opposition seemed to represent "national interests." At a second meeting the organization was perfected, and there was established the International Confederation of Philosophical Societies. As the title indicates, membership is to be held by Philosophical Societies. A board of directors of thirty-one members was elected. Professor Richard McKeon was elected as a representative of UNESCO; Professor H. W. Schneider and the writer were elected as representatives of the American Philosophical Association. Professor Pos was made President. Professor Herbert Schneider was elected one of the Vice-Presidents. The office of the Confederation is to be in Paris, with Professor Raymond Bayer as Secretary-General.

MARTEN TEN HOOR

PROCEEDINGS

AUDIT REPORT

Professor George R. Geiger, Secretary-Treasurer
American Philosophical Association
Yellow Springs, Ohio

Dear Sir:

I have made an examination of your records for the period April 16, 1948 to May 1, 1949, and submit herewith my report consisting of this letter and the following exhibits:

EXHIBIT A—Summary of Cash Receipts and Disbursements for the period April 16, 1948 to May 1, 1949.

EXHIBIT B—Reconciliation of Fund Balances to Securities and Cash in Bank as at May 1, 1949.

The amount of cash on hand at May 1, 1949 has been verified by correspondence with your depositories. Securities in the form of United States Treasury Bonds, Series G, were inspected at the Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

All receipts were compared with bank deposits and all disbursements were evidenced by cancelled checks or supporting vouchers.

In my opinion, the attached statements fairly reflect the results of activity for the period ending May 1, 1949.

Respectfully submitted,
D. A. MAGRUDER, *Public Accountant*
Professor of Accounting, Antioch College

Yellow Springs, Ohio
May 13, 1949

EXHIBIT A

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Summary of Cash Receipts and Disbursements Period April 16, 1948 to May 1, 1949

	General	Revolving	Rockefeller
	Treasury	Fund for Publication	Fund
<i>Fund Balances, April 16, 1948</i>	\$ 531.29	\$11,085.20	\$ 5,860.71
<i>Cash Receipts:</i>			
Dues and Pro-rata Cost of Proceedings:			
Eastern Division—1948.....	532.68		
Western Division—1948.....	468.58		
Pacific Division—1948.....	236.59		
Eastern Division—1949.....	349.50		
Sale of Proceedings.....	8.56		
Additional Contribution to International Federation from Eastern Division....	69.90		
From Bollingen Foundation, for Latin-American Proceedings.....	2,000.00		
From Littauer Foundation, for Latin-American Proceedings.....	1,000.00		
From Leys—for typing envelopes.....	12.15		
Royalties—from McGraw-Hill Book Company.....		398.72	
Interest on U. S. Treasury Bonds and Savings Account.....		304.95	
From Rockefeller Foundation.....			10,000.00
<i>Total Cash Receipts</i>	<i>\$4,677.96</i>	<i>\$ 703.67</i>	<i>\$10,000.00</i>
<i>Total Cash Available</i>	<i>\$5,209.25</i>	<i>\$11,788.87</i>	<i>\$15,860.71</i>

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

Cash Disbursements:

Printing Proceedings, 1947-1948, PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.....	\$ 903.54.		
Printing Proceedings, Latin-American—to Farber, Nahm, and Schneider	2,488.93		
Dues—American Council of Learned Societies	45.00		
Express and Packing of Proceedings and Files	46.05	22.79	
Postage.....	15.00		
Telephone and Telegraph.....			7.25
Stationery, Printing, and Supplies.....	10.60		
Secretarial and Stenographic Aid.....	28.50		
Bank Charges and Safe Deposit Box Rental..	5.10		
Audit, Grant—1947-1948.....	57.89		
To Clarence Finlayson.....			1,938.50
To Leopold Zea.....			1,200.00
To Risieri Frondizi.....			6,000.00
To Risieri Frondizi, for travel expense.....			188.10
Dues—International Federation.....	28.53		
Additional Contribution to International Federation from Eastern Division.....	70.80		
Expenses of Secretary-Treasurer to UNESCO meeting in Cleveland.....	29.20		
Expenses on Source Book of Chemistry.....		29.52	
<i>Total Disbursements</i>	<u>\$3,729.14</u>	<u>\$ 52.31</u>	<u>\$ 9,333.85</u>
<i>Fund Balances, May 1, 1949</i>	<u>\$1,480.11</u>	<u>\$11,736.56</u>	<u>\$ 6,526.86</u>

EXHIBIT B

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Reconciliation of Fund Balances to Securities and Cash in Bank as at May 1, 1949

Summary of Fund Balances:

General Treasury.....	\$ 1,480.11
Revolving Fund for Publication.....	11,736.56
Rockefeller Fund.....	6,526.86
<i>Total all Funds</i>	<u>\$19,743.53</u>

Summary of Securities and Cash in Bank:

United States Treasury Bonds, Series G (in safe deposit vault at Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio).....	\$ 7,800.00
Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio, checking account.....	2,852.72
Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio, savings account number 4275.....	2,563.95
Middletown National Bank, Middletown, Connecticut, checking account.....	6,526.86
<i>Total Securities and Cash in Bank</i>	<u>\$19,743.53</u>

PROCEEDINGS

Report of the Secretary of the Board of Officers

The most important activities of the Association during the past year are described in the minutes of the divisions and in the reports of various delegates and committees. For the two chief items which concerned the board were the problem of reorganizing the Association and the question of devising more techniques for continued international co-operation.

In the minutes of the Eastern Division will be found the details of the proposed reorganization proposals. Since both the Eastern and Western Divisions have ratified in principle the idea of reorganization (the Pacific Division opposed the plan), a committee is at present making a further study of the idea, hoping to report back later to the board and to the Divisions.

International co-operation was given a stimulus by the appointment of a Committee on International Cultural Co-operation, with Cornelius Krusé as chairman. (The personnel of the committee will be found listed in the roster of committees.) The committee has already begun to function.

The Association was well represented at last summer's international meeting in Amsterdam, and a report of that meeting by Marten ten Hoor will be found in the *Proceedings*. The Association was also represented at other international gatherings, including the national conference of UNESCO.

The membership continues to grow and is now not far from 1,100.

For the Board of Officers,

GEORGE R. GEIGER, *Secretary-Treasurer*

EASTERN DIVISION

President: Walter T. Stace

Vice-President: John Wild

Secretary-Treasurer: Milton C. Nahm

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and Herbert W. Schneider *ex officio* for one year, Fulton H. Anderson (1949), Henry S. Leonard (1949), Max Black (1950), Sidney Hook (1950), Lewis W. Beck (1951), Glenn R. Morrow (1951).

The forty-fifth meeting of the Eastern Division was held at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Va., December 27, 28, 29, 1948. The following program was presented:

Concurrent Sessions

Logical Positivism (Chairman, Max Black)

What Is an Individual?.....	A. J. Ayer
Ethical Predicates	Henry S. Leonard
Explanation	C. West Churchman
The Concept of Verifiability.....	Thomas A. Goudge

The History of Philosophy (Chairman, George Boas)

Plato and the Law of Nature.....	Glenn R. Morrow
Leibniz's Doctrine of Natural Law.....	Paul Schrecker
The Philosophical Problem of History.....	A. R. Caponigri

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

Plenary Session

Moral and Social Philosophy (Chairman, Milton C. Nahm)

- The Notion of Responsibility.....Christopher Salmon
Can Utilitarianism be Formulated in Naturalistic Terms?.....Lucius Garvin
The Two Realms of Ethics.....Hans Margolius

Discussion

Problems of World Society and World Government (Chairman, Susanne K. Langer)

Discussion Panel: William Higginbotham, John Collier, Karl Polanyi

Presidential Address

Metaphysical VisionHerbert W. Schneider

Plenary Session

The Philosophy of Science (Chairman, Sidney Hook)

- The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences.....Ernest Nagel
Purpose and Causality.....Y. H. Krikorian
Postulates for Physical Time.....Erwin Biser

Concurrent Sessions

The Philosophy of History (Chairman, Herbert W. Schneider)

- Nature and History.....Erich Frank
The Nature of Historical Objectivity.....Helen M. Lynd
Toynbee and the Categories of Interpretation.....John W. Blyth

Metaphysics (Chairman, Fulton H. Anderson)

- A Realistic Defense of Causal Efficacy.....John Wild
Hume on Scientific Law.....Chester Townsend Ruddick
SubstratumMorris Lazerowitz

Group Meetings

The Charles S. Peirce Society

- The Paradox of Peirce's Realism.....Manley H. Thompson
A View of the Future of Peirce's Ideas.....James K. Feibleman

The Personalist Discussion Group

The Association for Realistic Philosophy

- Some Reflections on Reason and Being.....Helmut Kuhn

The annual Business Meeting was held at 11:00 A.M., December 29, with President Schneider presiding. The minutes of the forty-fourth annual meeting were approved as printed.

The following Treasurer's Report was read and approved:

PROCEEDINGS

FINANCIAL STATEMENT: DECEMBER 23, 1947, TO DECEMBER 23, 1948

Receipts:

Balance on hand, December 23, 1947	
Book value of government bonds	\$1,500.00
Commercial account	1,687.30
Membership dues	1,152.00
Interest on government bonds	37.50
Contribution, A. A. Berle, Sr., to Inter-American Congress	50.00
	<u>\$4,426.80</u>

Expenditures:

National dues for 1948	\$ 318.00
Cost of 1946-47 <i>Proceedings</i>	432.48
Cost of 1947-48 <i>Proceedings</i>	516.38
Expenses of officers and committees	94.24
Secretarial assistance	104.40
Printing (including programs of Second Inter-American Congress) and mimeographing	460.26
Committee on Information Service	100.00
Stationery and postage	164.85
Transfer membership	2.00
Check returned	2.00
	<u>\$2,195.01</u>

Balance on hand..... \$2,231.79

The Auditing Committee, Douglas V. Steere and Richard B. Brandt, reported that the Treasurer's Report had been examined and found correct.

Following a report of the increased expenses of the Division, particularly for printing and labor, it was voted unanimously to raise the dues of the members of the Eastern Division from two to four dollars per year.

The following Memorial Minutes were read, and by a rising vote were adopted and ordered printed in the *Proceedings*:

Bruce Wallace Brotherston, Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, in Tufts College, died April 17, 1947, in his seventieth year. He was born, of Scotch ancestry, at Coboury, Ontario, August 12, 1877. He married Jessie May Bowen in 1907 and had two children. A tinsmith (and Charter President of the Sheet Metal Workers' Union in North Adams and Adams), he supported himself by this trade before and during his undergraduate years at Williams College, from which he graduated in 1903. He then studied for the ministry at Andover Theological Seminary, received the degree of S.T.B. in 1906, was a teaching fellow there the following year, and devoted the next thirteen years to the ministry in the Congregational Church, except for one year of graduate study as Andover Fellow at Harvard. As a minister (and still a tinsmith, once reroofing his church with his own hands) he preached the social gospel, but growing friction between his liberal ideals and the more conservative views of his parishioners led him to abandon this vocation for philosophy. He studied at Harvard, where he received the degree of Ph.D. in 1923. He was professor of philosophy at St. Lawrence University from 1923 to 1930, and at Tufts College from 1930 until his retirement in 1944. He then acquired a greenhouse and grew flowers commercially until the time of his death.

The practical interests indicated by his varied career and his social approach to philosophy and religion were reflected in his teaching, his articles on epistemology and ethics, and his book *A Philosophy for Liberalism*. Humble, infinitely patient, and devoted to his students, he was in turn respected and loved by them.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

His sense of humor and fund of stories enlivened his lectures, but his technical language made them difficult for the less rigorous minds. James and Dewey were outstanding influences on his thinking. He was a pragmatist in philosophy and a liberal in religion. He devoted the latter part of his life to the elaboration of a constructive liberal philosophy suitable for our day, based on what he called "the ancient conception of moral good as an organic interknitting of positive responsibilities in which all men are involved by virtue of the fact that sociality is a demand of the inner nature of each." This is the philosophy which he taught in his classes and practiced in his life.

GEORGE B. BURCH

Emmanuel Chapman was born February 7, 1905, in Chicago, Illinois. He attended the University of Chicago from 1921 until 1924 but received his A.B. degree from Loyola University in 1931. Devoted to art and literature as well as philosophy, he spent much time in Europe cultivating the friendship of certain artists and philosophers to whom he felt drawn. While on one of his visits to Europe he met Jacques Maritain, and soon there sprang up between these two a deep and lasting friendship which was to influence his future development in large degree. While in Paris he sent articles to the *Chicago Post's* weekly art magazine. Returning to this country after some time in Europe, he wrote a book on the American artist William Schwartz, which was published in 1929.

In 1931 he enrolled in the Institute of Mediaeval Studies in the University of Toronto, now the Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, to study medieval currents of thought under the direction of Étienne Gilson. In 1934 he received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Toronto, where he held a teaching fellowship. As a graduate student he entered deeply into the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. But he was also fascinated by the thought of St. Augustine, and indeed wrote his doctoral dissertation on Augustinian aesthetics, under the title *St. Augustine's Philosophy of Beauty*, which was published by Sheed and Ward. Already as a student he exhibited what was so characteristic of all his thinking — an appreciation of a thinker's importance in terms of the real problems he brought before the mind. This same characteristic explains his constant preoccupation with problems regardless of whether they were first proposed within a materialistic setting, such as the Marxian, or whether they came to life in the theory and practice of a psychologist like Freud. Before his death he was planning to commit to writing his many profound insights on Freud as they affected his own philosophical standpoint, which he described as a living Thomism, very far removed from much that went under the name of Thomism, and which he seemed to believe was little more than St. Thomas' Latin translated into English.

After receiving his doctorate, he taught at the University of Notre Dame until 1936 and then at Fordham University from 1936 until 1944, when he joined the Hunter College faculty. He was an annual contributor to the *Encyclopedia Americana*, *Philosophic Abstracts*, *Journal of Aesthetics*, and other periodicals.

There was another outstanding trait of the man, which endeared him to many and also brought much turbulence to his life, namely, his unflinching sense of civic responsibility and his intense dislike of theory that had no relation to practice. Today we might say that the existentialist spirit was strong in him. Hence his truly gigantic efforts on behalf of human rights as executive secretary of the Committee of Catholics for Human Rights, which he helped found, brought down on his head an avalanche of abuse. Hence his interest in the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion of which he was a founding member. Hence too his activities as a member of the national board of the Council for Democracy, as a board member of the Greater New York Committee for Japanese-Americans, as a member of the national advisory board of the Commission on Law and Social Action, and as a member of the executive committee of the State Commission against Discrimination in Education.

We can glimpse the sort of man Chapman was in this: just a few weeks before his death, while suffering almost unbearable agony and barely able to remain on his feet, he yet managed to keep an engagement to read a philosophical paper at Cooper Union and to enter into his usual free and open exchange with

PROCEEDINGS

all comers after the lecture. His extraordinary courage and fortitude right up to the moment of his passing and his inexhaustible sense of humor taught many a devoted friend how to die, just as he had taught so many how to live.

ROBERT C. POLLOCK

Ivy Campbell Fisher, the senior member of the Wells College faculty and Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, died of a cerebral hemorrhage on April 22, 1948. Born in Malvern, Iowa, on July 3, 1888, Ivy Campbell received the B.A. in 1911 at the University of Colorado, the M.A. in 1912 and the Ph.D. in 1914 at Clark University, where she studied psychology under the great teacher and pioneer in psychological research, G. Stanley Hall, and wrote her dissertation, *Manaism: A Study in the Psychology of Religion*. After teaching a year at Wellesley, she joined the Department of Philosophy and Psychology at Wells in 1916. She was promoted to associate professor the following year and to full professor in 1919. Shortly before her death, she was appointed chairman of the newly created Department of Aesthetics.

Professor Fisher was fond of looking at aesthetics as a middle ground between philosophy and psychology, out of which she had hoped to achieve a synthesis. Poor health prevented her from reaching this goal, but she published a number of articles on aesthetics from the Gestalt point of view. An unpublished manuscript develops a "logic of sense," emphasizing the *intrinsic* expressiveness of sense materials and their compositions. She was a Spinozist in philosophy and a Gestaltist in psychology.

In her teaching Mrs. Fisher insisted on thoroughness and stressed increasingly the relationships of the various arts and sciences. It was characteristic of her to speak out for what she believed before her students and colleagues. An irreplaceable link between the old Wells and the new has been snapped with the passing of Ivy Campbell Fisher.

PATRICK ROMANELL

Cassius Jackson Keyser (May 15, 1862—May 10, 1948), Professor Emeritus of Mathematics, Columbia University, was a native of Ohio, studied law at Michigan, took his Bachelor's degree at the University of Missouri and his graduate degrees at Columbia University. He held teaching positions as well as honorary degrees in many institutions and was widely known as a lecturer on the philosophical and theological aspects of mathematical theory.

If there is such a thing as mathematical philosophy Keyser helped create it. Philosophers and mathematicians will probably remember his *Thinking about Thinking* and *The Nature of Doctrinal Function* better than some of his other contributions, but every one of his books and essays bears the same stamp of originality in the same inimitable Keyser style as those two masterpieces.

Keyser probably had among his readers more nonphilosophers and non-mathematicians than any other writer on mathematical or philosophical subjects. To him clear thinking, rigorous and vigorous clear thinking, was the highest expression of human culture, and mathematics and its philosophy were the most beautiful and most perfect forms of such thinking.

He always deeply regretted the fact that these perfect and beautiful forms of thought are put beyond the reach of a vast majority of cultured laymen by the technical and symbolic language in which they are presented. In fact, he considered this to be the tragedy of our modern culture, and in every one of his books he tried (and as a rule, succeeded) to mitigate at least a part of this tragedy. The readers could not help feeling that Keyser was trying to open to them the tightly closed doors of the firm ivory towers of mathematics and of philosophy. The warmth of feeling permeating the writings of this sage still glows in the hearts of thousands of his readers, and this is perhaps the best monument to his memory, a monument that Keyser himself would have chosen.

JEHUTHIEL GINSBURG

Dr. Otis Hamilton Lee, Taylor Professor of Philosophy and Chairman of the Department at Vassar College, died suddenly of a heart attack on September 17, 1948. Born in Montevideo, Minn., on September 28, 1902, he received his B.A.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

from the University of Minnesota in 1924, his A.B. from Oxford in 1926, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1930. He taught at the University of Michigan (1927-1929), at Harvard (1929-1933; 1934-1935)—in 1931-1932 he was also reader for A. N. Whitehead—and at Pomona (1935-1938), leaving there for Vassar to assume the post he held until his death. He was a Rhodes Scholar (1924-1927), a Harvard Milton Scholar (1933-1934), a Guggenheim Fellow (1940-1941), a member of the executive committees of both the Pacific and Eastern Divisions (1936-1939; 1938-1941), a member of Phi Beta Kappa, a member of the board of the *Review of Metaphysics*, editor of *Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead* (1936), and author of the forthcoming *Experience and Inquiry*. A constantly growing, ruminative, original thinker, he died in mid-career, on the verge of developing a new metaphysical and sociological pragmatism having direct relevance to the American scene.

There was a largeness of spirit to Otis Lee, a flexible yet muscular tone to his mind, that made him an ideal philosophic and social companion. He was a friend in the genuine Aristotelian sense, a sympathetic, active participant in many effective efforts to promote what was worthwhile. Unusually free from but sensitive to cant and superficiality in their multiple guises, he had the gift of helping men in many walks of life to develop and to work with renewed energy and confidence. One expanded in his presence, began to think with greater freshness, with more honesty and courage than one had before. He knew how to catch the special flavors of men, making needless the virtue of tolerance. He knew how to excite the use of men's special abilities, making conversation, writing, and action richer by his presence. Modest, even diffident, he was at once self-critical, fair and generous, giving lavishly of his time and his mind to those who needed help both in the political realm and in the realm of ideas. A good man, a full-grown, rich, mature, sensitive human being, Otis Lee died just on the verge of reaping a deserved, full intellectual harvest of years of honest, conscientious reading, discussing, and thinking. By his death the philosophic community lost a man of genuine, growing promise. Those fortunate to have known him have been deprived of an irreplaceable friend and man.

PAUL WEISS

The American Philosophical Association records with sorrow the death of the *Reverend Eugene William Lyman* on March 15, 1948.

Dr. Lyman was born in 1872 in Cummington, Massachusetts. In 1894 he graduated from Amherst College, and nine years later he received an A.M. degree from the same institution. There he came under the influence of Professor Garman, whose teaching of philosophy had a determinative effect upon Dr. Lyman's own methods. After brief appointments as instructor in Latin at Easthampton, Massachusetts, and Lawrenceville, New Jersey, he entered Yale Divinity School, where he received the B.D. degree in 1899. A fellowship then enabled him to spend the next two years studying in Germany at the Universities of Halle, Berlin, and Marburg. Upon his return to this country, Dr. Lyman held professorships successively at Carleton College, the Congregational College of Canada, Bangor Theological Seminary, and Oberlin School of Theology. During this period he received the S.T.D. degree from Bowdoin College and the D.D. from Amherst and Yale. In 1918 he went to Union Theological Seminary, New York City, as Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, and held this chair, on the Marcellus Hartley Foundation, until his retirement in 1940.

Dr. Lyman married Mary R. Ely in 1926. As a New Testament scholar and a teacher at Barnard College, Mrs. Lyman shared intellectual and religious concerns with her husband; indeed, they were never happier than when studying side by side.

In the classroom, as well as in personal conversations in his office or home, Dr. Lyman possessed to a rare degree the gift of encouraging every type of student. He sought always to elicit, never to deprecate. One consequence has been that Dr. Lyman fulfilled his philosophy as much through the productiveness of his students as through his own writings. When plans were drawn up for the symposium, *Liberal Theology*, which was presented in his honor at the time of his retirement, there were more than forty of his former students who might

PROCEEDINGS

well have been invited to contribute because they were actively engaged in teaching or writing in the fields of philosophy and theology. The first chapter of that volume, by Walter Horton, lucidly surveys Dr. Lyman's thought and takes due account of the importance of his *magnum opus*, *The Meaning and Truth of Religion*. Except for a book entitled *Religion and the Issues of Life*, which he wrote after his retirement, the bibliography appended to this *Festschrift* preserves a virtually complete list of Dr. Lyman's many books, essays, and articles.

At Sweetbriar College, where his wife accepted the position of Dean after his retirement, Dr. Lyman continued as he had always lived, giving of himself unstintingly to students, friends, and the work of the church, and accepting the physical limitations of advancing years with silent courage. His sense of humor, his interest in people, his deep and serene love for his wife, and his steady trust in God were with him to the last.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

There were few members of our Association who were more generally beloved than Rufus M. Jones. His passing in June of this year marked the close of a life that was productive and in growth to the very day of his death.

Paul Valery in one of his essays says of Socrates that "he was born many, but he died one," and, in a peculiarly apt way, this remark describes the note of unity and togetherness that marked what Rufus Jones did and spoke and wrote throughout his career.

As an undergraduate at Haverford College, he had intended to prepare for the practice of law. But late in his college course he discovered the mystics, and his autobiography, *Finding the Trail of Life in College*, suggests that this changed everything. His senior thesis in 1885 was written on the subject of *The Mystics and Their Meaning*. There is no doubt that his upbringing in a Quaker family in South China, Maine, had prepared him for this undergraduate discovery that was to frame the central interest of his life.

With a versatile grasp of history and literature that might readily have led him to devote himself to either of these fields, he found in philosophy the root approach to the problems of life that attracted him most. After a period of academy teaching, he returned to Haverford College as an instructor of philosophy and spent forty years there as a teacher until his formal retirement in 1934, and then went on at Haverford living and writing and ministering to the college community until the end of his life. All of his other activities revolved round the central spindle of his life as a teacher and leader of young men at Haverford College, and few men have had so formative an influence upon an institution as has Rufus Jones at Haverford by his lifetime of intimate association with it.

Rufus Jones never secured a Doctor's degree in philosophy but he had two separated periods of graduate study, the one at Heidelberg University and the other later at Harvard for a year under Royce and James and Palmer, with all three of whom he was on terms of close personal friendship.

It is clear that Palmer's famous "Phil. 4" course in ethics did much to shape his approach in that field, and that in metaphysics Royce influenced him more than James. But systematic philosophy as such was never to be his major concern any more than it was von Hugel's or Dean Inge's.

For Rufus Jones, philosophy was always a tool that enabled him to probe and evaluate and interpret mystical religion and show its relevance to every aspect of life and human experience. But because mystical religion is so closely connected with the ground of all metaphysical or ethical inquiry, Rufus Jones's principal writings have had no small influence on philosophical thought in the span of his lifetime in America. Of these books, *Studies in Mystical Religion* (1909), *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (1914), and the later *Flowering of Mysticism* (1939) are perhaps the most important. Expanding their theme and drawing their philosophical implications for life are *New Studies in Mystical Religion* (1927), *Some Exponents of Mystical Religion* (1930), *Fundamental Ends of Life* (1924), *Mysticism and Democracy in the English Commonwealth* (1932), and *Pathways to the Reality of God* (1931). The four volumes of Quaker history which he edited and largely wrote are a case study in group mysticism and an amplification of his central theme.

In all, Rufus Jones wrote more than fifty books in his lifetime, and the bibliography of his articles in journals up to 1944 runs to over twenty-four closely printed pages, to say nothing of the chapters or the introductory essays which he generously contributed to the books of others. Anyone who has read widely in these books knows the perennial freshness and the singular lack of repetition that might easily have marred any such voluminous productivity. He had a startling capacity to finish his work well in advance of any deadline. I remember how his book on Haverford College—*A History and Interpretation*—which he wrote for the college centennial in 1933, was turned in and locked up in the college safe something over a year before it was due to go to the printers. He seemed to work without the harassing inner divisions and inhibitions that curb the literary productivity of so many minds, and this freedom was another indication that his life was all of one piece.

The mystical religion which he interpreted was of a divine power that energized the will and that drove men into the service of their fellows. His founding of the American Friends Service Committee in 1917, as an outlet for the Quaker affirmation of love to match their denial of the process of war, created a pattern that has been widely followed by other religious groups in the past decade. He guided the widespread activities and services of this unusual institution up to 1944, and until his death he took the most active personal concern in its affairs.

With his deep interest in the cause of education, he served on the Board of Managers of Bryn Mawr College from 1896 until his death and was its chairman 1916–1936. He also served on the boards of Brown University, Yenching University, Pendle Hill, and Moses Brown School.

Someone said of him recently, "He was a Quaker candle who shed a universal light." A great teacher and educator, a lover of humor and anecdote, a moving preacher, a tried and trusted friend of those in need in any country, a wise and tender counselor, a plain and simple man to the end—we take our leave of him with gratitude for his life. And to us he might reply in the words he once penned on the flyleaf of a copy of his *Exponents of Mystical Religion*, which he gave to a student friend, "Joy, Shipmate, Joy."

DOUGLAS V. STEERE

Alfred North Whitehead was born in Ramsgate, England, on February 15, 1861, and died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on December 30, 1947. He attended Trinity College, Cambridge, where he obtained the B.A. degree in 1884, the M.A. degree in 1887, and the D.Sc. in 1905.

He was lecturer and later senior lecturer on mathematics in Trinity College, Cambridge, from 1885 to 1911; lecturer on applied mathematics and mechanics and later reader in geometry at University College, University of London, 1911–1914; Professor of Mathematics, Imperial College of Science and Technology, University of London, 1914–1924; Dean of the Faculty of Science, 1921; Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University, 1924–1936; and Professor Emeritus, 1936 to the time of his death. He was a Fellow of the Royal Society and the British Academy and a member of the Mathematical Society, the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Aristotelian Society, and the American Philosophical Association, of which he was President in 1931. In addition to numerous honorary degrees from British and American universities, he received the James Scott Prize from the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1922, the Sylvester Medal from the Royal Society of London in 1925, and the Order of Merit in 1945.

Whitehead's publications include: *A Treatise on Universal Algebra*, 1898; *On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World*, 1906; *Principia Mathematica* (with Bertrand Russell), three volumes, 1910–1913; *An Introduction to Mathematics*, 1910; *The Organization of Thought*, 1916; *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, 1919; *The Concept of Nature*, 1920; *The Principle of Relativity*, 1922; *Science and the Modern World*, 1925; *Religion in the Making*, 1926; *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect*, 1927; *The Aims of Education*, 1928; *Process and Reality*, and *The Function of Reason*, 1929; *Adventures of Ideas*, 1933; *Nature and Life*, 1934; *Modes of Thought*, 1938.

Whitehead's thought ranged throughout the whole province of philosophy and

PROCEEDINGS

beyond to religion, education, history, and sociology. The *Principia Mathematica*, in part anticipated by Whitehead's *Universal Algebra*, unified mathematics and formal logic in a manner which was epoch-making. The entire theory of classes, number, and quantity—ideas traditionally basic—was deduced from a few logical concepts and principles. Whitehead also produced (in 1905) a formal unification of geometry and physics. He later constructed, on a broad epistemological basis, a special and a general theory of relativity which were in agreement with observed data and have been deemed philosophically more satisfactory than Einstein's. Extraordinarily sensitive to the relation between the basic, exact concepts of physical science and the immediate data of perception, he bridged the gap between them by an ingenious theory of "routes of approximation," in his last application of which a straight line was defined without reference to measurement. Constructing an "organic" philosophy of nature in the concrete, Whitehead accomplished with masterly completeness and subtlety the task of replacing the Cartesian and Newtonian cosmology. He elucidated the limits of science by his doctrine that scientific data are drawn solely from one mode of experience, presentational immediacy. Yet he gave scientific theory a new objective reference by exhibiting its subject matter as causal process rather than the positivistic correlation of sense-data.

In *Process and Reality* Whitehead viewed nature as a domain of multiple actual occasions in process. Each of these occasions comes to be in an indivisible stretch of time, by making internal to itself, in a creative act, all that lies beyond it in the universe. Nothing, he said, was simply located—here, and not in some sense also there. But just what meaning the universe had for a particular occasion, only that occasion could decide as it came to be; after which it perished, though not without acquiring a kind of immortality in nature and God.

This metaphysics united notions which modern thought has commonly held apart, such as actuality and potentiality, physical and mental, God and nature, universal and particular, thought and feeling. It deepened the concept of reason making it more fundamental than consciousness, language, inference, or any other special power. Expressing as it does the transition from nineteenth- to twentieth-century thought, Whitehead's metaphysics stands as a great modern synthesis, on a scale of comprehensiveness and elaboration rare in the history of philosophy.

Whitehead was a natural teacher, primarily because he liked young people and enjoyed their company. In the lecture room he gave the appearance of complete spontaneity. He did not deliver a set piece; his lecture was thought in action. Those who know him only from his books have missed something of his mind; for he was happier, easier, freer in speech than in writing. The listener had the experience of being taken behind the scenes and witnessing the very process of creative thinking, with its doubts and queries, its problems genuinely felt, in an unfinished but living form. His teaching extended beyond the classroom to his own home, where students gathered in the evening to hear him converse sagely on history, politics, society, art, and manners, as well as on philosophy. They were educated by him not merely because they heard seminal ideas, but also because they found themselves in the presence of a great and wise man.

RAPHAEL DEMOS, THOMAS G. HENDERSON, OTIS LEE,
VICTOR LOWE, ARTHUR E. MURPHY, F. S. C. NORTHROP,
PAUL WEISS, and RALPH BARTON PERRY, *Chairman*

The greetings and good wishes of the philosophers of India were given to the philosophers of America by Swami Mahadevi of the University of Madras and Cornell University.

The Secretary reported that there are 597 members of the Eastern Division, of whom 45 are emeritus, and 41 associate members.

The following report was presented by Lewis W. Beck on behalf of the Committee on Information Service:

During the year 1948, 205 persons registered with the Committee as prospective candidates for new appointments. Ninety universities and colleges re-

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

requested that the Committee call vacancies in their staffs to the attention of likely and suitable candidates. Twenty-nine appointments resulted from the work of the committee, in comparison with fourteen during the preceding year. Since a fairly high fraction of the schools that planned to make appointments did not as a matter of fact do so, we believe that nearly one-half the total number of schools which sought information from the Committee and did make appointments chose their appointees from names submitted by the Committee.

On June 17, 1948, the chairman attended a meeting of college appointment officers at Columbia University, called by the Cooperative Bureau of Teachers to discuss placement policies and agencies, and gave an account of the work of this Committee.

Financial statement

Expenditures:

Printing	\$ 88.60
Clerical help	71.50
Postage	61.19
Bank charges70
Total	\$221.99

Receipts:

Balance from 1947	\$ 38.61
From Eastern Div.	100.00
From Western Div.	50.00
From Pacific Div.	50.00
Total	\$238.61
Balance, December 15, 1948	\$ 16.62

L. W. BECK

A vote of thanks to Lewis W. Beck for the work of the Committee on Information Service was passed unanimously.

Cornelius Krusé presented an informal report on the policies of the American Council of Learned Societies and upon the methods now being adopted to aid scholars in financing research.

Professor Krusé then reported upon the progress of the Inter-American Congress Committee. He informed the Eastern Division of the plan to hold the next Congress in Mexico City in September, 1950, and of the efforts of the philosophers and the government of Mexico to assure the success of the proposed Congress.

In accordance with the unanimous vote of the members of the Eastern Division present at the business meeting in 1947, the following communication, on resolution presented by Professor Sidney Hook, was prepared by the Executive Committee and sent to President Juan D. Perón of the Argentine Republic:

His Excellency Senor Don Juan D. Perón
President of the Argentine Republic
Buenos Aires, Argentina

Your Excellency:

On December 31, 1947, the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, meeting in a joint session of various learned societies including the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, unanimously voted to investigate the authenticity of reports about affairs in the universities of the Argentine Republic. These reports state that many professors of Philosophy and of other subjects have been separated from their posts, or have been prematurely retired,

PROCEEDINGS

or have resigned in protest for reasons which do not impugn their scholarship or character.

The investigations of these reports subsequently made by members of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association were conducted without prejudice and were directed solely to the establishment of the facts of the case. Included in the material of the investigations were data derived from official reports, from letters of correspondents, and from oral reports of members of the Association who have had personal contact with the situation. The investigations indicate that the reports which have been circulated concerning the situation in the Argentine universities are well founded.

The universities of the Argentine Republic have long been held in high esteem by the world of international scholarship, and many distinguished philosophers have adorned their faculties. In consequence, it may easily be understood that bonds of respect and intellectual collaboration exist which cause the philosophers of the Americas not only to feel a common pride in the achievements of the culture in Argentina, but also a common regret at the rise of conditions adverse to the continuation of these achievements.

The American Philosophical Association earnestly hopes that the conditions which led to the reports have now been rectified. But in the light of these reports, it is incumbent upon the Association to state that the practices in question are contrary to the high ideals of the truth-loving universities of the Argentine and of all democratic countries of the world. Moreover, the American Philosophical Association believes that it is justified in special concern because the academic situation in Argentina exhibits not isolated abuses only but a serious defect of the entire university system. In making this observation, the Association takes into account the ties which unite the Americas, the bonds of the United Nations, and the universal contracts of reason and justice which obligate thinkers of every realm. And it believes that all to whom are consigned the tasks of maintaining the ideals of academic freedom and scholarship are justified in protesting against any practices, wherever they may appear, which militate against the investigation of truth.

With best assurances of the good will of American philosophers and of their high esteem for the noble culture of Argentina, we remain

Very respectfully yours,
MILTON C. NAHM, *Secretary-Treasurer,*
The American Philosophical Association,
Eastern Division

June 4, 1948

The Secretary reported that neither acknowledgment nor reply to this communication had been received.

The Secretary then reported that various members of the Eastern Division, including Professors Krusé, Brightman, Montague, R. B. Perry, Werner Jaeger, Charles de Konneck, and Ernest Nagel, had received invitations to the First National Congress of Philosophy to be held at the National University of Cuyo, Mendoza, Argentina, in March and April of 1949. It was reported that the invitations had been refused. The following paragraph in the letter to Professor Toribio from Professor Marvin Farber of the University of Buffalo was read and included in the minutes:

It appears necessary to make clear the reason for my inability to accept your invitation. The resolution of the American Philosophical Association, passed at its last meeting, calls attention to the dismissal from their positions of teachers in the national Argentine universities, and calls attention once more to its stand that violations of academic freedom of teaching and research, wherever they occur, imperil the life of the mind and the free interchange of ideas in the common quest for truth. The resolution called upon the President of the Argentine Republic to remove all restrictions upon freedom of teaching and research,

and requested that all teachers who had been dismissed because of their opinions be reinstated without prejudice.

Subscribing as I do to these principles, there is but one course for me to follow.

It was reported by Cornelius Krusé that the Bollingen Foundation has subscribed \$2,000 and the Littauer Foundation \$1,000 toward the publication of the papers of the Second Inter-American Congress in joint session with the American Philosophical Association at Columbia University in 1948. The papers will appear in the *Journal of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research*.

The report of the Publication Committee was read by Max Black. President Schneider called the attention of the meeting to the fact that the *Bulletin* of the forty-fifth meeting of the Eastern Division had been published by Oskar Piest without cost. A unanimous vote of thanks was tendered Mr. Piest.

The report of the Committee on Bibliography was read by C. J. Ducasse.

The following recommendations of the Executive Committee were adopted:

That the following applicants be elected to full membership: Sheldon Carmer Ackley, E. M. Adams, Warren Ashby, Mrs. Elizabeth Lane Beardsley, Robert N. Beck, Adolf Augustus Berle, Charles I. Biederman, Mrs. Mary L. Brady, Emile Cailliet, John F. Callahan, John Knox Coit, Bryant S. Cooper, Patrick O'C. Day, Herschel Elliott, Melbourne G. Evans, John R. Everett, W. Arthur Faus, William Eugene Felch, William Thomas Fontaine, Stanley Grean, Ellery Bickford Haskell, Henry W. Johnstone, Mortimer R. Kadish, Walter Arnold Kaufmann, William P. Kent, William E. Kerstetter, Raymond Klibansky, John Ladd, Max M. Laserson, Martin Edwin Lean, Hugues Leblanc, Arthur A. Loftus, John W. McCarthy, Howard C. McElroy, Richard Marion Millard, Jr., Simon Millner, James V. Mullaney, Edward D. Myers, Viljo K. Nikander, Swami Nikhilananda, Miss Jean Potter, Laurence J. Rosán, Richard Rudner, William S. Sahakian, Balduin Victor Schwarz, Leo Strauss, Herbert S. Turner, Kelvin Van Nuys, Paul Kenneth Vonk, William M. Walton, Paul Welsh, Edgar Wind, D. C. Yalden-Thomson, Frederic Harold Young.

That the following be elected to associate membership: Walter Edward Cushen, Theodore C. Denise, Frederick E. Ellis, Charles B. Fahs, Martin A. Greenman, Edward Greenfield, Margery V. C. Johnstone, Taylor Miller, Carl Patton, Jr., Orval Perry, Peyton Elliott Richter, Mrs. Lura Teeter, D. Burnham Terrell.

That the following be transferred from associate to full membership: Gabriel R. Mason, Francis J. McConnell, Paul B. Means, John E. Smith, Alvin Thalheimer, Miss Mary L. Whitman, Howard J. B. Zeigler.

That the Eastern Division accept the invitation of Clark University to hold the next meeting at Worcester, Mass.

The Nominating Committee (G. Watts Cunningham, Chairman, C. I. Lewis, and Charles W. Hendel) presented the following nominations: for President, Walter T. Stace; for Vice-President, John Wild; for members of the Executive Committee, Lewis W. Beck (1951) and Glenn R. Morrow (1951). All were elected by unanimous vote. Upon resignation of C. I. Lewis, which was accepted "with greatest regret," President Schneider appointed Mrs. Grace A. de Laguna to fill the unexpired term on the Nominating Committee. Upon resignation of H. Richard Niebuhr (1949) Henry S. Leonard was appointed to fill the unexpired term on the Executive Committee.

PROCEEDINGS

Charles A. Moore announced details of the East-West Philosophers' Conference to be held at the University of Hawaii, June 20-July 29, 1949.

Kurt F. Leidecker, Mary Washington College, announced that sets of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in the possession of William Torrey Harris' daughter, Miss Edith Davidson Harris, are available to interested persons and to libraries at a prorated charge for handling and similar expenses. Professor Leidecker announced that he had undertaken to supervise the distribution of the sets and would be glad to receive notice from interested members of the Association.

A motion to thank Susanne K. Langer and the guests on the discussion panel of "Problems of World Society and World Government," William Higginbotham, John Collier, and Karl Polanyi, was passed unanimously. On motion of Edgar S. Brightman it was voted to include in next year's program a discussion of the same topic.

Announcement was made of the *Bibliographie de la Philosophie*, publication of which is to proceed immediately under supervision of Raymond Bayer, 51, Avenue Georges-Mandel, Paris-16°.

Edgar S. Brightman announced that the Kant-Gesellschaft has been recognized by the authorities as a legal organization. The address of the Kant-Gesellschaft is Landesgruppe Bayern e.V., (13b) Munich 8, Chunrad von Perg Str. 18. Professor Brightman also announced that the Pan-Verlag, former publisher of the *Kant-Studien*, has been revived and is now located at Wurzach in Württemberg. The *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* is published by Pan-Verlag as a continuation of *Kant-Studien*, although it is possible that the publication of the latter may be resumed.

The following motion for the reorganization of the American Philosophical Association was presented by the Executive Committee and, on motion of Cornelius Krusé, adopted "in principle" by the Eastern Division:

Proposals Regarding the Reorganization of the American Philosophical Association

The Administrative Body of the Association shall consist of two committees: Executive Committee and Committee on International Cultural Cooperation.

SECTION A

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

1. Duties

The duties of the Executive Committee shall be as follows:

1. Collection of dues through its elected secretary-treasurer for the Association as a whole.
2. Sending announcements of all divisional meetings, printing of programs and abstracts (if desired) of divisional meetings, and other authorized publications.
3. Appointment of standing committees.
4. Elections of its own chairman (for a two-year term) and its own secretary-treasurer (three-year term) from among its members. The secretary-treasurer will be subject to re-election.
5. Administration of the election of new members-at-large to the Executive Committee.
6. Carrying on all other business of the Association.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

2. Constitution and Manner of Election

The Executive Committee shall be elected as follows:

One member shall be elected by each division from its membership for a four-year term and two members shall be elected at large by mail vote for three-year periods from a list of six nominees provided by the Executive Committee.

SECTION B

DIVISIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The divisional groups shall be responsible for (1) the election of divisional officers, (2) the planning of local meetings, (3) election of members, (4) election of representatives to the Executive Committee, and (5) making divisional recommendations for action to the Executive Committee, and (6) all other purely local business.

SECTION C

GENERAL

The following recommendations are submitted for consideration:

1. In order to administer the affairs of the Association until the reorganization is effected the National Board which assumes office in January, 1949, shall assume this responsibility and it is recommended that it appoint the members of the present board as a constitutional committee for purposes of consultation.
2. Members of all divisions shall receive announcements of all divisional meetings.
3. There shall be a statement of conditions of membership which is uniform for all divisions.
4. Dues shall be increased to four dollars.
5. The Association shall set aside a suitable amount for the establishment of a revolving fund for publication to be administered by its Publication Committee and additional funds shall be solicited from foundations and philanthropic individuals for the enlargement of this revolving fund.
6. Request shall be made to the American Council of Learned Societies for office space and mailing address in its Washington, D. C. headquarters. This would not involve a resident secretary, but it would involve part-time clerical assistance at Washington.

The following motion by George Boas was adopted unanimously: "That the Eastern Division express to President Darden and to Professor Albert G. A. Balz its appreciation of the hospitality of the University of Virginia in entertaining the forty-fifth annual meeting of the Eastern Division." The Secretary was instructed to convey this appreciation to President Darden and to Professor Balz and his aides.

MILTON C. NAHM, *Secretary-Treasurer*

PACIFIC DIVISION

President: Paul Marhenke

Vice-President: John R. Reid

Secretary-Treasurer: Herbert L. Searles

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and Donald A. Piatt *ex officio* for one year, James L. Jarrett, Jr. (1950), David Rynin (1949), and Barnett Savary (1949).

The twenty-second annual meeting of the Pacific Division was held at Stanford University, California, on December 27, 28, 29, 1948. The following program was presented:

PROCEEDINGS

Radical Naturalism.....	Edward O. Sisson
"Cause" and "Influence" in Historical Writing.....	W. T. Jones
Ethics as a Science.....	Frederick Anderson
A Quantitative Criterion of Value.....	Hugh Miller
Values and Value Judgments.....	Stephen C. Pepper
The Subject Matters of Aesthetics and Criticism.....	William B. Holther
Some Complementary Key Terms in Aesthetics.....	James L. Jarrett
The Aesthetic Object.....	A. P. Ushenko
Tautologies and Semiotic.....	Charles E. Bures and George H. Watson
Form and Content in Empirical Science.....	Herbert L. Searles
Individual Responsibility as a Consequence of the Relativity of Freedom.....	Hermann F. Schott
The Presidential Address: Philosophy, Pragmatism, and Human Bondage.....	Donald A. Piatt
The Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre.....	Catherine Rau
The Good — from the Absolute to the Relative to the Relative Absolute.....	Barnett Savery

The Pacific Coast Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy held its annual meeting in the morning of December 27, with members of the American Philosophical Association in attendance. A symposium on the teaching of ethics was presented by H. G. Townsend (paper read by C. J. Sullivan), Arturo Fallico, Donald A. Piatt, and Alfred G. Fisk.

The annual business meeting of the Division was held from 9:00 to 10:50 A.M., December 29, with President Piatt presiding.

The following memorial notice was read, adopted, and ordered printed in the *Proceedings*:

Harvey Gates Townsend was born January 27, 1885, in David City, Nebraska. He died at his home near Eugene, Oregon, December 19, 1948.

He received his Baccalaureate degree from Nebraska Wesleyan College in 1908 and his Doctor of Philosophy degree from Cornell University in 1913. At Cornell he was Sage Fellow in Philosophy for the year 1912-1913.

From 1938 until the time of his death he was head of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Oregon, where he had been Professor of Philosophy since 1926. Before coming to Oregon he had been Professor of Philosophy and Education in Central College, Missouri, from 1910 to 1914 and Professor of Philosophy and Education in Smith College from 1914 to 1926. He taught summer sessions in the University of Tennessee, Cornell University, Colorado College, the University of Colorado, and the University of British Columbia.

Besides being a contributor throughout his career of numerous articles and essays to the leading philosophical journals, Professor Townsend was the author of three major philosophical works. The last of these, *The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, from His Private Notebooks*, is now in printing and is to be published by the University of Oregon Press within the next two or three months. His *Philosophical Ideas in the United States*, published in 1934, established Professor Townsend's place as one of the ranking scholars in the important field of American philosophy. His first major work, *The Principle of Individuality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green*, was published in 1914.

In 1945 Professor Townsend delivered the annual Howison Lecture in the University of California, his topic being "On the History of Philosophy."

Professor Townsend's services in the American Philosophical Association were long and conspicuous. He was one of the founders of the Association in its present, national form and was its first representative on the American Council

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

of Learned Societies, in 1926. He served again as representative in 1929 and from 1933-1935.

He was secretary of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association from 1926 to 1928, and in the Pacific Division he was Vice-President in 1930-1931, Secretary from 1932 to 1934, and President in 1936. From 1944 to his death he was a member of the Carus Lecture Committee.

In the death of Harvey Gates Townsend American philosophy has lost one of its most distinguished scholars and leaders. As a founding member of the present federation of the American Philosophical Association and through the subsequent years, he has helped to mould its ideals and to direct its course. All of us in this community of philosophers will ever remember Professor Townsend as one who worked in philosophy with single-minded conviction and self-exacting devotion, and as one who taught it with severe and high demand. Those of us who were privileged to know him well will also remember him as one who in finest quality and in highest degree *lived* philosophy throughout his every day and in all his affairs, personal as well as professional. In his life and work philosophy has been lastingly enriched. He will not be forgotten.

BERTRAM E. JESSUP

The Treasurer's Report was read and approved as follows:

Receipts:

Balance on hand, December 17, 1947:	
War bonds	\$ 296.00
Savings account	306.79
Commercial account	369.24
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$ 972.03</i>
Interest on savings	1.53
Membership dues	216.00
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$1189.56</i>

Expenditures:

Printing of programs, 21st annual meeting	18.44
APA treasury, 1947 Proceedings	79.56
APA treasury, 1948 dues	58.50
APA treasury, 1948 Proceedings	95.58
L. W. Beck, Information Service of the APA.....	50.00
Printing of dues notices (3 years' supply).....	10.04
Mimeographing of announcement, 22nd annual meeting.....	2.16
Printing of programs, 22nd annual meeting.....	22.56
Envelopes, postage, and secretarial supplies	10.93
NSF check for dues	4.00
Bank charges53
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$ 352.30</i>

Balance on hand, December 20, 1948

War bonds	296.00
Savings account	300.00
Commercial account	241.26
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$ 837.26</i>

J. W. ROBSON, *Treasurer*

Audited by PAUL MARHENKE

PROCEEDINGS

A statement concerning the work of the Committee on Information Service was made by Paul Marhenke.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee, the following persons were elected to active membership: Else Frenkel-Brunswik, William H. Hollister, Benson Mates, Stanley Moore, Woodrow Wilson Sayre, and George H. Watson. Elected to associate membership were John B. Harrington and Winfield E. Negley.

A motion expressing the appreciation of the Pacific Division for the hospitality of Stanford University and the Stanford Department of Philosophy was adopted by acclamation.

The recommendation of the Executive Committee that the Division accept an invitation to hold the twenty-third annual meeting at Mills College was approved.

The following officers nominated by the Executive Committee were elected: President, Paul Marhenke; Vice-President, John R. Reid; Secretary-Treasurer, Herbert L. Searles; Executive Committee member, James L. Jarrett, Jr.

An amendment to the Constitution of the Pacific Division, submitted at the twenty-first annual meeting was adopted: Article II, Section 3, "The annual dues of members shall be two dollars, failure in payment of which for three consecutive years shall *ipso facto* cause membership to cease" was amended by the addition of the sentence, "New members, however, shall forfeit membership at the end of the first year after election if their dues have not been paid during this time."

A set of proposals for a reorganization of the American Philosophical Association, which had been received from the Chairman of the National Board of Officers, was presented for consideration. Following some discussion of the probable effects of the proposed changes, Stephen C. Pepper moved that the Pacific Division disapprove the movement towards amalgamation into a national organization; and, after much further discussion, this motion was carried. Later, on motion of Daniel S. Robinson, it was voted that the Pacific Division favors co-operation in the field of international cultural relations through a committee of the American Philosophical Association with power to act on matters concerned with UNESCO, the International Federation, and the like; and the Secretary was instructed to express this approval to the National Board of Officers of the Association.

The application of the Southwestern Philosophical Conference for admission to the American Philosophical Association was discussed; and a motion by Elmo A. Robinson was finally carried, which empowered the Executive Committee of the Pacific Division to approve the application provided the Committee finds upon investigation that no racial discrimination is practiced with regard to membership in the Southwestern Conference.

The following resolution, offered by David Rynin was adopted by a unanimous vote, and the Secretary was instructed to transmit it to President Raymond B. Allen of the University of Washington:

That the members of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association express their confidence in the integrity, as man and teacher, of Professor Herbert J. Phillips of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Washington, and affirm their strong conviction that membership, or non-

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

membership, in a legal political party is not in itself sufficient grounds for determining fitness for academic employment.

J. W. ROBSON, *Secretary-Treasurer*

WESTERN DIVISION

Officers (1948-1949)

President: Charles Hartshorne

Vice-President: Philip Blair Rice

Secretary-Treasurer: Wayne A. R. Leys

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and A. C. Garnett, Willis Moore, and Merritt H. Moore

Newly Elected Officers (1949-1950)

President: Albert E. Avey

Vice-President: D. W. Gotshalk

Secretary-Treasurer: Lewis E. Hahn

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and A. C. Garnett (1950), Merritt H. Moore (1951), and Everett W. Hall (1952).

The forty-seventh annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, April 28, 29, and 30, 1949. This was also a joint meeting of all Divisions of the American Philosophical Association.

The following program was presented:

Thursday Afternoon, April 28

Eighth Series of the Carus Lectures: I. Philosophy and the Mind-Body Problems, by C. J. Ducasse (Chairman, Charles Hartshorne)

A Reappraisal of Mill's Arguments for Utilitarianism, by Everett W. Hall

On the Relation of Being and Value, by Charles F. Virtue

Thursday Evening, April 28

Informal comments on the International Congress of Philosophy and the European philosophical situation, by Marten ten Hoor and Paul A. Schilpp

Friday Morning, April 29

Symposium on "The Principles of Justification," with papers by Herbert Feigl, O. K. Bouwsma, Paul Henle and Wilfrid Sellars (Chairman, Merritt H. Moore)

Friday Afternoon

Session on Ethics and Social Philosophy (Chairman, Willis Moore)

Right against God, by George Beiswanger

Is a Science of Ethics Possible? by Robert S. Hartman

Status without Privilege, by Bertram Morris

Session on Logic and the Philosophy of Science (Chairman, A. C. Garnett):

The Behavioral Dimension of Prediction and Meaning, by David L. Miller

PROCEEDINGS

The New Rationalism: Dewey's Theory of Induction, by May Brodbeck
Verifiability and Phenomenalism, by Asher Moore

Second Carus Lecture: Substance, Matter and Mind, by C. J. Ducasse (Chairman, A. C. Benjamin)

Friday Evening

Annual dinner with Presidential Address by Charles Hartshorne: Chance, Love, and Incompatibility

Saturday, April 30

Third Carus Lecture: The Mind-Body Relation, by C. J. Ducasse (Chairman, Albert Avey)

The following members served as critics: Charles L. Stevenson, Warner A. Wick, S. S. S. Browne, Cecil Miller, Lewis Zerby, W. Donald Oliver, George K. Plochmann, Frederick Will.

The first item of business was the presentation of a proposal for discussing problems of world society and world government. This presentation was made by Professor Suzanne Langer. A motion was unanimously adopted to instruct the Program Committee to arrange a discussion of this subject for the 1950 meeting.

The following nominees were elected to full membership in the association: Hazel E. Barnes, Richard William Burnett, J. L. Cobitz, J. Harry Cotton, Rush-ton Coulborn, Robert F. Creegan, William A. Earle, Henry J. Ehlers, Marvin Fox, Eugene Freeman, William Goodwin, Knox C. Hill, John Hospers, Nolan Pliny Jacobson, Henry Eugene Kolbe, Leonard Linsky, Robert Marsh, Raymond R. McGinnis, Ian P. McGreal, Asher Martin Moore, Edward Carter Moore, Maurice Nielsen, Stanley L. Olsen, Bruce T. Riley, Robert Paul Roth, Klaus Schaeffer, W. E. Schlaretzki, Robert Sharvy, Reidar Thomte, Lawrence O. Wolf. The following nominees were elected to associate membership in the association: Gerald T. Baskfield, Fred A. Brockway, Earl E. Larre, Norman Martin, Hugh J. Nolan, John A. Otto, Elizabeth G. Ramsden, H. Lawrence Reese, Hugh Aber Schleich, Ladislaus S. Sledz, J. Warren Slot. The following associate members were elected to full membership: William Briggs, Francis M. Donahue, Douglas N. Morgan, Howard Parsons, Don Smith, Thomas F. Storer.

In accordance with the new method of election adopted at the 1948 meeting, the Nominating Committee nominated more than one candidate for President and Vice-President, and there was one nomination from the floor. Those nominated for President were Albert E. Avey, Richard McKeon, Philip Blair Rice, and W. H. Werkmeister. Mr. Avey was elected. Those nominated for Vice-President were Albert R. Chandler, Herbert Feigl, and G. W. Gotshalk. Mr. Gotshalk was elected. Mr. Lewis E. Hahn was nominated for Secretary-Treasurer and was elected. (Mr. Hahn's address after Sept. 1, 1949, will be Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.) Mr. Everett W. Hall was nominated for member of the Executive Committee, and was elected. According to the rules adopted in 1948, the Vice-President will succeed to the presidency a year hence.

The Treasurer's Report was approved as follows:

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

MAY 6, 1948-APRIL 19, 1949

Receipts:

Balance on hand, May 6, 1948.....	\$310.75
Dues collected to April 19, 1949.....	700.00
Banquet ticket sale	387.75
<i>Total</i>	<u>\$1,398.50</u>

Expenditures:

National dues	\$175.50
Hotel Custer Banquet	382.50
Newsletter expense	116.00
Proceedings	284.31
International Federation Dues	8.77
Committee on Information Service	50.00
Stationery	33.50
Printing	152.74
Secretarial Assistance	12.15
<i>Total</i>	<u>\$1,215.47</u>
<i>Balance on hand, April 19, 1949</i>	<u>\$ 183.03</u>

WAYNE A. R. LEYS, *Secretary-Treasurer*

(Audited and bank statement reconciled 4/29/1949 by Merritt H. Moore)

The Division voted to continue co-operation with the Committee on Vacancies and Available Personnel and authorized the payment of \$50.00 toward the expenses of the Committee. The President designated the Secretary-elect as the Western Division's representative on this Committee.

The Division voted to continue publishing the Philosophers' Newsletter and re-elected Professor Willis Moore as editor for the ensuing year.

The 1950 meeting will be held at the University of Minnesota on May 4, 5, and 6, 1950.

Professor Benjamin presented the proposal to reorganize the American Philosophical Association, explaining that the plan which had previously been approved by the Eastern Division would require further discussion and that approval would simply mean that the National Board of Officers were instructed to continue attempts to perfect a new Constitution, which would later be submitted for ratification. After discussion the Division voted to approve the proposal in principle. There were a few dissenting votes.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee, the annual dues were raised to \$4.

The following memorial notice was presented:

Dr. P. S. Goertz, dean of Bethel College and Professor of Philosophy and Religion since 1930, died August 4 at his home in North Newton, Kansas. A scholar and administrator of high rank, he had been engaged in educational work on two continents for nearly forty years.

Dean Goertz had just returned from a year of leave of absence which he and Mrs. Goertz spent in Europe, with headquarters in Amsterdam. Dr. Goertz was engaged in relief work in various countries and also served on a supervising committee that selected students for American Mennonite colleges.

Coming to America as a child from Asiatic Russia, where he was born in 1886, Dean Goertz attended McPherson College, McPherson, Kansas, the Uni-

PROCEEDINGS

versity of Chicago, the University of Minnesota, obtaining his Ph.D. from Yale University. After teaching in the public schools of Kansas, Dr. Goertz went to China as an educational missionary, serving from 1918-1925. Between 1926 and 1930 he taught philosophy and religion at Tabor College, Hillsboro, Kansas, joining the Bethel College faculty in 1930.

He was a member of the American Philosophical Society, American Oriental Society, American Society of Church History, and Pi Gamma Mu.

I. G. NEUFELD

The following resolution was introduced:

"The Executive Committee is directed to receive information regarding cases of alleged violation of academic freedom, and to be of such assistance as possible in helping members to retain their positions or to secure new positions." A substitute motion was made as follows: "The Executive Committee is empowered to investigate any cases of violation of academic freedom, to cooperate with other organizations in making such investigations, and to report facts and recommendations to the division." Further discussion apparently being needed, both the original motion and the substitute motion were referred to the Executive Committee for further study.

The following resolution was adopted by unanimous vote: "Be it resolved that the Western Division express and record its deep appreciation of the hospitality of the Ohio State University on the occasion of the forty-seventh meeting of the division, and that the division further express and record its appreciation of the work of the local Committee on arrangements."

WAYNE A. R. LEYS, *Secretary-Treasurer*

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FOR 1949

(Addresses are given in the list of members)

Board of Officers:

Paul Marhenke, *Chairman*; Charles Hartshorne, Walter T. Stace, Herbert L. Searles, Wayne A. R. Leys, Milton C. Nahm, George R. Geiger, *Secretary-Treasurer*

Delegate to the American Council of Learned Societies:

Glenn R. Morrow (1950)

Delegate to the Council of the American Association for the Advancement of Science:

Charles W. Morris

Delegate to the American Documentation Institute:

R. P. Hawes

Committees:

International Cultural Co-operation — Cornelius Krusé, *Chairman*; Edgar S. Brightman, Richard McKeon, F. S. C. Northrop, W. R. Dennes, Charles W. Morris, Arthur E. Murphy, George Boas, W. E. Hocking, Susanne K. Langer
Bibliography — H. W. Schneider, *Chairman*; C. J. Ducasse, W. P. Montague, W. R. Dennes, D. S. Robinson, Maurice Mandelbaum, Emerson Buchanan, *Secretary*

Carus Lectures — E. L. Schaub, *Chairman*; C. J. Ducasse, A. E. Murphy, Irwin Edman, W. R. Dennes, E. A. Burt

Publication — Harold A. Larrabee, *Chairman* (1949); G. P. Adams (1950), Marten ten Hoor (1951), Virgil Aldrich (1951), Max Black (1952)

LIST OF MEMBERS

- Abarbanel, Prof. Albert, 319 W. 108th St., New York, N. Y.
 Abernethy, Prof. George, Davidson College, Davidson, N. C.
 Ackley, Prof. Sheldon Carmer, 163 Carlisle St., Gettysburg, Pa.
 Ackoff, Prof. Russell L., Wayne University, Detroit 1, Mich.
 Adams, Prof. E. M., Apt. 10, Abernethy Hall, Chapel Hill, N. C.
 Adams, Prof. Eugene Taylor, Colgate University, Hamilton, N. Y.
 Adams, Prof. George P., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Adams, Dr. John Stokes, Jr., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Adler, Prof. Mortimer J., 227 E. Delaware Pl., Chicago, Ill.
 Ahlén, Dr. A. Carl M., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Aiken, Prof. Henry D., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Akers, Prof. S. L., Wesleyan College, Macon, Ga.
 Akhilananda, Swami, Ramakrishna Vedanta Society of Massachusetts, 52 Deerfield St., Boston 15, Mass.
 Adlerblum, Dr. Nima H., P. O. Box 303, Long Branch, N. J.
 Albert, Dr. Sidney P., Triple Cities College, Syracuse University, Endicott, N. Y.
 Aldrich, Prof. Virgil C., Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio
 Alexander, Dean Hubert G., University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N. M.
 Allan, Prof. Denison Maurice, Hampden-Sydney, Va.
 Allen, Prof. Warren D., Stanford University, Calif.
 Allers, Prof. Rudolf, 3310 Dem Pl., N.W., Washington 7, D.C.
 Alles, Prof. Adam, Long Island University, 375 Pearl St., Brooklyn 1, N.Y.
 Ambrose, Prof. Alice, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Ames, Prof. Van Meter, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
 Anderson, Prof. Frederick, Stanford University, Calif.
 Anderson, Prof. Fulton H., University of Toronto, Toronto, Can.
 Anderson, Prof. John M., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
 Anderson, Pres. Paul Russell, Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh, Pa.
 Andrews, Prof. John T., 5 Storrs Ave., Middlebury, Vt.
 Anshen, Dr. Ruth Nanda, 14 East 81st St., New York, N.Y.
 Antz, Prof. Louise, New York University, Washington Square East, New York 3, N.Y.
 Apostle, Prof. Hippocrates G., Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
 Arbaugh, Prof. George Bartholomew, 1114—15th Avenue, Rock Island, Ill.
 Arndt, Prof. Elmer J., Eden Theological Seminary, Webster Groves, Mo.
 Aschenbrenner, Dr. Karl, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
 Ascher, Dr. Anita, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Ashby, Mr. Warren, 511 E. Rosemary Lane, Chapel Hill, N.C.
 Auld, Mrs. J. W., Red Cloud, Neb.
 Avey, Prof. Albert E., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
 Ayres, Prof. Edith, Palisades, N.J.
 Babcock, Prof. Donald C., University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
 Bachman, Prof. Walter E., York College, York, Neb.
 Bacoats, Pres. J. A., Benedict College, Columbia, S.C.
 Bahm, Prof. Archie J., University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M.
 Bajema, Prof. Jacob, University of Dubuque, Dubuque, Iowa
 Baker, Prof. John Tull, 47 Jane St., New York 14, N.Y.
 Bakewell, Prof. C. M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

PROCEEDINGS

- Balduf, Dean E. W., Roosevelt College of Chicago, 430 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago 5, Ill.
- Baldwin, Prof. Robert C., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
- Ballaine, Prof. Francis Knight, Adelphi College, Garden City, N.Y.
- Ballard, Rev. J. Hudson, 15 Foss Ave., San Anselmo, Calif.
- Balz, Prof. Albert, University of Virginia, University, Va.
- Banner, Prof. William A., 2925—10th St., N.E., Washington 17, D.C.
- Barbour, Prof. Harris M., Ripon College, Ripon, Wis.
- Barnes, Prof. Hazel E., University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio
- Barnhart, Prof. William R., Hood College, Frederick, Md.
- Barrett, Prof. Clifford L., Scripps College, Claremont, Calif.
- Barrett, Prof. W. C., Pomona College, Claremont, Calif.
- Bartlett, Prof. George R., Box 2085, University Sta., University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
- Barton, Prof. George E., Jr., 5635 Kenwood, Chicago 37, Ill.
- Barzin, Dr. Marcel, University of Brussels, Belgium
- Baum, Prof. Maurice, Kent State College, Kent, Ohio
- Baumgardt, Prof. David, 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E., Washington 2, D.C.
- Baxter, Dr. Clayton A., Mt. Allison University, Sackville, N.B., Canada
- Baylis, Prof. Charles A., University of Maryland, College Park, Md.
- Beach, Prof. Waldo, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
- Beals, Dr. Lawrence W., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.
- Beardslee, Prof. Claude G., 472 Vine St., Bethlehem, Pa.
- Beardsley, Dr. Elizabeth Lane, 1 Crum Ledge, Swarthmore, Pa.
- Beardsley, Prof. Monroe C., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
- Beck, Prof. Lewis W., Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa.
- Beck, Prof. Maximilian, Central College, North Little Rock, Ark.
- Beck, Prof. R. Lloyd, Marshall College, Huntington, W. Va.
- Beck, Mr. Robert N., 6 Watson Ave., Worcester 5, Mass.
- Becker, Prof. Frank C., Lehigh Univ., Bethlehem, Pa.
- Beiswanger, Dr. G. W., Georgia State College for Women, Milledgeville, Ga.
- Belknap, Mr. George N., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
- Benjamin, Prof. A. C., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
- Benne, Prof. Kenneth D., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
- Bennion, Prof. Milton, 2385—7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah
- Benson, Mr. Arthur J., 1628 Walnut St., Berkeley 9, Calif.
- Bentley, Prof. John E., American University, Washington, D.C.
- Benton, Prof. John Keith, Wesley Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.
- Berenda, Dr. Carlton W., University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.
- Bergmann, Prof. Gustav, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
- Berle, Dr. Adolf Augustus, 27 West 44th St., New York, N.Y.
- Berndtson, Dr. Arthur, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
- Bernhardt, Prof. William Henry, 2180 S. Clayton, Denver, Colo.
- Bernstein, Prof. B. A., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
- Berry, Dr. George D. W., Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
- Bertocci, Dr. Peter A., 243 Park Ave., Arlington Heights, Mass.
- Bettelheim, Prof. Bruno, 1365 East 60th St., Chicago, Ill.
- Bewkes, Pres. E. G., St. Lawrence University, Canton, N.Y.
- Bidney, Dr. David, 420 W. 119th St., New York 27, N.Y.
- Biederman, Mr. Charles I., 547 W. 157th St., New York 32, N.Y.
- Bisbee, Prof. Eleanor, 399 Roosevelt Way, San Francisco 14, Calif.
- Biser, Prof. Erwin, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.
- Bixler, Prof. J. S., 33 College Ave., Waterville, Me.
- Black, Prof. Max, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
- Blake, Prof. R. M., Brown University, Providence, R.I.
- Blanshard, Prof. Brand, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
- Blanshard, Mrs. Frances B., St. Roman St., New Haven, Conn.
- Blau, Dr. Joseph L., Columbia University, New York 27, N.Y.
- Block, Dr. Marguerite, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- Bloté, Dr. Harold C., 228 Scenic Ave., Piedmont, Calif.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Blyth, Prof. John W., College Hill, Clinton, N.Y.
 Boas, Prof. George, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
 Bøgholt, Prof. Carl, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
 Bogoslovsky, Dr. Boris B., Cherry Lawn, Darien, Conn.
 Bolman, Dr. Frederick deWolfe, Jr., 8 E. 77th St., New York 21, N.Y.
 Bonner, Prof. Hubert, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio.
 Boodin, Prof. J. E., University Club, 614 S. Hope St., Los Angeles, Calif.
 Bosley, Dr. Harold, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
 Boswell, Prof. Foster P., Hobart College, Geneva, N.Y.
 Boughton, Prof. Jesse, Westminster College, Salt Lake City, Utah
 Bourke, Prof. Vernon J., St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Bouwsma, Prof. O. K., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Bowden, Prof. D. J., Elon College, Elon, N.C.
 Boyer, Prof. Merle William, Carthage College, Carthage, Ill.
 Boynton, Prof. Richard W., University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y.
 Bradshaw, Prof. M. J., Bangor Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me.
 Brady, Prof. Mary L., 254 West 71st St., New York 23, N.Y.
 Brameld, Prof. Theodore B., New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.
 Brandt, Prof. Richard B., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 Brautigam, Prof. Herman A., Colgate University, Hamilton, N.Y.
 Brennan, Prof. Joseph G., Barnard College, Columbia University, New York 27, N.Y.
 Briggs, Dr. William, Oxford University, Oxford, England
 Brightman, Prof. Edgar S., Box 35, Newton Center 59, Mass.
 Brinton, Prof. Howard, Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pa.
 Brodbeck, Dr. May, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Brogan, Prof. A. P., University of Texas, Austin, Texas
 Bronstein, Dr. D. J., College of the City of New York, New York, N.Y.
 Broudy, Dr. Harry S., State Teachers College, Framingham, Mass.
 Brown, Prof. A. E., College of Emporia, Emporia, Kan.
 Brown, Principal James G., Union College, Vancouver, B.C., Can.
 Brown, Prof. Stuart M., Jr., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Browne, Prof. Samuel S.S., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
 Browning, Prof. Robert W., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 Brumbaugh, Prof. Robert S., Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.
 Bryan, Pres. W. L., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Buchanan, Mr. Emerson, Room 228M, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Buchanan, Prof. Scott M., The Parsonage, Richmond, Mass.
 Buchler, Prof. Justus, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Buckley, Prof. Joseph W., Notre Dame Seminary, New Orleans, La.
 Bugbee, Prof. Henry G., 46 Center Ave., Belmont, Mass.
 Burch, Dr. George B., Tufts College, Medford 55, Mass.
 Bures, Prof. Charles E., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
 Burkhardt, Pres. Frederick H., Bennington College, Bennington, Vt.
 Burks, Dr. Arthur W., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Burnett, Prof. Richard William, 610 E. Alton St., Appleton, Wis.
 Burnham, Prof. James, New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.
 Burt, Prof. E. A., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Buschman, Prof. Harold, University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo.
 Bushman, Sister Rita Marie, Fontbonne College, St. Louis, Mo.
 Bussey, Prof. Gertrude C., Goucher College, Baltimore, Md.
 Buswell, Pres. James Oliver, Jr., National Bible Institute, 340 W. 55th St., New York 19, N.Y.
 Butt, Dr. S. McClellan, 1908 Florida Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.
 Butterfield, Pres. Victor L., Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.
 Cailliet, Prof. Emile, 31 Alexander St., Princeton, N.J.
 Cairns, Dr. Dorion, 573 South 3rd St., Rockford, Ill.

PROCEEDINGS

- Calhoun, Dr. Robert L., 409 Prospect St., New Haven, Conn.
 Callahan, Prof. John F., Graduate School, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
 Cannabrava, Dr. Duryalo, Rainha Elisabeth, 62 ap. 5, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
 Caponigri, Prof. A. Robert, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.
 Carmichael, Prof. R. D., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Carnap, Prof. Rudolf, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Carnell, Prof. Edward J., Gordon College, Boston 15, Mass.
 Case, Prof. Mary S., 70 Church St., Wellesley, Mass.
 Cerf, Prof. Walter H., Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Chambers, Prof. L. P., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Chandler, Prof. Albert R., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
 Chanter, Prof. William G., 5 Academy Rd., Madison, N.J.
 Chapman, Prof. Harmon M., New York University, University Heights, New York, N.Y.
 Child, Dr. Arthur, 301 Swift Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Childs, Prof. John L., Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Chisholm, Prof. Roderick M., 6 South St., Plainville, Mass.
 Christ, Dr. Paul S., Liberty High School, Bethlehem, Pa.
 Christian, Prof. William A., Jr., 148 Crescent St., Northampton, Mass.
 Church, Prof. Ralph W., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Churchman, Prof. C. West, Wayne University, Detroit, Mich.
 Clapp, Dr. James Gordon, Hunter College, New York, N.Y.
 Clark, Prof. Gordon H., Butler University, Indianapolis, Ind.
 Clark, Prof. John A., 56 Leighton Road, Wellesley, Mass.
 Clarke, Prof. Francis P., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Clarke, Prof. Mary E., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Cleve, Dr. Felix, 634 Columbus Ave., New York 24, N.Y.
 Cobb, Prof. Henry V., University of South Dakota, Vermillion, S.D.
 Cobitz, Prof. J.L., State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
 Cocutz, Prof. John T., 24 Ivy St., Atlanta, Ga.
 Coffman, Dr. David R., 54 Claremont Ave., Maplewood, N.J.
 Cohen, Dr. Felix S., 810 — 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D.C.
 Cohen, Prof. Joseph W., University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
 Coit, Prof. John Knox, Sampson College, Sampson, N.Y.
 Collins, Dr. James, St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Conger, Prof. G. P., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Connette, Prof. Earle, Dept. of Music, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Conover, Prof. C. Eugene, Lindenwood College, St. Charles, Mo.
 Coolidge, Dean Mary Lowell, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
 Cooper, Prof. Bryant S., 242 Faculty Office Building, Univ. of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
 Copilowish, Prof. Irving, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Copp, Prof. Marie T., Wilson College, Chambersburg, Pa.
 Cory, Prof. C. E., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Costello, Prof. H. T., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.
 Cotton, Prof. J. Harry, 606 W. Wabash Ave., Crawfordsville, Ind.
 Coulborn, Prof. Rushton, Atlanta University, Atlanta, Ga.
 Cowling, Pres. D. J., 444 Otis Ave., St. Paul 4, Minn.
 Craig, Dr. Wallace, 10 Bowdoin St., Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Crawford, Prof. Lucy S., Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Va.
 Creed, Dr. Isabel, 128 Indian Road, Piedmont, Calif.
 Creegan, Prof. Robert F., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio
 Cresswell, Prof. John R., West Virginia University, Morgantown, W.Va.
 Crissman, Prof. Paul, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyo.
 Crowley, Prof. W. A., 5819 Glenview Ave., College Hill, Cincinnati, Ohio
 Culbertson, Prof. James T., 4446 University Ave., Chicago 15, Ill.
 Cunningham, Prof. Emeritus G. Watts, The Greenwood Road, Laurens, S.C.
 Currie, Dr. Cecil, McGill University, Montreal, Can.
 Curry, Prof. Haskell B., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
 Cushman, Dr. Robert, Duke University, Durham, N.C.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

Cutler, Prof. Anna A., 407 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Conn.

Dakin, Dr. Arthur Hazard, Darley-in-the-Dale, Amherst, Mass.

D'Alfonso, Dr. Joseph, 301 Pine Street, Lewiston, Me.

Davenport, Prof. Charles K., Box 1233, University of Virginia, University, Va.

Davidson, Prof. Robert F., University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.

Day, Mr. Patrick O'C., Queens University, Kingston, Ont., Can.

DeBoer, Prof. C., University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho.

DeBoer, Prof. Jesse, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.

Degelman, Prof. G. A., Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Mo.

DeHaan, Prof. John M., Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich.

DeLacy, Prof. Estelle Allen, Roosevelt College, 430 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago 5, Ill.

de Laguna, Prof. Grace A., 221 Roberts Rd., Bryn Mawr, Pa.

DeMoore, Prof. Leonard, Hastings College, Hastings, Neb.

Demos, Prof. Raphael, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Dennes, Prof. W. R., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

Dewey, Prof. John, 1158 Fifth Avenue, New York 29, N.Y.

DeWolf, Prof. L. Harold, Boston University, Boston, Mass.

Dickinson, Prof. F.S., University of Denver, Denver, Colo.

Diggs, Prof. Bernard J., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.

Diller, Prof. Elliott Van N., Mills College, Oakland, Calif.

Dodd, Mrs. Edwin M., Jr., 999 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Mass.

Doescher, Prof. Waldemar D., Capital University, Columbus, Ohio

Dolson, Dr. Grace N., St. Mary's Free Hospital for Children, Inc., 407 W. 34th St., New York, N.Y.

Domarus, Dr. E. von, 865 Park Ave., New York 21, N.Y.

Dommeier, Dr. Frederick C., 21 Elm St., Canton, N.Y.

Donahue, Prof. Francis M., Michigan State College, E. Lansing, Mich.

Donovan, Sister M. Annice, St. Mary's College, Holy Cross, Ind.

Dotterer, Prof. Ray H., 825 W. Foster Ave., State College, Pa.

Dowling, Mr. John W., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.

Drabkin, Dr. Israel E., 44 W. 96th St., New York 25, N.Y.

Druckmann, Prof. A., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.

Dubs, Prof. Homer H., University College, Oxford, Eng.

Ducasce, Prof. C. J., Brown University, Providence, R.I.

Dunham, Prof. Barrows, 127 Bentley Avenue, Cynwyd, Pa.

Dunham, Dr. James H., Hamilton Court, 34 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa.

Durfee, Prof. Harold A., Park College, Parkville, Mo.

Duvall, Prof. T. G., Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio

Dwight, Prof. Charles A. S., Box 1574, Oak Bluffs, Mass.

Dykhuizen, Prof. George, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vt.

Dykstra, Prof. D. Ivan, Hope College, Holland, Mich.

Earle, Mr. William A., 6540 Minerva Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.

Easton, Prof. Lloyd D., Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio

Eaton, Prof. Howard O., University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.

Ebersole, Prof. Frank B., Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio

Eckhardt, Prof. A. Roy, Lawrence College, Appleton, Wis.

Eckhardt, Prof. L. R., DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.

Eckstein, Dr. Walter, 3900 Greystone Avenue, New York, N.Y.

Edel, Prof. Abraham, College of the City of New York, New York, N.Y.

Edgar, Dr. Earl, 1492 Legore Drive, Manhattan, Kan.

Edman, Prof. Irwin, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

Edwards, Prof. George V., Jr., Associated Colleges of Upper New York, Plattsburg, N.Y.

Eggleson, Sister Mary Frederick, 2935 Upton Street, N.W., Dunbarton College, Washington, D.C.

Ehlers, Prof. Henry J., University of Minnesota, Duluth 5, Minn.

Elder, Prof. Lucius W., Knox College, Galesburg, Ill.

Elliott, Mr. Herschel, 16 Greylock Road, Boston 34, Mass.

PROCEEDINGS

- Emch, Dr. Arnold F., 2708 Lakeview Ave., Chicago, Ill.
 Emery, Dr. Sarah Watson, 513 E. Rosemary Street, Chapel Hill, N.C.
 Emery, Prof. Stephen A., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
 Erickson, Prof. E.E., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
 Erickson, Prof. Harris David, Evansville College, Evansville 4, Ind.
 Erickson, Prof. Ralph W., Mississippi State College for Women, Columbus, Miss.
 Eshleman, Prof. Martin, Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.
 Estall, Dr. Henry M., Queen's University, Kingston, Ont., Can.
 Evans, Prof. D. Luther, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
 Evans, Dr. Melbourne G., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Everett, Prof. John R., Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Everett, Prof. Millard S., Roosevelt College, 430 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago 5, Ill.
 Fackenheim, Dr. Emil Ledwig, 108 E. Avenue, South Hamilton, Ont., Can.
 Fales, Dr. Walter, Lincoln University, Pa.
 Fallico, Prof. Arturo B., San Jose State College, San Jose, Calif.
 Farber, Prof. Marvin, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y.
 Farley, Mother Elizabeth, Manhattanville College, New York 27, N.Y.
 Faus, Dr. W. Arthur, 1010 Dorey Street, Clearfield, Pa.
 Feibleman, Prof. James K., Tulane University, New Orleans, La.
 Feigl, Prof. Herbert, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Felch, Prof. William Eugene, St. Lawrence University, Canton, N.Y.
 Fenlon, Prof. Edward J., Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Fern, Prof. Vergilius, College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio
 Ferré, Prof. Nels F. S., 44 Stearns Street, Newton Center, Mass.
 Feuer, Dr. Lewis S., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
 Finch, Prof. Henry A., The College, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Firth, Dr. Roderick, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 Fisch, Prof. H. M., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Fisher, Dr. Donald Warren, Noe Avenue, Madison, N.J.
 Fitch, Dr. Frederic B., Silliman College, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Fitch, Dean Robert E., Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Fitzgerald, Prof. John James, 1019 N. Notre Dame Ave., South Bend, Ind.
 Flewelling, Professor Ralph T., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Flower, Dr. Elizabeth, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Fontaine, Dr. William Thomas, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Forrester, Prof. James, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa.
 Fort, Prof. William Edwards, Jr., Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla.
 Foss, Dr. Martin, 14 College Lane, Haverford, Pa.
 Fox, Prof. George G., University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
 Fox, Mr. Marvin, Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio
 Frank, Dr. Erich, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Frankel, Prof. Charles, Department of Philosophy, Columbia Univ., New York 27, N.Y.
 Frankena, Prof. William, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Franquize, Prof. José A., West Virginia Wesleyan College, Buckhannon, W.Va.
 Freeman, Prof. Eugene, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago 16, Ill.
 Frenkel-Brunswik, Dr. Else, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
 Freund, Prof. Ernest H., 319 W. Fairmount Ave., State College, Pa.
 Friedmann, Prof. F. H., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.
 Fries, Prof. Horace S., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
 Friess, Prof. Horace L., Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Fritz, Dr. Charles A., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
 Fritz, Mrs. Charles A., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
 Fuller, Prof. B. A. G., 6887 Alta Loma Terrace, Hollywood 28, Calif.
 Fulton, Prof. James S., Rice Institute, Houston, Tex.
 Gabbert, Prof. M. R., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Gamertsfelder, Dean W. S., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio
 Garland, Prof. Edwin N., Reed College, Portland, Ore.
 Garnett, Prof. A. C., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
 Garnett, Prof. C. B., Jr., George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
 Garvin, Prof. Lucius, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio
 Gauss, Prof. Charles E., George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
 Geiger, Prof. George R., Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio
 Gentry, Prof. George, University of Texas, Austin, Tex.
 Gerber, Dr. William, 4307 — 38th St., N.W., Washington, 16, D.C.
 Gerhard, Dr. W. A., Univ. of Chicago, 1117 Lunt Avenue, Chicago 20, Ill.
 Gewirth, Prof. Alan, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Geyer, Prof. Denton L., Chicago Normal School, 68th St., and Stewart Avenue, Chicago 21, Ill.
 Gifford, Prof. A. R., Box 933, Oak Bluffs, Mass.
 Gilbert, Dr. Allen, 201 Great Plain Ave., Wellesley, Mass.
 Gilbert, Dr. Katharine E., 516 Carolina Circle, Durham, N.C.
 Girvetz, Prof. Harry, Santa Barbara State College, Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Glathe, Prof. Alfred B., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
 Glick, Prof. Harry N., 30 N. Hadley Rd., Amherst, Mass.
 Gloyd, Prof. Cyril K., Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Godcharles, Prof. C. A., Davidson College, Davidson, N.C.
 Goheen, Dr. John, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.
 Golightly, Prof. Cornelius L., University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.
 Gonso, Prof. Raymond, Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich.
 Goodman, Prof. Nelson, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Goodwin, Prof. William, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.
 Gordon, Prof. A. D., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Gotesky, Prof. Rubin, University of Georgia, Athens, Ga.
 Gotshalk, Prof. D. W., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Goudge, Prof. Thomas A., University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont., Can.
 Gould, Prof. William D., Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.
 Gramlich, Prof. Francis W., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.
 Graves, Prof. Eliot B., Mary Washington College, Fredericksburg, Va.
 Gray, Prof. J. Glenn, Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 Gray-Smith, Prof. Rowland, Hingham, Mass.
 Grean, Mr. Stanley, Fort Trumbull Branch, University of Connecticut, New London, Conn.
 Greene, Prof. Theodore M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Griffith, Prof. C. R., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Grinnell, Prof. Robert, Stanford University, Calif.
 Gross, Dr. Mason W., Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.
 Groth, Dr. J. H., University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
 Gruen, Dr. William, 188-35 G 71st Crescent, Fresh Meadows, Flushing, L.I., N.Y.
 Gurvitch, Prof. Georges, International Universities Press, 227 W. 13th St., New York 11, N.Y.
 Gurwitch, Dr. Aron, 10 Agassiz St., Cambridge, Mass.
 Guthrie, Dean Hunter, Georgetown University, Washington 7, D.C.
 Guthrie, Prof. E. R., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Gutmann, Prof. James, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Haag, Prof. Alvin S., North Central College, Naperville, Ill.
 Hafkesbrink, Prof. Hanna, Connecticut College, New London, Conn.
 Hahn, Prof. Lewis E., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
 Hall, Prof. Everett W., University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
 Hamblin, Prof. Frances Murphy, Holcomb, N.Y.
 Hammerschmidt, Dr. William, St. John's College, Annapolis, Md.
 Hammond, Prof. Albert Lanphir, 2315 Maryland Avenue, Baltimore, Md.
 Hammond, Dr. Lewis M., University of Virginia, University, Va.
 Hantz, Prof. Harold D., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.
 Haring, Mrs. Ellen Stone, 672 Washington St., Wellesley 81, Mass.

PROCEEDINGS

- Harkness, Prof. Georgia E., Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Ill.
 Harmon, Dr. Frances B., Scarborough, N.Y.
 Harris, Prof. Frederick P., Cleveland College, Western Reserve University, Public Square, Cleveland 14, Ohio
 Harris, Pres. M. LaFayette, Philander Smith College, Little Rock, Ark.
 Harris, Prof. Marjorie S., Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchburg, Va.
 Hart, Prof. Charles A., Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.
 Hartman, Prof. H. G., 542 Northeast 107 St., Miami, Fla.
 Hartman, Prof. Robert S., Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio
 Hartshorne, Prof. Charles, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Hartt, Dr. Julian N., Yale University Divinity School, 409 Prospect St., New Haven, Conn.
 Harvanek, Dr. Robert F., West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Ind.
 Haserot, Dr. Francis S., R.F.D. 1-39, Williamsburg, Va.
 Haskell, Prof. Ellery Bickford, 1236 Alsace Road, Reading, Pa.
 Havice, Prof. Charles William, Northeastern University, Boston, Mass.
 Hawes, Prof. R. P., Goucher College, Baltimore, Md.
 Hawkins, Prof. David, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
 Hay, Prof. William Henry, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.
 Hayner, Mr. Paul Collins, Hamilton College, Clinton, N.Y.
 Hazelton, Prof. Roger, Andover Newton Theological School, Newton Center 59, Mass.
 Headley, Prof. Leal A., Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.
 Heath, Prof. Louise R., Keuka College, Keuka Park, N.Y.
 Hefelbower, Prof. Samuel G., Wagner College, Staten Island, N.Y.
 Helsel, Prof. Paul R., 5502 Rampau Blvd., Los Angeles 43, Calif.
 Hempel, Prof. Carl G., 64 Anthony Street, New Haven, Conn.
 Hendel, Prof. Charles W., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Henderson, Prof. Edgar, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla.
 Henderson, Dr. Thomas G., 1556 Summerhill Ave., Montreal, Can.
 Henle, Prof. Paul, Northwestern Univ., Evanston, Ill.
 Henry, Prof. Carl F. H., P. O. Box 989, Pasadena, Calif.
 Hepp, Prof. Maylon H., Denison University, Granville, Ohio
 Heschel, Prof. Abraham Joshua, 3080 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y.
 Hickson, Dr. J. W. A., 3428 Ontario Avenue, Montreal, Can.
 Hildebrand, Prof. Carroll Dewitt, DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 Hill, Prof. Knox C., University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Hill, Prof. Thomas E., Macalester College, St. Paul 5, Minn.
 Hill, Dr. Walker H., Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich.
 Hillman, Dr. Owen N., Department of State, Washington, D.C.
 Hiltner, Prof. John, 209 — 9th Street, N.W., Waverly, Iowa
 Hinman, Prof. E. L., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Hinshaw, Dr. Virgil G., Jr., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
 Hix, Prof. C. Eugene, Jr., Central College, Fayette, Mo.
 Hocking, Prof. Richard, 5745 Harper Ave., Chicago, Ill.
 Hocking, Prof. W. E., Madison, N.H.
 Hodgson, Prof. James B., Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
 Hoekstra, Prof. Raymond, Wayne University, Detroit, Mich.
 Hofstadter, Prof. Albert, New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.
 Hoke, Prof. Roy Edward, Davidson College, Davidson, N.C.
 Holbrook, Dean Clyde A., Shore Chapel, Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 Holcomb, Prof. Louise, Wilson College, Chambersburg, Pa.
 Hollands, Prof. E. H., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.
 Hollister, Prof. William W., Whitman College, Walla Walla, Wash.
 Holmer, Dr. Paul L., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Holmes, Prof. Eugene C., Howard University, Washington, D.C.
 Holmes, Prof. Roger W., Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.
 Holthaus, Prof. Reuben S., Western Maryland College, Westminster, Md.
 Holther, Dr. William, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Holtzclaw, Prof. B. C., University of Richmond, Richmond, Va.
 Hong, Prof. Howard B., St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minn.
 Hook, Prof. Sidney, New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.
 Hope, Prof. Richard, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
 Horkheimer, Dr. Max, 13524 D'Este Drive, Pacific Palisades, Calif.
 Hoppers, Prof. John, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Hout, Prof. H. T., 17 Second St., Athens, Ohio
 Howard, Prof. D. T., 1725 Orrington Ave., Evanston, Ill.
 Hudson, Prof. J. W., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Hudson, Prof. James, Florida A & M College, Tallahassee, Fla.
 Hughes, Prof. Percy, Belvedere, N.Y.
 Hungerland, Dr. Isabel C., University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
 Hunter, Prof. Armstrong, 6 Copeland Place, Roxbury 19, Mass.
 Hutchinson, Prof. John A., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.
 Iredell, Prof. F. Raymond, Pomona College, Claremont, Calif.
 Irving, Prof. John Allan, Victoria College, University of Toronto, Toronto, Can.
 Isenberg, Prof. Arnold, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.
 Jackson, Prof. John E., Doan College, Crete, Neb.
 Jacobson, Prof. Nolan Pliny, Huntingdon College, Montgomery, Ala.
 Jaffe, Dr. Haym, 248 Rocklyn Rd., Upper Darby, Pa.
 Jarrett, Prof. James L., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
 Jefferson, Prof. Howard B., Clark University, Worcester, Mass.
 Jeffery, Prof. Harriet, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
 Jellema, Prof. Harry, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Mich.
 Jenkins, Prof. Iredell, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Jessup, Prof. Bertram E., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
 Johnson, Dr. Allison Hartz, University of Western Ontario, London, Can.
 Johnson, Prof. George, 706 Nottingham Rd., Wilmington 56, Dela.
 Johnson, Prof. Paul E., 130 Day St., Auburndale, Mass.
 Johnson, Prof. R. B. C., Kittery Point, Me.
 Johnstone, Mr. Henry W., Jr., 68 South St., Williamstown, Mass.
 Jones, Prof. A. H., University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y.
 Jones, Prof. William T., Pomona College, Claremont, Calif.
 Jordan, Prof. E., Butler University, Indianapolis, Ind.
 Jordan, Prof. H. P., Washington Square College, New York University, New York, N.Y.
 Kadish, Mr. Mortimer R., 2290 Davidson Ave., New York 53, N.Y.
 Kahn, Mr. Sholom J., 1224 Walton Ave., Bronx 52, New York, N.Y.
 Kaiser, Prof. Charles Hillis, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.
 Kaiser, Prof. Edwin G., St. Joseph's College, Collegeville, Ind.
 Kallen, Prof. Horace, 66 W. 12th St., New York, N.Y.
 Kantonen, Prof. T. A., Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio
 Kantor, Prof. J. R., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Kaplan, Prof. Abraham, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles 24, Calif.
 Karlin, Dr. Eli, 27 W. 97th St., New York, N.Y.
 Kattsoff, Dr. Louis O., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
 Kaufmann, Prof. Felix, 66 W. 12th St., New York, N.Y.
 Kaufmann, Prof. Fritz, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y.
 Kaufmann, Dr. Walter Arnold, 228-A Marshall St., Princeton, N.J.
 Keeton, Prof. Morris T., Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio
 Kegley, Dr. Charles W., Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary, Maywood, Ill.
 Kemmerer, Dr. Mabel C., State Laboratory, Old Capital, Jackson, Miss.
 Kennedy, Prof. Gail, Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
 Kerby-Miller, Prof. S., 222 Lincoln Avenue, Alameda, Calif.
 Kerstetter, Prof. William E., Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, Ohio
 Kimpel, Dr. Ben F., Drew University, Madison, N.J.

PROCEEDINGS

- King, Prof. Albion R., Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Iowa
 Kirn, Dean G. J., North Central College, Naperville, Ill.
 Klausner, Prof. Neal W., Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa
 Klauss, Prof. Walter K., North Central College, Naperville, Ill.
 Klubansky, Prof. Raymond, Arts Buildings, McGill University, Montreal, Can.
 Knight, Prof. Edward C., Calle Montes de Oca, 168, Mexico City, D.F., Mexico
 Knight, Prof. Frank H., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Knode, Prof. Jay C., University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M.
 Knox, Prof. Israel, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio
 Knudson; Dean Emeritus Albert C., 18 Forest Street, Cambridge, Mass.
 Koch, Dr. Adrienne, 28 E. 10th St., New York 3, N.Y.
 Koch, Dr. G. Adolf, Chaplain School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
 Kolbe, Prof. Henry Eugene, Depauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 Konvitz, Prof. Milton R., Forest Home, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Kotkov, Dr. Benjamin, 223 Fuller St., Brookline, Mass.
 Koyré, Dr. Alexander, Ecole Practiques des Hautes-Etudes, Paris, France
 Kraemer, Prof. William S., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.
 Kraft, Dr. Julius, Washington and Jefferson College, Washington, Pa.
 Kraushaar, Pres. Otto F., Goucher College, Baltimore, Md.
 Kretschmann, Prof. Philip M., Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Krikorian, Prof. Yervant H., College of the City of New York, New York, N.Y.
 Kristeller, Dr. Paul Oskar, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Kroner, Prof. Richard, 99 Claremont Ave., New York, N.Y.
 Krug, Prof. C. A., Mt. Allison University, Sackville, N.B., Canada
 Kruisé, Prof. Cornelius, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.
 Kubitz, Prof. Oscar, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Kuhn, Prof. Helmut, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.
 Kuiper, Prof. John, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.
 Kuntz, Prof. Paul Grimley, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa
 Kwang-Won Kim, Prof., Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa
- Ladd, Dr. John, 162 Bishop St., New Haven 11, Conn.
 Lafferty, Prof. T. T., University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C.
 Lafleur, Prof. Laurence J., Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla.
 Lamont, Dr. Corliss, 450 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y.
 Lamprecht, Prof. Sterling P., Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
 Landon, Dr. K. P., 4711 Fulton St., N.W., Washington 7, D.C.
 Lane, Prof. W. B., University of Toronto, Toronto, Can.
 Langer, Dr. Susanne K., Columbia University, New York 27, N.Y.
 Langford, Prof. Cooper H., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Lapan, Dr. Arthur, Long Island University, 380 Pearl St., Brooklyn 1, N.Y.
 Larrabee, Prof. Harold A., Union College, Schenectady, N.Y.
 Laserson, Dr. Max M., 526 W. 113th St., New York 25, N.Y.
 Lavery, Prof. Horace T., Allegheny College, Meadville, Pa.
 Lavine, Prof. Thelma Z., Brooklyn College, Brooklyn 19, N.Y.
 Lawrence, Mr. Nathaniel, 709 West Nevada St., Urbana, Ill.
 Lazerowitz, Prof. Morris, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Leach, Prof. Frederick H., Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla.
 Lean, Prof. Martin Edwin, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
 Leavenworth, Dr. Isabel F., 277 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
 Leblanc, Dr. Hugues, College Inn, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 LeBoutillier, Prof. Cornelia G., 145 E. 74th St., New York 21, N.Y.
 Leckie, Prof. G. G., Pinegrove Road, Roswell, Ga.
 Ledden, Prof. Joseph E., Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.
 Leidecker, Prof. Kurt, Mary Washington College, Fredericksburg, Va.
 Leighton, Prof. J. A., 817 Oxford St., Worthington, Ohio
 Lenzen, Prof. V. F., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Leonard, Prof. Henry S., Duke University, Durham, N.C.
 Lepley, Prof. Ray, Bradley University, Peoria, Ill.
 Levi, Dr. Albert W., Black Mountain College, Black Mountain, N.C.
 Levinson, Prof. Ronald B., University of Maine, Orono, Me.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Levy, Dr. Beryl H., 15 Charlton St., New York 14, N.Y.
 Lewis, Prof. Clarence I., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Leys, Dean Wayne A. R., Roosevelt College, 430 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago 5, Ill.
 Liddell, Prof. A. Forbes, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla.
 Linsky, Prof. Leonard, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Litman, Dr. Alexander, 80-11 189th St., Jamaica, L.I., N.Y.
 Locke, Prof. Alain Leroy, 1326 R Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
 Lodge, Prof. R. C., 132 Earl St., Kingston, Ont., Can.
 Loemker, Prof. Leroy E., Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.
 Loewenberg, Prof. J., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Loftus, Prof. Arthur A., Iona College, New Rochelle, N.Y.
 Long, Prof. Marcus, University of Toronto, Toronto, Can.
 Long, Prof. W. H., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Lossky, Dr. N., 31 Everit St., New Haven, Conn.
 Lovejoy, Prof. A. O., 827 Park Ave., Baltimore, Md.
 Lowe, Prof. Victor, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
 Lowinger, Dr. Armand, 311 Carlton Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Löwith, Prof. Karl, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Conn.
 Lucas, Prof. Martha B., Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Va.
 Lynch, Dr. Jarmon A., 1456 W. 91st Pl., Los Angeles 44, Calif.
 Lynd, Dr. Helen Merrell, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville 8, N.Y.
 Lyon, Prof. Quinter M., University of Mississippi, University, Miss.
 McAllister, Prof. Winston K., Howard University, Washington 1, D.C.
 McCall, Prof. Raymond J., 123 South Bay Ave., Freeport, N.Y.
 McCarthy, Dr. John W., 144 E. 74th St., New York 21, N.Y.
 McClure, Dean M. T., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 McConnell, Bishop Francis J., 1219 S. W. Taylor, Portland 5, Ore.
 McCracken, Prof. Anna, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.
 McElroy, Dr. Howard C., 1116 Craig St., McKeesport, Pa.
 McEwen, Pres. Robert Ward, Hamilton College, Clinton, N.Y.
 McEwen, Prof. William P., Hofstra College, Hempstead, L.I., N.Y.
 McGary, Prof. J. Keith, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.
 McGill, Prof. V. J., Hunter College, New York, N.Y.
 McGilvary, Prof. E. B., 1920 Arlington Pl., Madison, Wis.
 McGinnis, Prof. Raymond R., St. Mary of the Woods, Ind.
 McGreal, Prof. Ian, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
 McKeon, Prof. Charles, Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vt.
 McKeon, Prof. Richard, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 McKown, Dean Edgar Monroe, Evansville College, Evansville, Ind.
 McLarty, Dr. Furman Gordon, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
 McMurrin, Prof. Sterling M., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
 McWilliams, Prof. J. A., St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.
 MacGowan, Prof. Robert, Florida Southern College, Lakeland, Fla.
 Mach, Prof. Robert, Connecticut College, New London, Conn.
 Macintosh, Prof. Douglas C., 25 Woodlawn St., Hamden, Conn.
 Mackay, Prof. Donald S., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 MacLennan, Prof. Roderick, McGill University, Montreal, Can.
 Madden, Prof. Arthur G., Mount St. Agnes College, Baltimore 9, Md.
 Magid, Dr. Henry M., College of the City of New York, New York, N.Y.
 Mahan, Prof. W. B., Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.
 Malcolm, Prof. Norman, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Mallett, Prof. Marcus B., 27 University Circle, Charlottesville, Va.
 Manasse, Dr. Ernest M., North Carolina College for Negroes, Durham, N.C.
 Mandelbaum, Prof. Maurice H., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.
 Manry, Prof. James C., Forman College, Lahore, West Pakistan, India
 Marck, Prof. Siegfried, Roosevelt College, 430 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago 5, Ill.
 Marcus, Dr. Ruth B., 5641 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.
 Marcuse, Dr. Herbert, 4609 Chevy Chase Blvd., Washington 15, D.C.

PROCEEDINGS

- Margolius, Dr. Hans, 624 Southwest 14th Ave., Miami 35, Fla.
 Marhenke, Prof. Paul, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Martain, Prof. Jacques, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
 Marlatt, Prof. Earl, School of Religion, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.
 Marsh, Prof. Robert, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Marshall, Prof. Donald K., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.
 Marshall, Prof. John S., University of the South, Seawee, Tenn.
 Marti, Prof. Fritz, Lower Salem, Ohio
 Martin, Prof. Herbert, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
 Martin, Prof. Richard Milton, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Martin, Prof. William Oliver, Rhode Island State College, Kingston, R.I.
 Marvin, Prof. Edwin L., Montana State Univ., Missoula, Mont.
 Maslow, Prof. Alexander P., University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Can.
 Mason, Dr. Gariel R., Abraham Lincoln High School, Ocean Parkway & West Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Mason, Prof. M. Phillips, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine
 Mates, Dr. Benson, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
 Mauzey, Prof. Jesse V., Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, N.Y.
 Maxon, Prof. Calvin H., 111 S. Lucas St., Iowa City, Iowa
 Mayer, Prof. Fred, University of Redlands, Redlands, Calif.
 Mead, Prof. Hunter, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena 4, Calif.
 Means, Dr. Blanchard W., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.
 Means, Prof. Paul B., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
 Meier, Dr. Frederick W., P. O. Box 642, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La.
 Meiklejohn, Prof. Alexander, 1525 La Loma Avenue, Berkeley, Calif.
 Melden, Prof. A. I., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Melvin, Prof. Georgiana, Mills College, Calif.
 Melzer, Prof. John Henry, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.
 Mendoza, Dr. Angelica, 130 W. 12th St., New York 11, N.Y.
 Mercier, Prof. Louis J. A., 3364 Tennyson Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
 Merlan, Prof. Phillip, Scripps College, Claremont, Calif.
 Metzger, Dr. Arnold, Simmons College, Boston 15, Mass.
 Meyerson, Dr. Helen C., 29 Washington Square West, New York 11, N.Y.
 Millard, Mr. Richard Marion, Jr., Hofstra College, Hempstead, N.Y.
 Miller, Prof. Allen Ott, Eden Theological Seminary, Webster Groves, Mo.
 Miller, Prof. Cecil H., Kansas State College, Manhattan, Kan.
 Miller, Prof. David L., University of Texas, Austin, Tex.
 Miller, Dr. Dickinson S., 95 Pinckney St., Boston, Mass.
 Miller, Prof. Hugh, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Miller, Prof. James W., College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.
 Miller, Prof. Robert H., Manchester College, North Manchester, Ind.
 Millner, Dr. Simon, 502 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.
 Minor, Prof. William S., West Virginia University, Morgantown, W.Va.
 Mitchell, Prof. E. T., University of Texas, Austin, Tex.
 Mitchell, Prof. Wilfred M., College of the Pacific, Stockton 27, Calif.
 Mitrany, Prof. David, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.
 Montague, Prof. W. P., Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Moody, Dr. Ernest A., 50 Woodside Dr., Greenwich, Conn.
 Moore, Prof. Asher Martin, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 Moore, Prof. Charles A., University of Hawaii, Honolulu 10, Hawaii
 Moore, Pres. Dale H., Cedar Crest College, Allentown, Pa.
 Moore, Dr. E. C., University of California, Los Angeles 24, Calif.
 Moore, Prof. Edward Carter, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
 Moore, Prof. Jared S., Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
 Moore, Prof. John M., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 Moore, Prof. Kate Gordon, 516 Woodruff Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Moore, Dean Meritt H., Knox College, Galesburg, Ill.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Moore, Prof. Stanley, Reed College, Portland 2, Ore.
 Moore, Prof. Willis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn.
 Morgan, Dr. Barbara S., 840 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
 Morgan, Prof. Douglas N., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 Morgan, Prof. George Allen, Jr., Foreign Service Mail Dept., Dept. of State, Washington 25, D.C.
 Morgan, Dr. Morris J., Iowa Wesleyan College, Mt. Pleasant, Iowa
 Morgan, Prof. W. J., Washburn College, Topeka, Kan.
 Morgan, Pres. William S., 1683 La Loma Ave., Berkeley, Calif.
 Morris, Prof. Bertram, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
 Morris, Prof. Charles W., University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Morris, Prof. David J., University of Illinois, Navy Pier Division, Chicago 11, Ill.
 Morris, Prof. Frank E., Connecticut College, New London, Conn.
 Morrow, Dean Glenn R., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Mothershead, Prof. John L., Jr., Stanford University, Calif.
 Mourant, Prof. John A., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
 Mulder, Dean Walter G., 72 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston 8, Mass.
 Mueller, Prof. Gustav, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.
 Mulherin, Father W. A., Loyola University, New Orleans, La.
 Mullaney, Prof. James V., Manhattan College, New York 63, N.Y.
 Munitz, Prof. Milton K., Washington Square College, New York University, New York, N.Y.
 Munro, Prof. Thomas, Museum of Art, Cleveland, Ohio
 Murphy, Prof. Arthur E., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Murray, Prof. Michael V., Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis.
 Myers, Dean Edward D., 455 High Street, Salem, Va.
 Myers, Prof. Orvil, Los Angeles City College, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Myerson, Dr. Helen C., 29 Washington Square W, New York 11, N.Y.
- Nagel, Prof. Ernest, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Nahm, Prof. Milton C., Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Nason, Pres. John W., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 Nathanson, Mr. Jerome, 2 W. 64th St., New York 23, N.Y.
 Negley, Prof. Glenn R., Duke University, Durham, N.C.
 Nelson, Prof. Everett J., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Nelson, Prof. Ralph W., Phillips University, Enid, Okla.
 Newhall, Dr. Jeannette E., Andover Harvard Theological Library, Francis Avenue, Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Newlin, Prof. W. J., Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
 Neyer, Prof. Joseph, 144 E. 24th St., New York 10, N.Y.
 Nicholson, Prof. J. A., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Nicol, Prof. Carl C. W., Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio
 Niebuhr, Prof. H. Richard, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Nielsen, Prof. Maurice, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio
 Nietmann, Prof. William D., College of the Pacific, Stockton, Calif.
 Nikander, Prof. Viljo K., 5 Wagner College Rd., Staten Island 1, N.Y.
 Nikhilananda, Swami, 17 E. 94th St., New York 28, N.Y.
 Nilson, Dr. Sven, Treeland, Huckleberry Hill Road, Unionville, R.F.D., Conn.
 Norborg, Dr. Christopher Sverre, 2614 N. Kedzel Blvd., Chicago 47, Ill.
 Norris, Prof. Louis William, DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 Northrop, Prof. F. S. C., Silliman College, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Norton, Prof. William J., Jr., 206 Hale Street, New Brunswick, N.J.
 Nurnberger, Reverend Lothar L., Jesuit Seminary, 403 Wellington, West Toronto 2b, Can.
- O'Brien, Reverend John A., Boston College, Chestnut Hill 67, Mass.
 Oliver, Prof. Donald, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Olsen, Prof. Stanley L., Augustana College, Sioux Falls, S.D.
 O'Meara, Prof. William, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
 Organ, Prof. Troy, Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh, Pa.

PROCEEDINGS

- Osborne, Prof. C. P., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.
 Otto, Prof. M. C., Dale Heights, R.F.D. 2, Madison 5, Wis.
 Overstreet, Prof. Harry A., 445 Riverside Dr., New York 27, N.Y.
 Owen, Prof. Margaret D., 52 E. 91st St., New York, N.Y.
- Pap, Prof. Arthur, College of the City of New York, New York, N.Y.
 Pape, Prof. L. M., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
 Parkhurst, Prof. Helen H., Barnard College, New York, N.Y.
 Parsons, Prof. Howard Lee, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn.
 Patrick, Prof. G. T. W., 1440 California Ave., Palo Alto, Calif.
 Patterson, Prof. Charles H., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Patterson, Dr. Robert Leet, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
 Payne, Prof. Wilfred, Municipal University of Omaha, Omaha, Neb.
 Pegis, Prof. Anton C., Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, Can.
 Pell, Prof. Orlie A. H., 27 E. 94th St., New York, N.Y.
 Pennepacker, Prof. Joseph Scott, Iowa Wesleyan College, Mt. Pleasant, Iowa
 Penrose, Prof. Stephen B. L., Jr., 50 W. 50th St., New York, N.Y.
 Pepper, Prof. S. C., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Pérez-Marchand, Prof. Monelisa, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, P.R.
 Perry, Prof. Charner, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Perry, Prof. Ralph B., 445 Widener Library, Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Perry, Prof. Reginald C., Oklahoma A. & M. College, Stillwater, Okla.
 Peterson, Dr. Huston, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.
 Pfeiffer, Prof. Frederick L., 2351 Chilcombe Ave., St. Paul, Minn.
 Pfeutze, Prof. Paul E., University of Georgia, Athens, Ga.
 Phillips, Prof. Bernard, University of Delaware, Newark, Del.
 Phillips, Prof. Herbert J., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Piatt, Prof. D. A., University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Picard, Prof. Maurice, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.
 Pingel, Prof. Martha M., 1202 Dickinson Ave., Greenville, N.C.
 Piper, Prof. Raymond F., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Plantinga, Prof. Cornelius A., Jamestown College, Jamestown, N.D.
 Pollock, Prof. Robert, Fordham University, New York, N.Y.
 Popkin, Dr. Richard Henry, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
 Porteous, Prof. A. J. D., 3 Kingsmead Road, North, Birkenhead, Cheshire, Eng.
 Portnoy, Dr. Julius, Brooklyn College, Bedford Avenue and Avenue H, Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Potter, Prof. Frank F., The College of Washington, Pullman, Wash.
 Potter, Miss Jean, Wells College, Aurora-on-Cayuga, Aurora, N.Y.
 Pott, Pres. W. S. A., Elmira College, Elmira, N.Y.
 Powell, Prof. Elmer E., 208 E. High St., Oxford, Ohio
 Price, Prof. Kingsley, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, N.Y.
 Prins, Prof. Tunis, University of Denver, Denver, Colo.
 Proctor, Prof. Thomas Hayes, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
 Pyle, Prof. C. B., Kansas State Teachers College, Pittsburg, Kan.
- Queener, Prof. E. Llewellyn, Southwestern University, Memphis, Tenn.
 Quine, Dr. Willard V., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Quillian, Prof. William F., Jr., Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio
- Rader, Prof. Melvin, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Ramsdell, Prof. Edward T., Vanderbilt University School of Religion, Nashville, Tenn.
 Ramsden, Dr. Raymond, State Teachers College, Oshkosh, Wis.
 Ramsperger, Prof. A. G., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
 Randall, Prof. J. H., Jr., Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Rathbun, Miss Constance, 15 Benton St., Wellesley, Mass.
 Ratner, Dr. Joseph, 468 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y.
 Raup, Prof. R. Bruce, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Read, Prof. Waldemar P., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
 Reese, Prof. William, 722 Fort Des Moines, Des Moines, Iowa

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Regerster, Prof. J. D., College of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Wash.
 Reichenbach, Prof. Hans, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Reid, Prof. John R., Stanford University, Calif.
 Reinhardt, Prof. Kurt F., Stanford University, Calif.
 Rein'l, Prof. L. C., Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La.
 Reis, Prof. Lincoln, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.
 Reiser, Prof. Oliver L., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
 Reither, Prof. W. H., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
 Remsberg, Prof. Robert G., Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio
 Reynolds, Prof. Paul A., Maple Shade Road, Middletown, Conn.
 Rice, Prof. Philip B., Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio
 Rich, Dr. Gertrude V. B., Barnard College, New York, N.Y.
 Richards, Prof. William A., Upper Iowa University, Fayette, Iowa
 Richardson, Prof. N. E., Jr., Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pa.
 Richter, Prof. Werner, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pa.
 Riesen, Prof. E. R., University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz.
 Rieser, Dr. Max, 519 W. 121st St., New York, N.Y.
 Riezler, Dr. Kurt, 270 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y.
 Riley, Prof. Bruce T., Youngstown College, Youngstown, Ohio
 Rist, Professor Martin, The Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colo.
 Roback, Dr. A. A., 8 Prescott Street, Cambridge, Mass.
 Robbins, Mr. Reginald C., Box 1140, Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Roberts, Prof. David E., Union Theological Seminary, Broadway at 120th St., New York, N.Y.
 Robins, Prof. Sidney S., 414 N. Pleasant St., Amherst, Mass.
 Robinson, Prof. Daniel S., University of Southern California, Los Angeles 7, Calif.
 Robinson, Prof. Edward S., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.
 Robinson, Prof. Elmo A., San Jose State College, San Jose, Calif.
 Robson, Prof. J. W., University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Roelofs, Prof. Howard D., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
 Roemer, Prof. William Francis, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.
 Rogers, Mr. Donald, 2080 N. Decatur Road, N.E., Atlanta, Ga.
 Rohrbaugh, Prof. L. G., Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.
 Rolbiecki, Prof. John J., Catholic University, Washington, D.C.
 Romanell, Prof. P., Wells College, Aurora-on-Cayuga, N.Y.
 Rome, Dr. Sydney, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.
 Rosán, Dr. Laurence J., 111 So. Allen St., State College, Pa.
 Rose, Dr. Grace L., Wheaton College, Norton, Mass.
 Rosenstock-Huussy, Prof. Eugene, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.
 Ross, Prof. Gordon, Berea College, Berea, Ky.
 Ross, Dr. Ralph Gilvert, Division of General Education, New York University, New York, N.Y.
 Rossinger, Dr. Kurt E., 314 N. George Mason Dr., Arlington, Va.
 Roth, Prof. Joseph M., College of Mines and Metallurgy, El Paso, Tex.
 Roth, Prof. Robert Paul, Augustana College, Rock Island, Ill.
 Rougier, Prof. Louis, 270 Riverside Dr., New York, N.Y.
 Ruby, Prof. Lionel, Roosevelt College, 430 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago 5, Ill.
 Ruddick, Prof. C. T., Lake Erie College, Painesville, Ohio
 Rudner, Prof. Richard, Washington University, St. Louis 5, Mo.
 Rujá, Dr. Harry, San Diego State College, San Diego 5, Calif.
 Rusk, Dr. George Y., 110 Elmwood Rd., Baltimore 10, Md.
 Rynin, Prof. David, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
- Sabine, Prof. George H., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Sabin-Smith, Prof. Ethel, Mills College, Calif.
 Sahakian, Prof. William S., Washington Street, West Boxford, Mass.
 Sait, Prof. Una B., 272 Marmona Drive, Palo Alto, Calif.
 Salmon, Dr. Christopher V., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.

PROCEEDINGS

- Sampson, Prof. Floyd Luman, University of Denver, Denver, Colo.
 Sanborn, Prof. Herbert C., "Isartal," Brentwood, Tenn.
 Sander, Major H. J., 1010 Sycamore St., Falls Church, Va.
 Savery, Prof. Barnett, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Can.
 Savides, Prof. A. P., 182 Allerton Rd., Newton Highlands, Mass.
 Sayre, Prof. Woodrow Wilson, Pomona College, Claremont, Calif.
 Scarborough, Pres. William John, West Virginia Wesleyan College, Buckhannon, W. Va.
 Schaeffer, Prof. Klaus, Alma College, Alma, Mich.
 Scharfstein, Dr. Ben-Ami, 310 W. 105th St., New York 25, N.Y.
 Schaub, Prof. E. L., Frankfort, Mich.
 Scherich, Prof. Millard, A. & M. College, Stillwater, Okla.
 Schilling, Prof. S. Paul, Westminster Theological Seminary, Westminster, Md.
 Schilpp, Prof. P. A., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 Schipper, Mrs. Edith, 826 S.W. 1st Ave., Miami, Fla.
 Schipper, Prof. Gerrit J., 826 S.W. 1st Ave., Miami, Fla.
 Schlabach, Prof. Anne V., Bennington College, Bennington, Vt.
 Schlaretzki, Prof. W. E., Oklahoma A. and M. College, Stillwater, Okla.
 Schmidt, Prof. Karl, Tamworth, N.H.
 Schneider, Prof. Herbert W., Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Schott, Dr. Herman, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Schrecker, Prof. Paul, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Schrickel, Prof. Harry G., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Schuetz, Dr. Alfred, 25 W. 81st Street, New York, N.Y.
 Schuhmann, Prof. Alfred, Farragut College, Farragut, Idaho
 Schwarz, Prof. Balduin Victor, 448 Central Park West, New York 25, N.Y.
 Scoon, Prof. Robert M., Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
 Scott-Craig, Prof. Thomas S. K., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.
 Scudder, Prof. Delton Lewis, 157 Florida Court, Gainesville, Fla.
 Searles, Prof. H. L., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Sears, Prof. Lawrence, Mills College, Oakland, Calif.
 Seelye, Prof. Laurens Hickok, Robert College, Istanbul, Turkey
 Sellars, Prof. R. W., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Sellars, Prof. Wilfrid Stalker, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Sellen, Prof. Arthur G., Washburn College, Topeka, Kan.
 Selsam, Dr. Howard, Jefferson School of Social Science, 575 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y.
 Settle, Dr. Edwin T., Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa
 Shafer, Prof. Robert, Graduate School, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
 Sharrard, Prof. J. A., University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Sask., Can.
 Sharvy, Prof. Robert, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Ill.
 Shaw, Prof. C. G., New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.
 Shaw, Dr. Mary, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Shearer, Prof. Edna A., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Scheffer, Prof. H. M., Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Shein, Dean Louis, Woodville, Ontario, Can.
 Sheldon, Prof. W. H., 169 Bishop St., New Haven, Conn.
 Sheriff, Prof. Wilbur S., 210 Vine St., Johnstown, Pa.
 Sherman, Prof. C. L., Williamette University, Salem, Ore.
 Shimer, Dr. William A., University of Hawaii, Honolulu 10, T.H.
 Shirk, Miss Evelyn Urban, Hofstra College, Hempstead, L.I., N.Y.
 Shute, Prof. Clarence, Lake Erie College, Painesville, Ohio
 Sibley, Prof. William M., University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Man., Can.
 Silverman, Prof. Hirsch L., 126 Milford Ave., Newark 8, N.J.
 Simkovitch, Prof. Vladimir, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Simon, Prof. Yves, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.
 Singer, Prof. Edgar A., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Singer, Dr. Milton B., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Sisson, Prof. E. O., P. O. Box 1774, Carmel, Calif.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Sloane, Prof. Eugene H., St. John's College, Annapolis, Md.
 Slonimsky, Dr. Henry, 40 W. 68th St., New York, N.Y.
 Smart, Prof. Harold R., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Smith, Prof. Don, Ripon College, Ripon, Wis.
 Smith, Prof. Gerald, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis.
 Smith, Dr. H. Jeffery, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif.
 Smith, Prof. Huston, Washington University, St. Louis 5, Mo.
 Smith, Dr. James Ward, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
 Smith, Prof. John E., Barnard College, Columbia University, New York 27, N.Y.
 Smith, Prof. John Milton, Fort Valley State College, Fort Valley, Ga.
 Smith, Prof. Ignatius, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.
 Smith, Prof. T. V., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Smullyan, Prof. Arthur, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
 Snow, Dr. Adolph J., 1320 Ashland Avenue, Wilmette, Ill.
 Solmsen, Prof. Friedrich, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Somerville, Dr. John, Hunter College, New York, N.Y.
 Soto, Prof. Juan B., University of Puerto Rico, San Juan, P.R.
 Speight, Dean H. E. B., Elmira College, Elmira, N.Y.
 Spencer, Prof. Margaret N., Miami University, Oxford, Ohio
 Spencer, Prof. W. Wylie, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio
 Spiegelberg, Dr. Frederic, 135 Harriet Avenue, Palo Alto, Calif.
 Spiegelberg, Dr. Herbert, Lawrence College, Appleton, Wis.
 Stace, Prof. Walter T., Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
 Stalknecht, Prof. Newton P., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Stalnaker, Dean Luther W., Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa
 Stearns, Prof. Isabel, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Steere, Prof. Douglas V., Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.
 Steiger, Prof. Henry W., 619 S. Lincoln Ave., Bloomington, Ind.
 Stephens, Prof. I. K., Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.
 Stephens, Prof. Robert G., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Stevenson, Prof. Charles L., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Stewart, Prof. Malcolm F., Illinois College, Jacksonville, Ill.
 Stine, Prof. Russell W., Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pa.
 Stob, Prof. Henry J., Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Mich.
 Stokes, Dr. Ella H., William Penn College, Oskaloosa, Iowa
 Stokes, Prof. Mack B., Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.
 Stone, Prof. Wendell C., Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla.
 Stoops, Prof. J. D., Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa
 Storer, Dr. Morris B., Humanities Division, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
 Storer, Prof. Thomas F., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Storrs, Dr. Margaret, 66 Massasoit Street, Northampton, Mass.
 Strauss, Prof. Leo, Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, 66 W. 12th Street, New York 11, N.Y.
 Strong, Prof. E. W., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Stuart, Prof. Henry W., P. O. Box 1943, Carmel, Calif.
 Stuurman, Prof. Douwe, Santa Barbara College, Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Sullivan, Prof. C. J., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.
 Swabey, Prof. Marie Collins, New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.
 Swabey, Prof. W. Curtis, New York University, University Heights, New York, N.Y.
 Swift, Professor R. F., Beloit College, Beloit, Wis.
 Szathmary, Dr. Arthur, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
 Tausch, Dr. C. F., St. Louis University, St. Louis 3, Mo.
 Talbert, Prof. Ernest L., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
 Talbot, Prof. Ellen B., Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.
 Taylor, Pres. Harold, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, N.Y.

PROCEEDINGS

Tecoz, Dr. Henri Francois, Huevelhowe, Den Dolder, Netherlands
 Temple, Sr. Sydney A., Jr., Episcopal Pacifist Fellowship, Essex, Conn.
 ten Hoor, Dean Marten, 4 Forest Lake Dr., Tuscaloosa, Ala.
 Tenney, Prof. Charles D., Southern Illinois Normal University, Carbondale, Ill.
 Tenney, Prof. E. V., Fresno State College, Fresno, Calif.
 Thalheimer, Dr. Alvin, American Trading and Production Corp., American Building, Baltimore, Md.
 Thalheimer, Dr. Ross, 4568 Spuyten Duyvel Parkway, New York, N.Y.
 Thomas, Dr. Francis A., Wilberforce University, Wilberforce, Ohio
 Thomas, Prof. George F., Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
 Thomas, Prof. Wendell, Celo, N.C.
 Thompson, Prof. Golden O., Western Union College, LeMars, Iowa
 Thompson, Prof. Hugo W., 1165 Lincoln Ave., St. Paul, Minn.
 Thompson, Prof. M. K., 11 S. Summit Street, Ypsilanti, Mich.
 Thompson, Dr. Manley H., Jr., University of Toronto, Toronto 5, Can.
 Thompson, Prof. R. C., University of Nevada, Reno, Nev.
 Thompson, Prof. Samuel, Monmouth College, Monmouth, Ill.
 Thomte, Prof. Reidar, Concordia College, Moorhead, Minn.
 Thorndike, Prof. E. L., Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Tilley, Prof. Ethel, Brenau College, Gainesville, Ga.
 Tillich, Prof. Paul, Union Theological Seminary, New York, N.Y.
 Titus, Prof. Harold H., Denison University, Granville, Ohio
 Toll, Prof. C. H., Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
 Tomas, Prof. Vincent Anthony, Brown University, Providence, R.I.
 Tornay, Dr. Stephen, 16—18th Place, Long Beach 3, Calif.
 Tower, Prof. C. V., Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pa.
 Trap, Prof. William M., Wayne University, Detroit, Mich.
 Trivers, Dr. Howard, 524 Maple Ridge Rd., Bethesda, Md.
 Trueblood, Prof. D. Elton, Earlham College, Richmond, Ind.
 Tsanoff, Prof. R. A., The Rice Institute, Houston, Tex.
 Tufts, Dr. Mathilde Castro, 1600 State Street, Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Turner, Prof. Herbert S., Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, Va.
 Turner, Prof. John Pickett, 430 W. 116th St., New York 27, N.Y.
 Turquette, Dr. Atwell R., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Tuttle, Prof. John R., Elmira College, Elmira, N.Y.
 Tuttle, Prof. Tom Hollingsworth, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio

Urban, Prof. Wilbur M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Ushenko, Prof. A. P., 120 Prospect Ave., Princeton, N.J.

Vander Lugt, Pres. G. T., Central College, Pella, Iowa
 Vander Lugt, Prof. William, Central College, Pella, Iowa
 Van Saun, Prof. Walter, Hope College, Holland, Mich.
 Van Tuinen, Prof. Jacob, Carroll College, Waukesha, Wis.
 Veatch, Dr. H., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Venable, Prof. Vernon, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
 Vibbert, Prof. Charles B., 1710 Hermitage Rd., Ann Arbor, Mich.
 Virtue, Prof. Charles F., University of Maine, Orono, Me.
 Vivas, Prof. Eliseo, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
 Vlastos, Prof. Gregory, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 von Hildebrand, Prof. Dietrich, 448 Central Park W., New York, N.Y.
 Vonk, Prof. Paul Kenneth, 860 N.W. 13th Court, Miami, Fla.

Wahl, Prof. Jean, 1551 E. 65th St., Chicago, Ill.
 Walcott, Prof. G. D., Long Island University, Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Walker, Dean Edwin R., Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla.
 Wallraff, Dr. Charles Frederic, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz.
 Walsh, Prof. Daniel C., 112 Haven Avenue, New York, N.Y.
 Walsh, Prof. Dorothy, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Walton, Dr. William M., 109 Linsly Hall, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Warbeke, Prof. John M., Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.
 Ward, Prof. F. Champion, 5302 Blackstone Ave., Chicago 15, Ill.
 Ward, Prof. Leo R., Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, Ind.
 Ward, Prof. Paul W., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Warren, Dr. Roland L., Alfred University, Alfred, N.Y.
 Warren, Prof. W. P., Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa.
 Warren, Dean William M., 28 Hamilton Rd., Brookline, Mass.
 Watson, Prof. A. C., Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio
 Watson, Prof. George H., University of Southern California, Los Angeles 7, Calif.
 Weaver, Prof. Paul, Stephens College, Columbia, Mo.
 Weber, Dr. Alden O., 252 First Street, Osawatomie, Kan.
 Weber, Prof. Anna Margaret, St. Lawrence University, Canton, N.Y.
 Weed, Prof. Charles A., Alderson-Broaddus College, Philippi, W.Va.
 Weedon, Dr. William Stone, University P. O. Box 1746, Charlottesville, Va.
 Weinberg, Prof. Julius, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wis.
 Weinreich, Dr. Marcel, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, P.R.
 Weiss, Dr. Charles, 2205 Davidson Avenue, Bronx 53, New York, N.Y.
 Weiss, Prof. Paul, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Weitz, Prof. Morris, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
 Welch, Dr. Livingston, Hunter College, New York, N.Y.
 Weld, Dr. Hiram C., Elm Park Church, Scranton 10, Pa.
 Wellmuth, Prof. John J., S.J., Xavier University, Cincinnati 7, Ohio
 Wells, Prof. John M., Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, Mich.
 Wells, Dr. Rulon, 445 Orange Street, New Haven, Conn.
 Wells, Prof. Wesley R., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Welsh, Prof. Paul, Box 6793 College Station, Durham, N.C.
 Wenrick, Prof. John E., Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio
 Werkmeister, Prof. W. H., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
 Weyer, Dean Edward M., 49 S. College St., Washington, Pa.
 Wheelwright, Prof. Philip E., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.
 Whitchurch, Dean Irl Goldwin, Kingfield, Me.
 White, Dr. Morton G., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 White, Prof. Stephen S., 4941 Tracy Ave., Kansas City 4, Mo.
 Whitman, Prof. Mary, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y.
 Wick, Prof. Warner Arms, 304 Swift Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Widgery, Prof. Alban G., Duke University, Durham, N.C.
 Wiederhold, Dr. Albert George, 305 Melville Ave., Palo Alto, Calif.
 Wieman, Prof. Henry N., Star Route 76512, Wrightwood, Calif.
 Wiener, Prof. Philip P., 192 Coligni Ave., New Rochelle, N.Y.
 Wienpahl, Prof. Paul D., Santa Barbara State College, Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Wiggins, Dr. Forrest Oran, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Wild, Prof. John, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Will, Prof. Frederick L., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Williams, Prof. D. C., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Williams, Prof. Daniel D., Chicago Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill.
 Williams, Prof. Gardner, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio
 Williams, Prof. Milton, Syracuse University, Syracuse 10, N.Y.
 Williams, Prof. S. P., Lake Forest University, Lake Forest, Ill.
 Williamson, Prof. Mary, Hollins College, Hollins, Va.
 Wilson, Prof. H. Van Rensselaer, 2711 Avenue K, Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Wilson, Dr. Mabel Virginia, 205 Cayuga Heights Rd., Ithaca, N.Y.
 Wind, Prof. Edgar, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Winn, Dr. Ralph B., 265 Wilson Avenue, Long Beach, N.J.
 Wolf, Prof. Lawrence A., St. Paul Seminary, St. Paul, Minn.
 Wolfson, Prof. Harry A., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 Wolz, Dr. Henry G., 118 W. 104th St., New York 25, N.Y.
 Wood, Prof. Ledger, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
 Woods, Mrs. James K., 9 Denton Road, W., Wellesley, Mass.
 Wright, Prof. H. W., University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Man., Can.
 Wright, Prof. William K., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.

PROCEEDINGS

Yalden-Thomson, Dr. D. C., 446 Argyle Avenue, Westmount, Quebec, Can.
 Yost, Dr. Robert M., Jr., University of California, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Young, Prof. Frederic Harold, 77 Edgemont Rd., Upper Montclair, N.J.
 Young, Prof. Warren Cameron, 3040 W. Washington Blvd., Chicago 12, Ill.

Zerby, Dr. Lewis, Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich.
 Ziegler, Prof. Howard J. B., Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa.
 Zink, Dr. Sidney, 5462 Cornell Ave., Chicago, Ill.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS

Adamson, Mr. Robert W., 2 Ridgely Court, Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Bakan, Miss Mildred Blynn, Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio
 Baskfield, Prof. Gerald T., St. Paul Seminary, St. Paul, Minn.
 Bohnert, Mr. Herbert G., 43-20—162 Street, Flushing, N.Y.
 Bradley, Dr. J. Harold, 138 S. Camden Drive, Beverly Hills, Calif.
 Brockway, Mr. Fred A., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
 Burroughs, Miss Josephine, Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio
 Burton, Mr. Charles, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
 Callaghan, Mr. William J., 151-09—33d Ave., Flushing, N.Y.
 Carroll, Mr. Newton L., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
 Chrakian, Prof. Elisha B., 83 Barnard Ave., Watertown 72, Mass.
 Cooley, Mr. Alan Ashton, 180 Appleton Ave., Pittsfield, Mass.
 Crockett, Mr. Campbell, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
 Cushen, Mr. Walter Edward, 1519 Virginia Ave., Hagerstown, Md.
 Denise, Mr. Theodore C., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Douglass, Pres. Paul F., American University, Washington, D.C.
 Dowdell, Dr. Victor L., Tivoli-on-Hudson, N.Y.
 Drake, Mr. Henry L., 215 East New York St., Indianapolis, Ind.
 Drake, Prof. Robert, 1130 Winfield Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio
 Eames, Mr. S. Morris, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Eaton, Mr. Cyrus, 2000 Terminal Tower, Cleveland 13, Ohio
 Ellis, Prof. Frederick E., Department of Education, Tufts College, Medford 55, Mass.
 Erdos, Dr. Leslie, 32-02 Sprayvion Avenue, Edgemere, L.I., N.Y.
 Esterling, Prof. Marion, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Everall, Dr. David, 498 Vernon St., San Francisco 12, Calif.
 Fahs, Dr. Charles B., The Rockefeller Foundation, 49 W. 49th St., New York 20, N.Y.
 Forkosch, Dr. Morris D., Brooklyn Law School, 375 Pearl St., Brooklyn 1, N.Y.
 Frank, Dr. Solomon, 911 Garfield St., Winnipeg, Man., Can.
 Goldenson, Dr. Robert, 545 W. 236th St., Riverdale, N.Y.
 Greenfield, Mr. Edward, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Greenman, Mr. Martin A., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Halverson, Dr. Wendell Q., Heidelberg College, Tiffin, Ohio
 Hamilton, Prof. Samuel M., State College, Ft. Hays, Kan.
 Harrington, Prof. John B., Lewis and Clark College, Portland 1, Ore.
 Hattersley, Prof. L. W., Pasadena Junior College, Pasadena, Calif.
 Hughes, Dr. W. Hardin, Pasadena Junior College, Pasadena, Calif.
 Johnson, Mrs. Dorothea Stats, 514 N. Prior Ave., Apt. 11, St. Paul, Minn.
 Johnstone, Mrs. Margery V. C., 68 South St., Williamstown, Mass.
 Kalish, Mr. Donald, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
 Kamiat, Mr. Arnold H., Hotel Martinique, New York, N.Y.
 Larre, Prof. Earl E., St. Ambrose College, Davenport, Iowa
 Leavens, Dr. R. F., 1900 Yosemite Rd., Berkeley, Calif.
 McLaren, Mr. Myron, 545 W. 148th St., New York 31, N.Y.
 MacDonald, Prof. Lauchlin D., University of Mississippi, University, Miss.
 MacLeod, Mr. William J., 1 Willard St., Ayer, Mass.
 Mattern, Dr. Charles D., Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pa.
 Maziarz, Prof. Edward Anthony, St. Joseph's College, Collegeville, Ind.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

- Mazouch, Mr. Charles H., 42 Buswell St., Boston 15, Mass.
 Merriam, Mr. Ralph, 19 S. LaSalle St., Chicago, Ill.
 Miller, Mr. Taylor Edward, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Moore, Mr. Elliott Russell, 311 Rich St., Syracuse, N.Y.
 Murphy, Prof. Clifford, University of Denver, Denver, Colo.
 Nations, Miss Caroline G., 7305 Pershing Ave., University City 5, Mo.
 Negley, Dr. Winfield E., Lewis and Clark College, Portland 1, Ore.
 Nolan, Prof. Hugh J., St. Paul Seminary, St. Paul, Minn.
 Oldfield, Col. Charles B., 1705 Bolling Ave., Norfolk 8, Va.
 Otto, Professor John A., St. Ambrose College, Davenport, Iowa
 Overholt, Mr. William A., 107 Fitzgerald St., Charleston, W.Va.
 Panush, Mr. Irving, 9603 N. Martindale, Detroit 7, Mich.
 Patterson, Prof. Floyd Merrill, Central College, Fayette, Mo.
 Patton, Mr. Carl, Jr., Box 1200, Station 1, Fayetteville, Ark.
 Perry, Mr. Orval, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Piest, Mr. Oskar, 121 W. 72nd St., New York, N.Y.
 Pollard, Prof. Hybert, Linfield College, McMinnville, Ore.
 Ramsden, Prof. Elizabeth G., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 Rau, Dr. Catherine, 2537 Dwight Way, Berkeley, Calif.
 Reese, Mr. H. Lawrence, Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio
 Reidenbach, Rev. Clarence, First Congregational Church, Oakland, Calif.
 Reinhardt, Mr. John F., 1212 Dierks Bldg., Kansas City, Mo.
 Richter, Mr. Peyton Elliott, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla.
 Rosenbaum, Mr. Ira, 47 Plaza Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Rosenfield, Dr. Leonora Cohen, 3600—38th Street, N.W., Washington 16, D.C.
 Schleich, Mr. Hugh Aber, Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio
 Schneider, Dean Edward, Lincoln University, 1101 Masonic Ave., San Francisco, Calif.
 Simpson, Prof. Kenneth, Santa Barbara College, Santa Barbara, Calif.
 Skulsky, Mr. Samuel, 415 Lefferts Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Sledz, Prof. Ladislaus S., St. Paul Seminary, St. Paul, Minn.
 Slot, Prof. J. Warren, Asbury College, Wilmore, Ky.
 Sonthoff, Mr. Herbert, 29 Harrison Ave., Northampton, Mass.
 Sprague, Mrs. Rosamond Kent, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Sprague, Mr. Wayne L., Multnomah College, Portland, Ore.
 Sternfeld, Mr. Robert, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Terrell, Mr. D. Burnham, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.
 Tiebaut, Prof. Harry, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
 Urban, Dean Percy L., Berkeley Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.
 Weinberg, Miss Yehuda L., American Preparatory School, 1214 Spruce St., Philadelphia, Pa.
 Wieman, Prof. Robert M., Oklahoma A. & M. College, Stillwater, Okla.
 Wilson, Dr. David H., "Brickends," Alfred, Me.
 Wohlstetter, Dr. Albert, 308 W. 106th St., New York, N.Y.

